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Abstract 
S implified forms of post-structuralism have recently been applied to the 
teaching of English in secondary schools in order to sanction multiple 
interpretations of a wider variety of texts, free students from slavishly adopting 
the evaluations of authorities, and encourage them to enjoy the interplay of 
contradictory and complementary readings. When linked to the purposes of 
political forms of criticism, this model of English is known as critical social 
literacy. 
However, in my view difficulties in the epistemological and ethical 
underpinnings of this post-structuralist literacy are often overlooked, rendering 
its political agenda less effective. To the extent that post-structuralism questions 
the referentiality of language and the agency of discursively determined 
subjects, it undermines the construction of morally autonomous persons. 
Furthermore, the vulgar relativism entailed by a naive promotion of cultural 
pluralism hinders the resolution of destructive conflicts of interest. A deeper 
problem arises if post-structuralism is seen as a nihilistic philosophy, denying 
the possibility of moral principles and valorising only the will-to-power. When 
this notion is combined with the world-view of popular scientific materialism - 
that of a hostile universe formed by random processes - students may suffer a 
crisis of hope. In response to this I outline a pedagogy which supports an ethical 
approach to ethical and political education through reading and discussing 
literature. 
Although post-structuralist ideas are vulnerable to particular criticisms, 
they offer insights into the limitations of discourse, textuality and agency which 
must be considered when devising an ethics to support the egalitarian aims of 
critical social literacy. However, more positive approaches to ethics, based on 
evolution, pragmatism and quantum mechanics, might also be incorporated in a 
new synthesis. Darwin's theory that organisms evolve through random variation 
and natural selection has been expanded and made more plausible by 
developments in mathematics and science, such as quantum mechanics, 
complexity theory, neuro-science and sociobiology. Popper's evolutionary 
epistemology supports the modest truth claims of the scientific method 
employed in these discourses, supplanting the more radical scepticism of post-
structuralist epistemologies. Borrowing Zygmunt Bauman's terms, I call this 
synthesis 'the ethics of disillusionment and re-enchantment', since it combines 
procedural scepticism with renewed confidence in agency, referentiality and the 
flourishing of life. I explore how these ideas make sense of the world as it is 
modelled in three novels suitable for senior secondary study - Conrad's Heart of 
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Darkness, Chambers' Breaktime, and Byatt's 'Morpho Eugenia'. I do not claim to 
articulate fully a new theory - rather, in sketching its salient features, I offer 
tentative foundations for ethics as a viable concern in literary studies and critical 
literacy teaching. 
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Introduction 
It is unfortunate that Derrida's technique of deconstruction is much easier to 
reproduce than his capacities as a philosopher. In the hands of Derrida's 
followers, deconstruction has all too often become a means of warding off any 
real encounter with alternative perspectives. All possible non-Post-structuralist 
arguments are defeated before they even get started, defeated by an effortless 
out-conscious-ing. Thus does an apparently liberating height of awareness turn 
into a very great closer of minds. (Richard Harland 1993: 221) 
Post-structuralist literary theories continue to have profound practical 
implications in university English departments and in my own profession as a 
teacher of English. It was with these implications in mind that I embarked upon 
this study, viewing both the theory and the practice from my dual perspective as 
a full-time teacher in charge of English from kindergarten to grade 12 in an 
independent school, and as a part-time postgraduate student in a university 
English department. The seeds of this study - if it is possible so to simplify its 
complex determinations - may be found in two events which occurred in 1991. 
The first was my attendance at the national conference of the Australian 
Association for the Teaching of English (AATE) in Brisbane, and the second 
was my appointment to a sub-committee charged with the task of developing a 
school-wide values education curriculum within the Hutchins School, Hobart. 
The conference focused on the claim by keynote speakers that texts, the 
acts of reading and teaching, and other social practices are constructed by forces 
largely beyond individual control. It was also claimed that the insights and 
methods of recent literary theories - such as Marxist and feminist criticism, 
combined with a form of deconstruction - could nevertheless liberate individual 
teachers and students from prevailing prejudices and discriminatory practices 
concerning gender, class and race. As I read in preparation for the conference 
and then attended lectures and workshops, my initial reaction was that the ideas 
being presented in the name of post-structuralism seemed simplistic, incoherent 
and ultimately nihilistic. Yet they were being promoted as relevant to English 
teaching by well qualified people who patiently attempted to explain their 
theories to willing but perplexed listeners like me. Accordingly I was provoked 
to study post-structuralism in greater depth, especially as the subtleties of the 
issues were clearly going to be of increasing importance in my profession. 
I was particularly concerned that teachers had too often been encouraged 
to adopt pedagogical practices based on principles which they had little time or 
inclination to study fully, and which the proponents - academics in teacher 
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training institutions, for whom such detailed study is their bread and butter - 
believed to be so important and urgent that they sometimes promoted them in 
simplified versions designed for immediate application in the classroom. 
Teachers had been invited to participate responsibly in such programs through 
'action research', yet often, in my view, prematurely and with insufficient 
understanding of just how contentious the issues were in the academy. After 
more than twenty years of teaching, and with a conservatism bred of hindsight, I 
was embarrassed that I and my colleagues had adopted elements of a number of 
new approaches - such as the individualistic liberal humanism of the personal 
growth model, the neo-Marxist agenda of media studies, and the genre theory 
program for literacy teaching based on functional linguistics - without an 
adequate grasp of their philosophy and practice. Clearly we ought to be more 
cautious, more genuinely responsible, more informed, more patient - in short, 
more ethical - in our attempts to redefine educational ends and means, yet 
without abandoning the enthusiasm for necessary improvements which teachers, 
students and the wider society require in order to tackle the future confidently. 
In this way teachers are confronted constantly with questions of value, 
both moral and otherwise. If 'How should we live?' is the fundamental question 
of ethics, then a subsequent question for educators is, 'What teaching methods 
will foster the kinds of life which we, the wider society and our children 
choose?' Ethical questions have always been inescapable in every area of life, 
but it is only in this post-structuralist phase of the twentieth century that ethical 
questions about the nature of texts and their inter-relationships with social and 
personal life have become urgent and divisive. The teaching methods which 
follow from these theories are an area of ideological practice which has been 
almost invisible in the current debate in university English departments. This 
idea was made more directly pertinent to my concerns about radical literary 
theory when it was drawn to my attention that an article had recently appeared 
in Quadrant in which David Parker (1990) raised serious questions about the 
implications of post-structuralism for ethical criticism, arguing for a return to 
ethics as a central concern of literary studies along lines proposed by the 
American philosopher Martha Nussbaum. (1989, 1990) Thus my desire to 
explore the relationship between ethics and theories of literary criticism took 
shape, driven by curiosity about these two philosophical topics and by concern 
for the ethics of my own professional conduct. 
The second event, my appointment to a values education sub-committee, 
required close questioning of the aims and practices of a large Anglican school 
for boys - arguably an ideal subject for deconstruction of the discriminatory 
ideologies of gender, class, race and religion which might lie repressed beneath 
8 
its façade of moral rectitude. Thus it also reminded me, on the one hand, of the 
way in which ethical concerns interpenetrate all the educational decisions which 
are made more or less consciously about the curriculum and co-curriculum, and 
wholly unconsciously about the 'hidden curriculum'; and, on the other hand, of 
the difficulty of finding a purely rational (as opposed to a broadly religious) 
foundation for the moral values which the school publicly espoused in its 
statement of aims and objectives. In this last matter the study of ethics in the 
Western philosophical tradition was taken as our guide, though of course the 
question of a rational foundation for morality remains vexed. 
A further problem occupied much of our preliminary work on the sub-
committee: that of indoctrination. A school which promotes a particular set of 
religious and moral values must surely be alert to the accusation of 
indoctrinating its students. Indeed, this is an accusation to which all schools, 
both state and independent, are vulnerable, although at least ours could claim 
that its values were clearly and publicly stated and that parents had a choice 
about whether or not their sons should be exposed to them. To further obviate 
the charge of indoctrination the sub-committee recommended that, whenever 
appropriate and possible, teachers should declare to students the school's 
position (if it had one) on the value in question, their own positions, and the fact 
that other views exist, in order to emphasise to the students their right and 
responsibility to make up their own minds. Nevertheless, while the school 
encourages its students to question all its religious and moral values, and can 
tolerate a variety of values expressed in the students' conduct, it has to 
acknowledge limits to its tolerance, for it simply cannot function if it allows its 
fundamental values to be consistently flouted. The conflict between the value of 
tolerance and that of maintaining a coherent and stable society for the well-
being of its inhabitants is a perennial problem for liberal, democratic, pluralist 
societies, yet it is merely typical of the moral dilemmas which ethics describes 
and seeks to clarify. Clearly the particular dilemma which I have just raised is 
one of many which frequently perplex the teacher of literature: are there limits 
to our tolerance of the expression of differing moral values by individuals 
through the texts which are created in, or selected for, the classroom? Should 
we, for example, remove from the library shelves picture books which contain 
stereotyped gender roles? 
Wrestling with such questions as they apply to the whole school 
curriculum, and especially to my own concerns as a student and teacher of 
literature, I became acutely aware of the need for an understanding of the nature 
of ethics itself, and of its intimate relationship to language, literature, criticism, 
creative writing and education - an understanding which will guide teachers and 
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students in making the moral judgements demanded by English studies in 
schools and universities. Inevitably, teaching - like the texts on which it 
selectively focuses - reflects the implicit moral values of each educational 
institution and its individual teachers. It is important, as I have indicated, to 
make those values explicit, and so open them up to the informed processes of 
public criticism by which a liberal democracy seeks to reform itself in the light 
of changing circumstances. I began to hope that, while pursuing a study of some 
aspects of ethics and criticism in the wake of post-structuralism, and reflecting 
on its implications for teaching, there might be opportunities to offer my 
insights and concerns on a larger stage. Then my professional colleagues, and 
perhaps members of the wider community which educational institutions serve, 
might participate in the important decisions which continually have to be made 
about the ends and means of education. Such decisions, especially those 
concerning ends, should not be left to academics and teachers alone. 
In the years that followed, from 1992 to 1995, I set myself the task of 
presenting papers at each of the AATE National Conferences and finally at the 
IFTE/NCTE conference in New York, exploring some of the ethical 
implications of post-structuralist literary theories for the teaching of literature 
and critical literacy, and advocating the re-instatement of ethics education as a 
central concern of English studies. The mood at some of these events was such 
that anyone adopting a cautious view of post-structuralism, no matter how 
carefully argued their case might be, found themselves marginalised by the 
exponents of a theory which purported to be the champion of the marginalised. 
Thus it became clear that post-structuralist literary theories were gaining the 
status of a new orthodoxy among English educationists, as well as in university 
English departments, and that anyone who had misgivings about aspects of this 
movement would need to adopt an open-minded and balanced approach, 
attempting to uncover the attractions and strengths of its ideas as well as their 
weaknesses. Indeed, this seemed to me not just politic, but also the only ethical 
way to proceed. 
There is no doubt that post-structuralist theories have indeed changed the 
face of English studies in university departments around the world, and have 
become increasingly influential in schools, whatever the status of these ideas in 
other disciplines. (For example they generally do not seem to be held in such 
high regard in Australian philosophy departments.) In this milieu teachers and 
critics are more concerned about the politics of literacy, and the role of language 
and literature in the oppression and liberation of disempowered groups through 
the interplay of multiple interpretations and modes of being, than they are about 
the ethical underpinnings of such political interests. Hence the time is indeed 
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overdue for English teachers to reconsider the possibilities for ethics today, 
including the role of ethics in literary education and of literature in ethics 
education. Of course literary studies have always been regarded as having 
something to contribute to the teaching of morality, from Plato, (Lee, Ed., 1967) 
who in The Republic allowed only a heavily censored role for literature, to some 
recent moral philosophers, such as Martha Nussbaum (1990) and Richard Rorty, 
(1991) who find in literature a unique form of moral discourse. It is only in the 
last three decades that this view has fallen from favour amongst some literary 
theorists. Nevertheless, the popularity of post-structuralism and political 
criticism does pose very real challenges to a rethinking of the ethics of writing, 
reading and discussing literature in our times, and it is with these challenges that 
my study begins. However, lest I be seen as dourly reductive in my use of 
literature, I hasten to add that of course literature's function is not solely moral: 
the good life holds pleasures beyond any smug assurance that we are trying to 
do the right thing, whatever that may be. 
Because ethics and literary theory are abstract topics which have practical, if 
problematic, implications in personal and public spheres, particularly in literary 
criticism and pedagogy, I have organised this discussion under headings 
provided by Aristotle's three categories of knowledge: Theoria, Poiesia and 
Praxis. 1 These may be roughly translated as: (1) Theory - in particular 
disciplines such as literary theory, ethics, epistemology and evolutionary theory; 
(2) Craft - the doing, which is at once a way of knowing, developed and 
expressed in such ongoing acts as criticism, creative writing, making moral 
decisions and teaching; and (3) Political Practice - especially the politics of 
literary criticism and literacy teaching, in which politics is conceived of as a 
mode of deliberate or theorised action aimed at improving some aspect of life. 
While Aristotle saw the life of the theoretician, or philosopher, as the highest 
calling, he recognised that his knowledge could not be complete, partly because 
he could never fashion a theory of everything (though he certainly tried) and 
partly because the knowledge of the politician and the craftsman were of a 
different order, thereby supplying an indispensable complement to the more 
abstract knowledge of the philosopher. In our more egalitarian society we might 
wish to revise these sentiments by asserting that none of the above ways of 
living and knowing should be privileged over the others. Indeed, our ideal of a 
universal and comprehensive education aims to create a society in which every 
adult is a thinker, worker and political activist. Yet, in the interest shown by 
1 I am indebted to Thomas H. Groome's (1980) Christian Religious Education: Sharing our 
Story and Vision for the conception of Aristotle's three ways of knowing which I am using here. 
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academics and teachers in recent literary theory, there has been a distinct 
tendency to privilege theory over practice, the philosopher over the critic, the 
reader over the writer, the academic over the classroom teacher. At the same 
time, as a result of the Marxist base of most post-structuralist theories, there has 
been a desire to see the implications of both theory and practice as simply 
political rather than ethical, as if ethics and politics could be ultimately 
separated. It seems, however, that there are those (e.g. Fredric Jameson, 1991) 
who think a radical separation is possible, not because they seriously wish to 
conduct their politics in an immoral way, but because, on the contrary, having 
conceived of ethics as a discourse of the ruling class concerned to bolster up its 
position of dominance by inculcating a narrow middle-class morality, such 
reformers consider ethics irrelevant or distinctly harmful to their commitment to 
create a more just, free and equal society. However, marginalising ethics in 
favour of politics is simply to make a clumsy distinction which, as David Parker 
(1993a) points out, does not remove the ethical from politics at all. 
In commencing this project I must draw attention to an apparently more 
serious threat to the possibility of defining an ethics of literary theory, literary 
criticism and critical literacy teaching - one which will be a major theme of this 
study. There is an element in post-structuralist theories which undermines the 
very possibility of ethics existing at all, by denying the referentiality of texts - 
the ability of texts to refer to the 'real' world beyond themselves - and the 
agency of the subject - the ability of humans to exercise free will. At least this 
trend would be more disturbing if it were not for the fact that the theory is 
continually contradicted by the practice of its exponents. What we have seen in 
this recent philosophical movement is, among other things, yet another turn in 
the old debate between free will and determinism, as will become clear as this 
study progresses. Yet whatever may emerge concerning the existence of human 
freedom - and I predict that the convergence of quantum mechanics, 
cybernetics, neuro-science and cognitive psychology will throw new light on 
this subject - critics and teachers constantly assume the 'commonsense' view that 
we can exercise some degree of agency. In this study I refer to some recent 
arguments which lend support to the idea that common sense has some validity, 
contradicting some of the more radically sceptical claims of constructivists. 
My broad aims in restoring a more balanced view of the relationship 
between ethics, literary studies and critical literacy are to propose, through a 
necessarily limited marshalling of theory and example, that teachers and critics 
should seek a clearer understanding of the nature of ethics itself; to demonstrate 
that ethics is indissolubly linked to all three realms of knowing and doing - 
theoria, poiesia and praxis - as they apply to literary criticism and teaching; to 
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show that the skill of making sound ethical as well as political judgements must 
be learned and taught through both philosophical analysis and the practice of 
making the ethical and political decisions inherent in all acts, including the acts 
of creating, criticising and theorising about literary and other texts; and to re-
affirm the role of literary studies in developing ethical and political awareness. 
In what follows I attempt to give equal weight to each of these aims, but if it 
seems that I have privileged theory by considering it first (which of course does 
not prohibit the reader from considering it last) and at greater length, it is 
because I believe that at the moment the championing of post-structuralism by 
some educators and critics as the new theory of literary studies is generating 
problems of practice which in general have not been sufficiently identified and 
examined. Indeed, I contend that we have not seen in post-structuralism's 
influence on literary studies a Copernican revolution, but rather a complication 
and exaggeration of ideas which have long been recognised in various ways and 
to various degrees in the Western tradition. 
Whilst for some of my readers post-structuralist theories might remain the new 
orthodoxy, others might object that these ideas, having already been the subject 
of extensive criticism from 1990 to 1995 (far more extensive than I have been 
able to indicate in this study), are already passé, and that therefore my project is 
now irrelevant. That would be premature, especially as the ideas which have 
been gathered under this title are now recognised in academic circles (if not yet 
in schools) as many and varied, and while some may ultimately languish in 
obscurity as discredited curiosities, others will no doubt survive the test of time. 
Literary studies never really leave behind the influence of critical movements; 
their insights are added to the useful baggage critics and teachers carry with 
them for the rest of the journey. Nevertheless, post-structuralism has been 
unfolding for over three decades now, long enough for academics of all 
persuasions to be gaining some perspective on it and to have marshalled 
critiques which are carefully reasoned rather than just reactionary - though, I 
hasten to add, it has been little more than a decade since post-structuralism 
began to filter through to English teachers in Australia. While there are signs of 
a cooler, more wide-ranging, less partisan discussion of the nature of post-
structuralist theories and their place in literary and cultural studies - in short, of 
the advent of a post-post-structuralist period - it is evident that post-
structuralism is still the reigning paradigm in most university English and 
Cultural Studies departments and among English educationists. My particular 
concern is with the versions of post-structuralism, which some of the latter are 
still promoting as a foundation for teaching critical literacy through literary and 
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other texts. Many reasons have been suggested for the attraction which post-
structuralism holds in these circles and I touch upon some of these in the course 
of this study. 
A further possible objection to my project must also be answered at this 
point. Surely it is too ambitious an enterprise to identify all of the ethical 
implications of post-structuralism for literary criticism and teaching; to review 
the very many criticisms and defences of post-structuralist theories in order to 
decide what aspects can justifiably be rejected and what retained; to examine the 
varied ethical theories which moral philosophers have been proposing and 
evaluate their usefulness to critics and teachers; and to discuss and illustrate the 
possibilities for the craft of ethical criticism and for the ethics of English 
teaching? Of course I cannot hope to do all of that, let alone to offer anything 
really new in every one of these areas. What I have tried to do, and what I think 
will be innovative in the context of secondary school and university English 
teaching, is, first, to alert my colleagues, who have not been kept well enough 
informed by enthusiastic promoters of post-structuralism and critical literacy, of 
some of the problems and possibilities for ethics, ethical criticism and an ethical 
critical literacy in the wake of post-structuralism; and, second, to introduce and 
illustrate what I consider to be a more fruitful contribution to epistemology, 
ethics and literary studies: that of the latest evolutionary theories. Thus I attempt 
to map some previously unfamiliar terrain which will be very relevant to 
English teachers today, and so point out new directions for study. Having laid 
these foundations, I can then offer by way of example one new approach to the 
ethical criticism of some literary texts which could be taught to senior secondary 
students, and some ideas for the re-establishment of an ethical literary criticism 
and critical literacy teaching. 
Throughout this work, unless otherwise specified, I make the following 
distinction between ethics and morality: ethics refers very broadly to the 
practice of reasoning together about the question, 'How should we live?' while 
morality refers to the particular codes of conduct which an individual or 
community adopts, overtly and tacitly, in answer to this question. 2 This seems to 
be a helpful conception. It can certainly encompass the following questions 
which are particularly relevant to my project, although I do not pretend to have 
answered them all: 'How should we conduct literary studies in the light of post-
structuralism?' and, 'Is it possible to determine some rules to guide our efforts in 
this area?' Further questions follow: are there some kinds of texts which are 
2 See Louis Pojman (1995: 1-17) for a more detailed discussion of the relationship between the 
concepts of morality and ethics. 
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more open to deconstruction than others; is it possible to say anything useful 
about an author's intentions; are there any limits to the multiplication of 
different readings of a text; can we afford simply to enjoy the free play of 
indeterminate meanings or must we finally choose between them for ethical and 
political reasons; on what grounds can we make such choices; are we indeed 
free to make any choices at all or are we totally determined by the discourses 
which intersect in our lives? 
The simplified version of post-structuralism which is being promoted for 
consumption by teachers and their students, and which is the particular focus of 
my study, has been usefully summarised by Wendy Morgan: (1992) 
1) Texts are produced within the historical and cultural contexts which shape 
them; the discourses available at the time of writing govern what can be said 
and how it can be said. 
2) No text is a unity, complete and consistent; it must encompass silences, 
incoherencies, contradictions. 
3) Readings produce meanings. There is no single, pre-existent, 'authorised' 
meaning of a text, which determines how it is to be read; instead, different, 
often contradictory meanings will be available in specific historical, cultural 
and textual contexts. 
4) Any text constructs a version of reality; that version convinces those readers 
who find it reflects 'the way things are', 'what goes without saying', 'the truth of 
the matter'. (76-81) 
Critical literacy has been conveniently described by Colin Lankshear 
(1994), building particularly on the work of Paulo Freire (1972), Gunther Kress 
(1985), James Gee (1990), Catherine Wallace (1992) and Pam Gilbert (1993). 
Broadly speaking it is a set of pedagogical practices designed to expose the 
ways in which texts have been constructed to serve the interests of dominant 
power groups in society through covertly or, at least, implicitly positioning 
readers to accept the status quo as natural. Students are taught to expose the 
gaps, contradictions and silences in texts, both canonical and popular, by which 
the interests of oppressed groups have been marginalised, and to engage in the 
struggle to empower these groups by rereading existing texts and constructing 
new and differently interested ones. Fundamentally critical literacy is a Marxist 
pedagogy and, like all Marxist theories, it tends to imply a certain morality: for 
example all classes should have equal access to social 'goods'. This morality 
usually remains an unexamined assumption among literacy theorists even 
though, as Slack and Whitt (1992: 571) point out, cultural theorists have begun 
to recognise that ethical issues raised by their research deserve critical attention. 
The concepts of modernity and postmodernity are more difficult to pin 
down, partly because so much has been written about them from so many 
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different perspectives, 3  and partly because they refer to aspects of cultural 
history through which we are still living. Thus they are too complex and too 
immediate to be entirely clear, and in any case they will probably always remain 
somewhat contentious, just as the idea of Romanticism has. However, I am 
using these terms as follows. 
Modernity, it is generally accepted, germinated in the Renaissance, 
flowered in the Enlightenment, and came to fruition in the Industrial Revolution 
which stretches from the end of the eighteenth century into (at least) the middle 
of our own. The great project of modernity has been to achieve a systematic 
understanding of the whole of existence and to bring everything under human 
control. Hence modernity is associated with the growth of science, which 
accompanied the development of rationalism and empiricism, and the decay of 
Christianity, which was seen by many thinkers to rely ultimately on superstition 
and emotion. Yet modernity has not enjoyed a steadily increasing domination; 
rather it has been beset by a series of fluctuating counter-movements, including 
Romanticism, symbolism, spiritualism, hippiedom and New Age beliefs. 
Finally, some would say, with the failure of a common belief in an essential, 
God-created human self or spirit, modernity's project to unravel the mysteries of 
the universe, to liberate us from the fear of the gods and to create a 
technological utopia has declined beyond resuscitation in the global wars and 
environmental disasters of the twentieth century. The Romantics, it seems, may 
have been right all along: modernity is akin to Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, 
who represents a self-centred, egotistical rationality that investigates, creates but 
refuses to nurture. By the overweening invention of scientific ambition, 
modernity is reducing the world to a wasteland. Yet late traces of modernity's 
dream live on in the minds of many contemporary optimists - including 
scientists such as Paul Davies (1992) and Steven Weinberg (1992) who still 
speak of the possibility of developing a totally unified theory in particle physics 
and cosmology - in spite of widespread postmodern scepticism about the very 
possibility of a totalising system of thought and of the utopia it might empower 
mankind to create. 
Postmodernity, which might be described as the new Romanticism, 
could be seen to have its beginnings in thinkers like William Blake, and later to 
be revealed in those apparently contradictory impulses of the Victorians 
towards, on the one hand, scientific materialism and, on the other, the search for 
evidence of life after death in spiritualism, which A.S. Byatt (1992) portrays so 
compellingly in Angels and Insects, a novella which I examine in detail in 
3 See for example Lyotard (1984), Vattimo (1988), Hutcheon (1989), Ross (1989), Jameson 
(1991), McGowan (1991), Bauman (1992), Docherty (1993). 
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Chapter 3. Today, with the information revolution fully upon us, we are 
overwhelmed by the contradictions and discontinuities of the myriad competing 
claims about the nature of human existence criss-crossing in the webs of 
cyberspace and slugging it out at the political negotiating tables and on the 
battlefields of the world. Thus rigorously open-minded people frequently find 
themselves constrained by an agnostic eclecticism, unable to commit 
themselves totally to any creed, whether it be scientism, one of the ancient 
world religions, some new age patchwork of neo-paganism and Eastern 
religion, the philosophy of post-structuralism, or the search for ecstasy and self-
knowledge through a deliberate transgression of social boundaries such as 
James Miller (1994) presents Michel Foucault as pursuing. Yet, in spite of this 
decentring impetus, perhaps the late nineteenth century conflict between the 
material and the spiritual can still be seen as one of the central dilemmas of our 
age, and indeed of the whole Western tradition which seems to be reaching a 
crisis point today. Indeed, a renewed concern with what would traditionally 
have been regarded as spiritual matters can be seen in Derrida's recent book 
(1995), The Gift of Death, and in Foucault's (1984) turning to Greek ethics in 
his last, uncompleted work. 
The binary opposition of matter and spirit goes all the way back to the 
beginnings of Western culture, where it can be seen most starkly in the conflict 
between the sophists and Platonists of ancient Greece. Derrida's (1976) 
deconstruction of such dualities is an attempt to collapse the founding 
categories of our thought and to point to some other, as yet only dimly 
perceived, mode of structuring our vision of the world, one which would be 
more egalitarian since it would be free from the oppression caused by 
privileging one of the binary terms over the other, as 'spirit' has traditionally 
been privileged over 'matter' in academic circles. 4 Yet, ironically, even this 
project seems to participate in its own way in the hubristic, totalising ambitions 
of modernity, such that post-structuralism can be seen as the currently dominant 
term in a binary opposition with essentialism. The great moral lesson of 
postmodernism may well be, as Zygmunt Baumann (1993: 31-36) maintains, 
that our actions should be conditioned more by our knowledge of the great deal 
that we do not know than by the very little that we do. However, as I hope to 
show, this does not mean that we should abandon the search for truth, but we 
may need to be more modest about how successful we can expect to be. 
4 Yet it is a curious paradox that 'matter', the body, property, and chemical and organic 
structures of all kinds have at the same time and increasingly been the actual concern of 
academics, as opposed to the ostensible superiority of spirit in their work. 
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In Part One of this study, 'Theoria', I examine some of the problems and 
possibilities for ethics which arise in critical literacy education and literary 
criticism in the wake of post-structuralism. 
In Chapter 1 I introduce a number of texts aimed at English teachers 
and/or students in order to show how simplified are the post-structuralist critical 
theories which have recently been adopted by language and literacy 
educationists and applied to the inescapably ethical practices of the teaching of 
English with at least two aims in mind. The first aim has been to sanction a 
plurality of readings of any text, thereby freeing students from slavishly 
adopting the interpretations and evaluations of authorities, whilst encouraging 
them to engage with a wider variety of texts and find pleasure in the interplay of 
multiple contradictory and complementary readings. The second aim has given 
a political edge to this agenda by linking a debased form of Derrida's 
deconstructive methods to the purposes of political criticism, especially neo-
Marxist, feminist and post-colonial criticism. 
This approach, a diluted version of the new 'cultural studies' in 
universities and known as 'critical social literacy' in schools, pursues pluralist 
and egalitarian goals which appear to be thoroughly laudable. However, even 
though the problems which extreme forms of post-structuralism raise for ethical 
discourse should by now be well known, several difficulties in the ethical 
underpinnings of this post-structuralist literacy education have been overlooked, 
rendering it less effective in promoting its political agenda. First, to the extent 
that post-structuralism calls into question the referentiality of language and the 
agency of the discursively determined subject, it renders the project of ethics in 
developing morally autonomous persons more dubious. Nevertheless, while a 
number of feminists have urgently discussed the contradictions for women in 
this tension between theory and practice, many post-structuralist educators seem 
oblivious. They assume that language refers at least to certain social realities, 
and that students can be taught to exercise at least sufficient agency to choose 
between more, or less, empowering readings of texts. Second, a more crippling 
ethical problem arises in the vulgar relativism entailed by a naive promotion of 
cultural pluralism. In a pluralist, liberal democracy, which rightly or wrongly 
promotes the pursuit of the maximum multiplicity of interests, there will 
inevitably arise conflicts of interest calling for the application of more 
fundamental principles by which those conflicts may be resolved. While 
academics have wrestled with the problem of whether, in fact, post-structuralist 
philosophies are able to offer such ethical principles, few educationists have 
troubled to inquire into this issue. Those who have, with unrecognised irony, 
tend to look for their ethical theory to other philosophical traditions which post- 
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structuralists have commonly sought to problematise. Third, an even deeper 
problem arises if post-structuralism is seen as a nihilistic philosophy which 
denies the possibility of all moral principles and valorises the exercising by 
individuals and interest groups of the will-to-power. When this view is 
combined with the picture of the world offered by popular versions of scientific 
materialism - that of a hostile universe formed by completely random processes 
- it may become more difficult to inspire students to persevere in making the 
world a better place for present and future generations. Hence I introduce 
several critiques of post-structuralism in order to demonstrate that it has proved 
vulnerable to criticism from a variety of perspectives. However, what remains 
after these attacks offers useful insights into the limitations of discourse, 
textuality and agency which must be taken into account in devising a plausible 
ethical theory. 
In Chapter 2 I illustrate some recent approaches to ethics and ethical 
criticism from evolutionary, post-structuralist, pragmatist, postmodern, and 
quantum mechanics perspectives, and I suggest a synthesis of various elements 
from among these approaches which a new theory of ethics for our times would 
need to incorporate. I argue that this new approach should be centred on 
Darwin's (1859) theory that organisms evolve by means of random variation and 
natural selection, a theory which has been expanded and made more plausible 
by developments in mathematics and science, such as quantum mechanics, 
complexity theory, neuro-science and sociobiology. I maintain that Popper's 
(1979) evolutionary epistemology supports the modest truth claims of the 
scientific method employed in these fields of inquiry, thus supplanting the more 
radical scepticism of post-structuralist epistemologies. I call the proposed 
synthesis of the ethical theories listed above 'the ethics of disillusionment and 
re-enchantment' (to borrow Bauman's, 1993, terms), since it combines 
methodological scepticism with a renewed confidence in the possibilities of the 
agency of human beings and the referentiality (i.e. the truth claims) of the arts 
and sciences, and in the flourishing of life on earth. I do not claim to have fully 
articulated a new theory; rather in sketching some of its salient features I hope 
to offer a possible foundation for reinstating ethics as a central concern in 
literary criticism and critical literacy teaching, demonstrating that critics and 
teachers should look beyond the negative, anti-rationalist metaphysics of post-
structuralism for the construction of more valid and productive approaches to 
ethical issues. 
In Part Two, 'Poiesia' (Chapter 3), I put this sketch for a better theory of 
ethics to the test in the first of my two areas of practical concern - the craft of 
literary criticism - by offering readings of three literary texts - Joseph Conrad's 
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Heart of Darkness, Aidan Chambers' Breaktime and A.S. Byatt's 'Morpho 
Eugenia' - which are suitable for study at senior secondary school level, and 
which demonstrate how an ethics of disillusionment and re-enchantment makes 
sense of the world as modelled in these fictions. In doing this I also consider 
some of the implications for teaching these texts to senior students. 
In Part Three, 'Praxis' (Chapter 4), I draw some conclusions from all of 
the foregoing discussion for my second and wider area of practical concern: the 
ethics and politics of critical literacy teaching in the education of teenagers and 
young adults. Finally I outline a pedagogy which supports an ethical approach 
to moral, ethical and political education through reading and discussing 
literature. 
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Part One: Theoria 
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Chapter 1 
Problems: critical literacy / ethics / post-structuralism - an 
uneasy alliance 
1. The ethics of post-structuralism versus the ethics of critical literacy? 
B rian Moon, in a 1990 essay, recognises the importance of the ethical 
implications of post-structuralism for English teaching when he writes about 
Roland Barthes' Camera Lucida, a very personal reflection on the nature of 
photography and a study of the place of death in Western thinking: 
Such new directions in writing raise questions. How should teachers 
of 'Literature respond? How will they position this text? Should they 
accommodate the new critical approaches? Should they stop teaching high 
school students the conventional notion of genres? Should they (if they are still 
doing it!) stop teaching students to look for 'what the author meant'? These are 
not idle questions. How we answer them will have real, direct consequences in 
our society, and in this sense it can be argued that post-structuralism has 
succeeded in restoring social consciousness to textual theory. Nor will changes 
be restricted to the English departments of schools, colleges and universities, 
for there is no better subject for deconstruction than the structure of traditional 
Western culture itself. (19) 
Moon then illustrates his point by discussing the application of a form of 
deconstruction in feminist criticism to expose the pervasive patriarchalism of 
our culture. Post-structuralism, as Moon presents it, can be an instrument of 
liberation: by deconstructing the structures of society both men and women can 
be alerted to the inherited patterns of thought which have constructed the prison 
of a gendered identity and which limit the play of new and multiple identities. 
Thus a feminist appropriation of deconstruction opens the way for a deliberate 
reconstruction of a more just and equal society. In a similar manner, Moon 
might also have argued, a post-colonial application of deconstruction to notions 
of race in the Western imperialist tradition can help to construct a more tolerant 
multicultural society. However, Moon is using the term 'deconstruction' in a 
very debased sense, which amounts to little more than a particular form of 
Marxist-motivated textual analysis, a mere pointing at questionable ideological 
assumptions and at various other possible interpretations. Derrida's 
deconstruction is a process of sophisticated critical enquiry from which emerges 
the 'aporia' in a particular text, the particular passages and moments when they 
reveal the philosophical emptiness of the whole enterprise of 'realist' 
referentiality in literature. 
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But, if Moon's deconstruction, however well or poorly done, does expose 
the multitude of meanings possible in a text, it also raises some obvious 
problems. First, are there any limits to the number of readings - some of which 
may be contradictory - a text can be justifiably held to sustain? And, if there are, 
how are these limits to be defined? Second, and more important from the point 
of view of this study, the use of deconstruction to expose a variety of 
interpretations still leaves the reader with the responsibility of assigning relative 
values to these readings. It is all very well to talk of enjoying the play of 
possible meanings, but in the end most teachers will be obliged to make 
decisions which reveal their preferences. In a book entitled Reading Hamlet, 
which examines different ways of reading Gertrude and Ophelia, Bronwyn 
Mellor (1989) writes: 
So are we simply left with a number of readings from which to 
choose? In a sense, yes. But this is not saying that any reading will do and that 
it just 'depends on your opinion'. 
Readings assign particular meanings and affirm certain values. This is 
another way of saying that readings are constructed to support particular views 
of the world and how it should be. A.C. Bradley's reading of Gertrude (47-8), 
for example, supports particular views of how women should behave. 
Choosing between readings involves debating meanings and questioning 
values. (77) 
Having conceded this vital point, Mellor gives no guidance as to how questions 
of competing values should be resolved. 
The problem appears even more strikingly in an article, or series of 
confessions, by Vivienne Muller. (1990) Claiming to be parodying a script for 
Days of Our Lives, she presents us with this scene, which takes place between a 
student and herself: 
Boy (querulous): Did you really mean what you said in the lecture yesterday? 
Do you really believe in feminism? 
Me (adamant): Well, yes. I don't agree with Ruthven, that a feminist approach 
is 'just another way of looking at text.' I think some commitment is necessary - 
particularly with ideological-based criticism. Otherwise how could such a 
subversive and potentially transformative discourse be effective and avoid 
becoming mainstream, monolithic, logocentric? 
Boy (triumphantly): Ah... you're ugly anyway!... (34) 
So, 'some commitment is necessary'! Indeed, but the boy has already made his 
commitment and how is he to be convinced that he should re-examine and 
change it? Furthermore, how can English teachers justify such 'social 
engineering' and what pedagogical praxis can they draw on for the re-education 
of values? In the era of the so-called 'backlash against feminism', for example, 
we cannot rely on education against gender discrimination retaining the priority 
which it has been accorded in schools of education and government 
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departments. Muller, in the title of her article, 'Private Discourses from the 
Pedagogic Trenches', reveals that she feels beleaguered. Later (Chapter 1.2) I 
will suggest that re-inforcements at least, if not a whole new strategy, are 
available in the literature on values education. 
To return to the essay by Moon referred to above, another ethical 
dimension of his representation of deconstruction becomes apparent: 
I began with the observation that post-structuralism is not monolithic, 
and this point must be re-affirmed. Within post-structuralism there are many 
potential directions. One can pursue an anarchic line, demonstrating over and 
over the impossibility of truth, the relativity of all things. Or one can turn the 
project to practical ends, as the feminist movement has done. (Moon, 1990: 20) 
I have already pointed out some of the ethical dilemmas opened up by Moon's 
second potential direction of post-structuralism. I do not suppose that many 
teachers would want to opt for the first of these directions: to dismantle their 
students' faith in the possibility of making meaning at all and to encourage a 
form of nihilism. Such pessimism might find all too ready acceptance in the 
minds of a generation of students who are discovering, for example, that their 
society denies so many of them a place in the workforce. Yet the possibility of 
inadvertently promoting nihilism remains, and that is one reason why I am 
questioning the implications for teaching of post-structuralist positions and 
critical practices. 
In the first essay of his collection, Reconstructing Literature Teaching: New 
Essays on the Teaching of Literature, Jack Thomson (1992) makes some very 
telling points: 
If the logic of post-structuralism implies the end of notions of philosophical 
truth, interpretation, meaning, reference, narrative, history and value, we have 
to recognise the need for an ethical stance constructed from the work of the 
deconstructive philosophers Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Roland 
Barthes. Theirs is not a vision of apocalyptic emptiness but a clear-sighted 
honesty about facing, demystifying and deconstructing the myths and illusions 
of our culture, and of its signifying practices which have created the myths and 
illusions, all of which we have come to see as natural rather than as artificial 
and constructed. We cannot subscribe to nihilism because we have 
responsibilities to other human beings, and especially in our case, to our 
students. By all means let us be sceptical and knowledgeable about the 
referential and communicative limitations of language and texts, about the 
difficulties of establishing a representational relationship between words and 
things, but as English teachers we also have sufficient ethical understanding to 
see the real difference between the image of an expensively clothed and half 
naked model in Vogue magazine and the image of an emaciated and half naked 
Ethiopian woman trying to feed her starving baby on A.B.C. News... There is 
some reference in texts and some freedom in interpreters. (19, 20) 
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In making such a bald assertion in his last sentence Thomson is nevertheless in 
good company. As I will show, (Chapter 1.5) he is quite justified in believing 
that the reflexivity and linguistic determinism of some post-structuralist thought 
is overstated. However, I am also interested in his plea for an ethical program in 
teaching deconstruction. Thomson has clear ideas about how students can be 
taught to read in such a way that alternative values are brought to light, but he 
does not suggest how students can develop the ability to make sound moral 
judgements between competing values. He simply assumes that teachers, and 
hence students, already know which of the alternatives they should choose. 
Indeed post-structuralist literary criticism and pedagogy typically make such 
assumptions, thereby concealing their ethical foundations just as much as more 
traditional approaches have done. Unfortunately moral judgements are not as 
clear cut as Thomson would have us believe in his example of the Vogue model 
versus the Ethiopian woman. Therefore, even after sorting out the confusions 
caused by the comparison of two visual symbols from the different discourses of 
news reporting and fashion advertising, students and teachers will still need the 
help of the organising concepts and rational methods of ethics - hence my 
attempt to revive and re-fashion the traditionally close association between 
literary criticism, ethics and education. 
In a later essay in the same volume, 'Imagining Realities: Values and 
literature,' Robert McGregor directly addresses the issue of how texts can be 
used to shape the values of students. McGregor's approach takes no account of 
post-structuralist ideas of narrative and character and therefore seems out of 
place in Thomson's book. Indeed, the fact that Thomson was unable to include a 
more up-to-date discussion of the topic is indicative of the failure of English 
teachers to pay adequate attention to the ethics of their enterprise. However, 
McGregor does introduce some useful techniques for helping literature students 
to clarify their own values and the values seemingly presented in the text. He 
focuses particularly on the use of imagination in order to empathise with the 
situation of characters and to explore other possible courses of action, before 
attempting to make ethical judgements. This goes some way towards 
establishing a program of ethics education, for the imagination is indeed 
fundamental to ethical judgement. But McGregor's approach is severely limited 
in that it does not provide students with an understanding of other possible 
grounds for making sound ethical judgements, or with the necessary reasoning 
skills. Values clarification, while once the fashion in ethics education, is now 
seen as an inadequate model, since it does not provide for the development of 
such judgement and of what might be regarded as the humane virtues which are 
necessary in creating an adequate degree of social harmony. Hence McGregor's 
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essay, which is an account of things that happened in his Year 10 class in 1986, 
seems even more out of place in a book entitled Reconstructing Literature 
Teaching. As I pointed out above, few teachers, even in a commendable spirit of 
non-judgmentalism, or conscious of the dangers of a blind allegiance to political 
correctness, will be satisfied with the student who at the end of a values 
clarification lesson acknowledges his sexism and reaffirms his commitment to 
it. 
In concluding his essay McGregor makes an observation which opens up 
fruitful ways of pursuing his thesis towards a more satisfactory program of 
ethics education: 
The development of personal values - and the sense that one possesses 
personal choices for action - relies upon experience of interaction with other 
people where such choices are laid bare and examined. English classrooms and 
texts provide an appropriate venue for such experience. (Thomson, 1992: 147) 
Two points can be made here: first, the notion that 'one possesses personal 
choices for action' has been seriously challenged by post-structuralism. 
However, Thomson in his comments quoted above rejects the post-structuralists' 
neo-deterministic view of the wholly linguistic construction of the self and 
asserts the existence of free will, a power which is of course fundamental to any 
discussion of the relevance of ethics. It is intriguing to note the persistence of 
this idea of the freedom of the subject in texts aiming to introduce post-
structuralism to teachers and students (I will illustrate this point in a moment). 
Second, McGregor recognises the importance in the development of personal 
values of 'the experience of interaction with other people where.. .choices are 
laid bare and examined.' This idea of interaction is at the heart of the 
'community of inquiry' approach to values education which I describe in 
Chapter 4, and it is also fundamental to notions of the construction of the self 
espoused by the moral philosopher, Charles Taylor. (1989) 
Making Meanings (Forrestal, 1992) is a course-book designed for junior 
secondary classes. Among other things, it introduces, through a series of rigidly 
guided activities, post-structuralist concepts such as how multiple readings are 
possible, how beliefs influence readings, how readings are constructed 
(including dominant and resistant readings) and how readers use other stories 
they have read to read new stories. The implicit aim of these activities seems to 
be ethical, that is to construct student readers who are aware of the way in which 
they are being constructed by other texts, and so to liberate them to make their 
own choices. Students are encouraged to reflect on their own beliefs by an 
author (or authority) who addresses them as reasonable and relatively free 
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subjects - though, ironically, at no stage are they invited to act as resistant 
readers of Forrestal's text, an invitation which Thomson (1992) is careful to 
offer the adult readers in the introduction to his book. 
In Making Meanings several ethical issues are raised through 
engagement with a variety of texts. Among them are: indifference to the 
suffering of others contrasted with terrorism as a political act - depicted in a pop 
song and a poem; smoking - as portrayed in advertising; and attitudes to gender 
- revealed in dominant versus resistant readings and retellings of traditional 
tales. Not only are students asked to identify the varying attitudes of others and 
to clarify their own, but they are also introduced to some of the ways in which 
aspects of their culture have influenced their beliefs, thus laying the foundation 
for an excellent values education program. Indeed the book goes a step further 
in Chapter 11 where students are asked to form an opinion on the issues of duck 
shooting and eating meat, after sample arguments have been presented for and 
against. The students then explore what is involved in presenting their views 
through the mass media. Here they are moving from ethics into the related area 
of political action, but before they get to this stage they are challenged to give 
reasons and examples which would support their opinions, and to test their 
arguments in class debates. Unhappily, from the point of view of a thorough 
ethics education, there is no help given at this point concerning the difficulties 
of establishing sound reasoning skills and of bringing them to bear on the 
rhetoric which commonly operates in both the mass media and school debating. 
Yet the need for such assistance would quickly become apparent in the course of 
spirited discussion. It is just here that the philosophical discipline of ethical 
inquiry can make an important contribution. 
Wendy Morgan's book, A Post-Structuralist English Classroom: The Example 
of Ned Kelly, was also first published in 1992. In it she gives, for the benefit of 
teachers, a very detailed account of a unit of work designed to introduce her 
Grade 10 class to a range of post-structuralist ideas about textuality, and 
especially about the conflicting ways in which historical figures are constructed 
and reconstructed in a wide variety of literary and other texts. This is a 
fascinating book and an excellent example of how students can be led, for the 
most part in an ethically defensible way, to a post-structuralist understanding of 
texts, without burdening them with theoretical terms. Indeed, the particular 
understanding of theory which directed Morgan's experiment is not fully 
explained until the last section of the book. I have quoted her list, minus the 
commentary, in my introduction. (p. 14) Her fourth point - that 'any text 
constructs a version of reality [which] convinces those readers who find it 
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reflects "the way things are", "what goes without saying", "the truth of the 
matter" (76-81) - indicates clearly that Morgan is aware of the political, and 
hence ethical, dimension of her project: that is to liberate her students from 
unconscious ideological construction in the same way that Forrestal and 
Thomson seek to do. She is even uncomfortably aware of the need to liberate 
her students from her own authoritative intervention in their lives: 
It's obvious that I am an interventionist teacher, and my students tend 
to bestow on me the role of expert authority. So even when I'm explicit about 
where I'm coming from in my readings (as I am about my feminism), and 
where other readings are coming from, and even when I try to show how texts 
speak differently and partially, and deliberately instruct my students not to 
believe my version - even then I think my students will look to me for the 
meaning I derive from any text. They may even believe that I'll find their 
readings more acceptable in so far as they conform to my views and learn to 
use my terms. And to be honest, it's hard for me, as it is for any teacher, to 
avoid nudging my students to take up my preferred reading position. I may not 
be aware that I'm doing it even as I pay lip service to the relativity of all 
readings. How much plurality of meaning can be accommodated in my 
classroom when I'm in control of the teaching? How far will I permit resistant 
readings of my texts and my readings? (84, 85) 
This passage illustrates clearly the strength in that fundamental paradox 
of deconstruction which has often been noted by its critics as one of its greatest 
weaknesses: Morgan writes as a deconstructor of texts, who is herself an author 
writing a text with quite specific aims in mind, but who is also aware of the 
possibility of deconstructive readings of her own text. 5 The way she does this 
highlights the ethical value of deconstruction, for here we see both the boldness 
and the humility of its program. 
In the same way, Derrida confidently contributes works in the great 
tradition of Western philosophy - his immediate antecedents being Heidegger, 
Husserl and Nietzsche (as Kevin Hart, 1989, demonstrates in his book, The 
Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy) - whilst 
revealing that Western philosophy can never be completely certain of its own 
metaphysical foundations. This seems to me the only honest way to proceed for 
anyone who has the temerity to be a writer or teacher yet does not claim to be 
God. Here, we see an essential element of any ethics education program: the 
teacher must be willing to declare openly her own position together with her 
reasons for holding it, to point out that other positions exist, and to allow her 
students to question, discuss and arrive at their own rationally defensible and 
mutually acceptable positions. I should stress that by 'mutually acceptable' I do 
not necessarily mean that they should be the same. The minimum criterion 
should rather be: can we reasonably tolerate our disagreement and still maintain 
5 I illustrate and discuss this paradox further in Chapter 1.3 and 5. 
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our community? Following from this, a second essential element is also 
apparent: the necessity of participating boldly and humbly in a community of 
inquiry if we hope to live together as best we can. This is the ethical ideal of 
democracy and possibly the only hope of resolving the conflicting values of the 
groups which make up our multi-cultural, pluralistic communities, whether 
local, national or international. Wendy Morgan recognises this when she says, 
'In the course of this unit.. .my class and I have been developing into a kind of 
interpretive [sic] community...'. (84) I discuss the nature of such communities in 
more detail in Chapter 4.2. 
Whilst I admire Morgan's book I remain unhappy about some aspects of 
it. For example there is the idea which it seems to present of the construction of 
the subject, whether that be the historical subject of Ned Kelly, the author's and 
reader's constructions of the author herself, the author and reader's constructions 
of the reader himself, our own construction of ourselves - or whatever other 
permutations are possible. In her introduction she quotes eminent Australian 
historian, Manning Clark, as saying, 
There was no such person as Ned Kelly. Indeed, there is no such thing as a 
human being, in some ways. There is only what he thinks of himself at 
different periods of time and what other people think of him at different 
periods of time. (5) 
Morgan then comments that 'any attempt to recover the person from the texts is 
a futile project. That is, it is impossible he could ever be present to us; instead 
there are endless possibilities for representing that figure.' (5) Earlier Morgan 
had said, 
Yet other readers may wonder whether I'm describing an English or a 
History classroom, and whether my approaches aren't already being practised 
by History teachers, though perhaps without the underpinning of a post-
structuralist literary theory. The boundaries in the curriculum between these 
subjects are largely a matter of convention and convenience; and certainly 
History and English have much in common as studies of culture... While many 
professional, academic historians now recognise the way language constitutes 
their subject and cannot be ignored (this is sometimes called the 'turn to 
textuality' or the 'textual turn' in the social sciences), in both English and 
History at the secondary level we still tend to ask of our texts, 'What does this 
mean?' instead of 'How does this mean?' - that is, what language, what 
discourses, what systems of belief, what cultural contexts encourage us to read 
into this a particular meaning? (4) 
Here, and in what follows, Morgan has given a challenging 
demonstration of the possibilities of teaching History from a post-structuralist 
perspective, but I think she has practised a sleight of hand, and performed a 
disservice to both History and English, by exaggerating the similarities between 
the two disciplines. In fact Morgan passes too quickly over her hints that there 
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really do remain some differences between the truth claims of History and 
English - for she says that the boundaries between these two subjects are only 
largely a matter of 'convention and convenience'. I do not think that it is at all 
clear that fictional and historical narratives aim to construct the same kinds of 
truth. In fact History and English are different discourses. In the end the 
responsible historian is limited in the 'spin' which he can put on his retelling of 
the story of Ned Kelly by the evidence of his sources, textual and conflicting 
though they are, and by his knowledge that, in spite of Manning Clark's rhetoric, 
there really was such a person as Ned Kelly. 
The writer of narrative fictions has different and arguably less limiting 
restrictions, depending partly on the genre of his work. Manning Clark's 
statement that 'there was no such person as Ned Kelly' is problematic in ways 
which Morgan remains silent about. Would Clark make the same kind of truth 
claim for the statement that there was no such person as Hamlet? And what can 
we make of Clark's further claim that 'there is no such thing as a human 
being...'? At least he qualifies it by adding, '...in some ways'. But here, in his use 
of the present tense and the pronoun 'us', Clark is referring to his readers and 
himself as much as to a figure from the past. And concerning this man of the 
past he goes on to say, 'There is only what he thinks of himself at different 
periods of time, and what other people think of him at different periods of time.' 
Clark is unduly emphatic about this claim - he does not say 'may be.' Yet the 
popular post-structuralist view that the subject is simply the construct of 
intersecting discourses, and that there is nothing which is not a text, is only a 
theory which is still being disputed - as I illustrate later in my discussion of 
some critics of post-structuralism. (Chapter 1.4) Clark's point appears to be a 
debased amalgamation of the Foucauldian view of the construction of the 
historical subject and some equating of this subject with a 'text' which can be 
subjected to a pseudo-Derridean deconstruction. He seems to be redefining 
'human being' in just such an oddly disembodied fashion, yet humans do have a 
bodily existence, which I will argue influences their being in ways beyond the 
social discourses 'inscribed' in their bodies. (Chapter 2) As Shakespeare's 
Shylock says, making an impassioned plea for recognition of a common 
humanity outside the discourses of Judaism and Christianity: 'If you prick us do 
we not bleed?' 
My chief concern here is not what Clark might have meant by his 
statement, but that Morgan adopts it too glibly as the epigraph for her unit of 
work. One result is that there is certainly a danger in her text that post-
structuralism will be enshrined in the minds of the young and impressionable as 
the new orthodoxy - but she is acutely aware of this and tries to combat it as 
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shown above. More worrying is the possibility that, in spite of Morgan's ethical 
intentions, some of her students will go away believing that truths are simply 
fictions, that humans are merely unstable miasmas conjured up by fictional 
narratives, and that since nothing really exists outside one's own fantasies there 
is no need to exercise responsibility towards others. On the other hand, there is 
hope that the rich and partly extra-linguistic experience of communal endeavour 
under Morgan's benevolent tutelage will subvert this nihilistic construction of 
her text. But what might happen in some less thoughtful teacher's classroom? 
Indeed, this question highlights a fundamental educational problem 
which arises out of Morgan's relatively cautious attempt to impose post-
structuralist notions on her classes. At what age - if at all - should secondary 
students be given post-structuralist concepts without the supporting theory? 
Morgan clearly believes they should be spared the theory, since she spells out 
her severely simplified version only in an appendix for teachers, presumably 
because high school students are not old enough to understand it, but this also 
means that they do not have the breadth and depth of philosophical experience 
to test it. (Neither do many teachers, one might add.) It might be better, 
therefore, to engage students in philosophical discussions of a simpler nature 
before embarking on the notoriously bewildering difficulties of post-structuralist 
discourse. Perhaps in the final years of secondary school it would be enough to 
impart some introductory ideas about Marxism and structuralism, without which 
it is impossible to begin to understand post-structuralism. Indeed, it might be 
more sensible for Australian universities to adopt the common US model of 
postponing the treatment of post-structuralist literary theories until graduate 
programs. In Australia this might mean that post-structuralisms would be dealt 
with at the earliest in honours courses. 
Brian Moon has written two books introducing post-structuralism to senior 
secondary students: Studying Literature (1990) and Literary Terms: A Practical 
Glossary. (1992) The first is satisfying in ways which the second is not. In both 
texts Moon adopts an easy, authoritative tone, addressing his readers as 
intelligent, free agents. In Studying Literature he leads a class through a series 
of activities which use mostly whole works by a wide variety of writers, and 
which are carefully structured to give the students an understanding of post-
structuralist - notions of the contested definitions of literature, of reading 
practices, and of reading in terms of gender. It is only after his students have 
engaged with particular texts in particular ways that he introduces post-
structuralist and feminist terminology for the concepts and practices which he 
wishes to inculcate, such as 'dominant and marginalised ideas', 'reading 
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practices', 'gaps, silences and contradictions in literature', 'readings and re-
readings', 'construction of readings', 'patriarchy', 'naturalising gender', 
'intertextuality', 'de-centred', 'reading against the grain' and 'deconstructing the 
text'. At no stage does Moon invite students to resist his text, let alone supply 
them with concepts from alternative discourses with which to do so. Nor does 
he foreground his political or ethical aims in teaching students to use these 
reading practices. Instead he just gets on with the task in a mild and reasonable 
manner, an approach which is made to seem even more innocuous by his 
method of presenting students with whole works to read, asking many questions 
- only a very few of which are open-ended - and making extensive use of group 
discussion. These methods do allow students to come up with their own ideas 
but because the whole program is carefully structured there is no scope for 
pursuing different views very far. In practice, given a (perhaps rare) teacher who 
is well informed about the controversies surrounding literary theory, Moon's 
text might not prove too draconian, but instead a helpful starting point for a 
genuine community of inquiry in the classroom. In any case I doubt that Moon 
really expects teachers to work slavishly through the book. It is more likely that 
experienced practitioners will draw on it for examples of the kinds of things 
which could be done. However, there undoubtedly will be others - probably 
student-teachers - who will rely on Moon for all they need to know about post-
structuralism, and in this situation one can only hope that they will learn enough 
to begin to ask what are the silences in his text and whose dissenting voices 
have been marginalised by his theory. 
Moon's somewhat cosy impression that modern literary theory represents 
an unproblematic advance on its predecessors is even more prevalent in his later 
work, (1992) Literary Terms: A Practical Glossary. This is surprising, given the 
continued controversy over post-structuralism in Australia and elsewhere, and 
especially given that this time Moon includes an introduction which states: 
The glossary is oriented towards concepts and issues rather than terms 
and 'facts'. Literature is not a body of objective knowledge, but a field of social 
practices in which people struggle to make meanings and exert influence. We 
could say that in literature study there are only issues. It is therefore important 
that we give our students the skills not simply to absorb literature and criticism 
but to interrogate it, and to consider the social functions of literary 'knowledge'. 
With this aim in mind, the glossary includes not only 'analytic' terms, 
such as 'character' and 'imagery', but also brief accounts of some major critical 
orientations, such as structuralism, feminist criticism, and Marxist criticism. In 
thus acknowledging the differences within literary scholarship, the glossary 
aims to assist in the development of a democratic, active approach to the study 
of literary texts: an approach that will enable students to question the 
perspectives offered by literary and critical texts they encounter - including this 
one. (vii) 
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These are laudable sentiments - except perhaps for the notion 'that in literature 
study there are only issues': surely we are not arguing about the definition of 
iambic pentameter, for example? But I believe that Moon's aims are not 
adequately realised in his text. His audience is inexperienced and he practises on 
them in a too tendentious manner. No dictionary can escape bias entirely, but 
most try to be genuinely even-handed. Moon's glossary aims to be highly 
selective in the terms it includes: compare it, for example, to a full-scale 
glossary like The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory 
(Cuddon, 1992) - and before I am accused of being unfair, I would argue that 
there is greater educational value in directing senior students to an adult 
dictionary which contains more information than they think they immediately 
need. 
A glance at his contents page shows that Moon's glossary sets out to 
teach post-structuralism and those theories which are most closely related to it. 
Where others are introduced, such as New Criticism, it is mainly - but not 
entirely - to knock them down. In his individual entries Moon supplies little 
ground on which his student readers could gain sufficient confidence to resist 
his privileging of the latest theory over other approaches. For example, in 
commenting on New Criticism he seems to me to be guilty of pursuing the kind 
of ideological program which he accuses the New Critics of: 
Modern theories see this search for unity and coherence as politically 
unacceptable. In arguing that their method revealed the 'true' meaning of 
literary works, the New Critics implied that other readers and other readings 
were wrong. This suggests a desire to reshape society in terms of the values 
and beliefs of one group of people. The New Critics also lacked an adequate 
theory of language. They failed to see that meaning is produced in the 
interaction between language users; it does not exist in the words themselves. 
The New Critical movement has been very influential, however; and 
its emphasis on detailed study of the language and structure of texts is now a 
feature of most critical approaches. (80, 81) 
Moon allows some good in New Criticism, but finds it politically incorrect; 
post-structuralism by implication is politically acceptable because it desires 'to 
reshape society in terms of the values and beliefs' of more than one group of 
people - but only so long as its ideological pluralism does not extend to an 
unbiased presentation of the claims of New Criticism. Not only does Moon 
make a large jump in suggesting that, because the New Critics' readings might 
be incomplete, misleading or erroneous, they must therefore be wanting to 
reshape society, but he might also be accused of hypocrisy. Yet in the latter 
claim perhaps I am being too hard on Moon. He is actually doing what ethics 
demands - but perhaps unconsciously, and there is the rub. 
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In a review of Charles Taylor's (1992) The Ethics of Authenticity, 
Richard Rorty (1993) says, with disturbing and perhaps extreme pragmatism, 
...fellow-feeling degenerates into self-indulgent cant and political frivolity 
when we forget that some cultures, like some people, are no damn good; they 
cause too much pain, and so have to be resisted (and perhaps eradicated) rather 
than respected. This so-called 'politics of difference pretends that both 
morality and politics can be reduced to niceness; it evades the thought that 
moral choice is sometimes a matter of deciding who is going to get hurt. (3) 
This startling comment shows why open-minded members of a liberal 
democracy often feel uncomfortable with discussions about morality: it is a 
dangerous subject; with utilitarianism always hovering in the shadows debates 
can suddenly tip over into seemingly illiberal judgmentalism. And yet, as 
arguments about political correctness have been making clear, there are attitudes 
and behaviours which communities feel justified in condemning in the strongest 
terms, and at the same time there are real dangers in doing so. Moon's glossary 
would be a better book if he had recognised his 'ethical unconscious' and stated 
more clearly what his agenda is; and if he had included an entry on, and revised 
his whole work in the light of, 'ethical criticism' - by which I mean reading in an 
ethical manner, understanding the inherently ethical nature of language use, and 
reading to make sound judgements of the ethics of the text. 
I want to look at one more aspect of Moon's glossary. In his entries 
entitled 'Author' and 'Character' he advances some by now familiar post-
structuralist ideas about the construction of subjects both in texts and in life. 
However, perhaps because he does not have sufficient space to develop the 
ideas fully, or because he does not recognise the importance of fine distinctions, 
he too fails to leave room for the least degree of free will, moral responsibility, 
and communication between writer and reader. Post-structuralism is probably 
right in drawing our attention to how problematic these things are, but arguably 
wrong when it denies them entirely. Rorty, in the review quoted above, has 
something relevant to contribute here: 
...we should keep reminding people that the selves to which they hope to be 
true are 'dialogical selves' - that we are what we are because of the people, real 
or imaginary, with whom we have talked. As Taylor says, 'We become full 
human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining an 
identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression.' 
The great merit of Taylor's... book... is the vigour with which he 
restates the point which Hegel (and later Dewey) urged against Rousseau and 
Kant: that we are only individuals in so far as we are social. None of us has a 
self to be faithful to except the one which has been cobbled together in 
interchanges with parents and siblings, friends and enemies, churches and 
governments. Even if we bring something new and idiosyncratic into the 
world, it will be at best a slight modification of what was already there. (3) 
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I draw attention to Taylor's use of the phrase 'dialogical selves' and the word 
'agents', and to Rorty's admission that we may be able to 'bring something new 
and idiosyncratic into the world', be it ever so slight. These may seem subtle 
points, but they are significant in denying a picture of the writer and reader as 
totally constructed by forces outside their control. As I seek to demonstrate in 
Chapters 2 and 3, there remains a space, however limited, in which humans may 
be free to choose their courses of action and be held morally responsible for 
them. It is the same space in which teachers may be held morally responsible for 
entering into dialogue with their students about the ethical issues raised by 
narratives of all kinds. The Russian formalist scholar Mikhail Bakhtin (1973) 
has noted that the novel, as a 'dialogical' form (like plays and narrative films, 
one might add), is well suited to expressing social complexities, and that some 
novels do this better than others. He accuses Tolstoy of constructing 1 monologic' 
novels in which only one point of view ultimately dominates, whereas 
Dostoevsky's works are 'dialogic' and therefore more ethically complex. Indeed, 
teaching morality and ethical judgement through stories has been a traditional 
role of education, and it remains no less so today despite the fact that it has been 
problematised and often marginalised by the influence of post-structuralist ideas 
upon critical literacy teaching. 
in a 1994 issue of English in Australia Bronwen Mellor and Annette Patterson 
admit to feeling some anxiety about the fact that normative issues inescapably 
disrupt the desired, and supposedly free, play of interpretations in the post-
structuralist classroom. Teachers, they note, do have political commitments (for 
example to freedom from discrimination on the basis of gender, class and race), 
and they do promote critical readings which support these views. Admitting this 
fact openly is the first step in developing an ethics of teaching ethical and 
political issues without excessive indoctrination. Vaughan Prain, (1996) in an 
essay entitled, "Readings by Request", takes up this issue, pointing out the 
contradiction inherent in adopting post-structuralist approaches to reading in 
promoting particular value positions under the aegis of teaching critical literacy. 
On the one hand, he says, theorists assume that students are free agents able to 
construct a variety of unconstrained readings in response to texts, while on the 
other they are seen as having been constructed as readers and as subjects by a 
variety of discourses. He cites Ian Hunter's (1994) argument that a major cause 
of the contradiction has been that teachers have failed to acknowledge that 
'English education has necessarily been predominantly concerned with "pastoral 
surveillance", despite various rationales to the contrary'. (34) While Hunter has 
not proposed an overtly new rationale for English teaching, Prain points out that 
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he 'implies the need for English teachers to acknowledge more directly the 
nature of their work on students' subjectivities'. (34) Thus Prain welcomes 
Mellor and Patterson's admission that 'the aim of reading lessons is "to construct 
the reader as a social agent with particular capacities - such as that of producing 
feminist or anti-racist or plural readings of a text". (35) However, Prain notes 
that this amounts to a justification for gross indoctrination, and he suggests that 
a broader, more complex rationale for English teaching needs to be developed. 
Such a rationale, he says, would begin with the recognition that literature 
teaching is centrally about the formation of particular values and subjectivities 
in students. However, it would also be concerned with 'the understanding and 
critique of (and, in some cases, empathetic engagement with) the values 
represented in texts'; 'developing a range of communicative skills and 
knowledge'; and understanding 'the bases of these values and the authorial 
choices through which these values are represented in texts'. Finally, he says, 
'students also need to understand more clearly (and be able to evaluate) the 
values by which they judge others' values'. (36) Prain does not, however, offer a 
program of values education which would impart to students these ethical and 
meta-ethical capacities. All he does is offer some strategies for responding to 
texts which rely on the complex understandings needed in order to extend a 
literary text in the style of its author. I think Prain is right in supposing that this 
type of 'creative' response will engage students in subtle processes of 
empathising with, evaluating and criticising the values presented in the text, and 
that this would provide a more effective values education than simply 
demanding of students particular kinds of readings, such as a feminist reading. 
However, this strategy will not equip students with the possible justifications for 
particular moral positions, or the skills of reasoning needed to criticise or defend 
those positions. Yet it is precisely these skills and understandings which are 
required if students are going to make reasoned choices about the values which 
their schooling is inculcating in them. If students are to be offered an antidote to 
the moral indoctrination which it seems schools inevitably impose, then it is to 
be found in the theory and practice of ethics education - as will be made clear in 
the next section of the present chapter. In this way they will be enabled to 
become as nearly autonomous moral agents as it is possible for them to be. 
James Gee (1994) is the only critical literacy theorist I am aware of who 
has recognised that the values which his practice implies need not only to be 
declared but also to have some sort of reasoned foundation. He concludes a 
paper entitled "Postmodernism and Literacies" with 'a consideration of how 
moral judgements and practices of resistance can be "validated" in the face of 
the pervasive postmodern rejection of claims to exclusivity and privilege on the 
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part of any social practice'. (271) Gee admits that there is no simple answer to 
this problem, yet the solution he offers is short, if not sweet. He proposes two 
fundamental conceptual principles governing human ethical discourse: 
That something would harm someone else (deprive them of what they or the 
society they are in view as "goods") is always a good enough reason (though 
perhaps not a sufficient reason) not to do it... 
One always has the ethical obligation to try to explicate (render overt and 
conscious) any social practice that there is reason to believe advantages oneself 
or one's group over other people or other groups. (292) 
He then appeals to all human beings on the basis of their rationality to follow 
these principles. If after careful discussion some people reject them, then in his 
opinion they do not deserve to be honoured by the term 'human'. What should 
happen next Gee does not say, but some people (Richard Rorty perhaps?) might 
be quick to assume that when such a miscreant has been declared to be outside 
the human family he can justifiably be penned up like a dangerous animal or 
swatted like a fly. All Gee offers is this - perhaps ominous - observation: 'In the 
end we run out of words, and meaning is rooted finally in judgement and action'. 
(293) Gee may be right here, but the implications of his view require further 
discussion. Clearly exponents of critical literacy need to develop a 
comprehensive ethical foundation for their practices, and to link this with a 
program of moral and ethical education which allows students to participate in 
the decisions which are being made about the values that they are expected to 
display. In the next section of this chapter I examine a workable model for 
ethics education, particularly through literacy teaching, and in subsequent 
sections I look more deeply at the strengths and weaknesses of post-
structuralism as a theoretical foundation for such practice. 
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2. The hegemony of morals and the necessity of ethics education 
It is clear that we make value judgements constantly and, indeed, that it is 
impossible to function in life without discriminating between likes and dislikes, 
good and bad, better and best, beautiful and ugly, and so on. In The Long-
Legged Fly: a Theology of Language and Desire, Don Cupitt (1987) argues that, 
as biological organisms, our most fundamental response to the phenomena of 
our environment is a binary ranking of those phenomena in order of their value 
to us, or in other words, of whether they 'turn us on or off. He goes on to show 
how these binary rankings are further articulated by human culture into 
elaborate patterns of scaling, particularly in the structure of language. By such 
means moral values - socially accepted standards of right and wrong, which 
have proved useful in organising viable communities - emerge within the 
various discourses of every culture and become enshrined in their languages. 
Valuing is therefore a fundamental human activity, and ethics - a later 
development of civilised societies - is the study of how, why and on what 
criteria human beings unconsciously and consciously make distinctions between 
right and wrong. Many such moral judgements have, of course, already been 
made for us by our society, and as we grow up we internalise these assumptions 
as rules of conduct. Thus morals exercise a hegemony over our attitudes and 
behaviour, and it is only through their conscious re-examination in the study of 
ethics that we can judge the validity and appropriateness of the particular moral 
obligations which shape our lives. In this light it is clear that values education, 
and in particular ethics education, ought to be seen as highly important in 
schooling, especially in a society dominated by cultural pluralism and rapid 
change. 
In his book, Values Education in Australian Schools, Brian Hill (1991) 
argues for the centrality and, indeed, inescapability of values education: 
...schooling is not a neutral process because.. .it represents something 
which adult society values... 
Having set out on the path of intervention, adult society then develops 
a curriculum which inevitably exercises a powerful influence on students. 
Apart from anything else they might learn, students get the message that, in the 
things which it includes and excludes, the curriculum mirrors the priorities 
which the community sets on things such as personal worth, job preparation, 
'the basics', 'the disciplines', the rights of minorities, and so on. 
Values education goes on, therefore, even when we are not 
consciously planning for it. But when its effect is not acknowledged or 
controlled, the result is often that wrong values for life are propagated by 
default. In schools where the emphasis is on learning subjects to gain good 
marks in order to beat others into higher education and better jobs, students are 
encouraged to develop a very self-centred and consumer-oriented value 
system. (3) 
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These sentiments will come as no surprise to teachers of English who in recent 
years have been reading in their national journal, English in Australia, that all 
teaching is political, that all texts are ideological, and that teachers should help 
students to understand how their notions of gender, class and race have been 
constructed. However, Hill's discussion extends the scope of values education 
beyond politics and the undoubtedly important issues of gender, class and race: 
he analyses the nature of values, identifying their cognitive, affective and 
volitional elements; he shows how we can avoid the extremes of either teaching 
preferred values as facts or, at the opposite pole, of representing all value 
judgements as entirely subjective; and he suggests how values can themselves 
be taught ethically in a secular, pluralist democracy. An important component of 
Hill's values education program is his notion of 'committed impartiality', 
whereby the teacher models the adult responsibility to adopt reasoned attitudes 
and to live by them, while remaining open to rational persuasion to change 
them. Thus Hill encourages teachers to declare their own views at appropriate 
moments during class discussion, whilst giving fair representation to opposing 
views and encouraging students to reason together in order to shape their 
opinions. 
With these ideas in mind, Hill maintains that values education should 
seek, as a minimum specification: 
1. to enable students 
(a) to acquire a representative knowledge base concerning the value 
traditions which have helped to form contemporary culture; 
(b) to enter with empathy into the perceptions and feelings of people 
who have been strongly committed to these traditions; 
(c) to develop skills of critical and appreciative values appraisal; 
(d) to develop and put into practice the skills of decision making and 
value negotiation; and 
2. it should enable them to develop a concern for the community and the care 
of its members. (10) 
Thus for Hill values education goes beyond teaching how to recognise and 
criticise our own and others' values, to include the encouragement to adopt 
values such as empathy, tolerance and care - in other words, those minimal or 
procedural values which, he maintains, allow a secular, pluralist democracy to 
flourish and transform itself into a better society. This is another situation where 
Hill believes that the need to make a judgement about fundamental values 
is inescapable. Society simply cannot function without some agreed values, but 
the question then arises as to which values will provide society with the best 
foundation. Hill summarises the various meta-ethical theories on which ethical 
systems have been based to demonstrate that even at this level choices have to 
be made. Thus, for example, C.S. Lewis (1967) in The Abolition of Man, or 
Reflections on Education with Special Reference to the Teaching of English in 
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the Upper Forms of Schools makes a case for the existence of a Natural Law 
which is the a priori foundation of morality in the same way as axioms are the 
foundation of mathematics and science. His choice is therefore a deontological 
rather than a utilitarian approach to ethics as the basis for education. My own 
choice, which I will attempt to justify in Chapter 2, is for a version of ethics 
founded on evolutionary principles but foreshadowing a possible synthesis with 
some postmodern and metaphysical ideas. 
Hill's book explores the ethical foundations of values education in 
considerable though not exhaustive depth, taking care to anticipate and answer 
many questions which immediately arise. For example, in a chapter entitled 
'Exploring Multiculturalism', Hill argues that, 'A policy of Multiculturalism in 
education requires that the multicultural perspective infuse all studies in the 
school curriculum.' (84) He then suggests ways in which this might be applied 
in, among other disciplines, Literary Studies: 
I would argue that the stranglehold of what is classically termed 
'English Literature' must be broken. As a core subject it has never been 
particularly suitable to an Anglo-Celt in Australia. Only a few decades ago, in 
fact, it excluded any reference to literary products outside the United Kingdom, 
even from Australia. If it was inadequate then as a core study, the 'Eng. Lit.' 
approach is all the more unsuitable now in a multicultural situation. 
A richer interchange of literary products from many cultures should 
form the basis of core studies in literature. This does not invalidate, however, 
the desirability of including specifically British literature in the elective range. 
It would be short-sighted not to make it possible for students at all levels to 
encounter a body of literature which has so substantially affected the culture 
which we now regard as Australian. 
A further reform is called for. Standard teaching approaches in literary 
studies have tended to reflect the somewhat over-refined casuistry of an 
intellectual elite rather than the interests of all people in the literary 
communication of finer perceptions and feelings. A particular kind of rational-
critical analysis, impregnated with the doctrine that one should not allow moral 
or cultural valuations to intrude, has choked off the interest of many a student 
in good literature. 
One of the greatest gains from the competent teaching of literature - 
from any source - is an increase in the powers of empathy and sensitivity to 
human motivations. Similarly, relating literature to its place and time makes 
the experience more vivid. Both of these aspects, neglected in the over-refined 
version of 'Eng. Lit.', become particularly important when one is also hoping 
for gains in multicultural understanding. (88) 
I have quoted this example at length because of its immediate interest to English 
teachers, and because it demonstrates clearly that a stimulating critique of the 
aims and methods of English can be gained when viewed in the wider context of 
values education. Of course only one aspect of values education is being 
considered here, the ethic of multi-culturalism (a value which has itself been 
hotly debated in Australia in recent times). Also Hill's critique is neither entirely 
new nor unexceptionable. In fact, Hill reveals in his third and fourth paragraphs 
that the teaching of English is somewhat beyond his expertise. The confusions 
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which abound there are at the heart of the difficulties of teaching literature in 
schools, yet on the one hand the English departments in universities are usually 
not interested in these school problems, and on the other the general public just 
want from literature 'a good read.' It is left to academics in departments of 
education and to teachers to confront the problems largely by themselves. And 
increasingly, new teachers will have come through academic departments which 
have promoted only 'theory' and/or 'cultural studies', often without ethical 
investigation. Thus it is very important for those who do recognise the need to 
help students to undertake a radical appraisal of the values implicit in the texts 
they study, to have a broad philosophical and educational justification for what 
they are doing. This is just what Hill supplies. 
In the light of the use of a form of deconstruction by the post-
structuralist educationists discussed above to expose the ideology inherent in a 
text, a more relevant example might be Hill's answer to the question, 'Should 
Religion be Taught?' After describing some approaches to teaching religion 
which proved in practice to be failures, and after making his own 
recommendations, he says that 
...religious studies, properly taught, inevitably encourage the 
development of a critical consciousness, and this is one of the most widely 
accepted goals of a general education. To recognise when truth claims are 
being made, to appreciate the differences between entertaining beliefs and 
claiming to know, to understand the part played in human thought by 
presuppositions and theoretical models: all these are antidotes for the one-
dimensional culture trap we spoke of earlier. (60) 
Hill goes on to deal with the objection that the teaching of a variety of faiths, or 
ideologies, can lead to the promotion of relativism and agnosticism. He counters 
this by arguing that Australian educators are justified in promoting democratic 
values and highlighting their Judaic and Christian roots. In support of this 
perhaps controversial view, he debunks two common misconceptions: first, that 
it is possible to construct a neutral curriculum and, second, that all religions are 
equal in their moral implications. He then goes on to point out that societies 
cannot function without an agreed set of values, and in Australia those values 
have been drawn from the Judaeo-Christian religious tradition, together with the 
Graeco-Roman democratic ideal which provides for the orderly adjustment of 
our values to suit changing circumstances and attitudes. Here is another useful 
discussion for English teachers, for while they may pay lip-service to the notion 
that all teaching is political and that not all ideologies are equally good 
(certainly Marxists and feminists will concur), I suggest that they may not be 
very expert at justifying their values, or of teaching their students how to make 
well-founded value judgements. In other words, to the extent that teachers' 
41 
values are unexamined in the light of an understanding of ethics and values 
education they may be guilty of unduly manipulating and indoctrinating their 
students. 
Hill's discussion of teaching English and religious studies touches on an 
issue which is at the very heart of any discussion of the ethical and political 
roles of literary and cultural studies, and of critical social literacy: that of the 
literary (and religious) canon. Clearly Hill's view is that students should be 
introduced to the ideas and cultural practices which have shaped our mainstream 
social values, but he also thinks that students should understand the stories and 
beliefs of minority groups within our culture and of other traditions outside it, in 
order to encourage both critical consciousness and multicultural understanding. 
In this way he hopes to avoid inculcating the twin extremes of moral relativism 
and intolerance of cultural differences. Traditionally the literary canon has been 
invoked to counter the first extreme by upholding the moral and other values of 
the Western tradition, especially after the failure of Christianity in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. But latterly the canon has been attacked and 
largely jettisoned in schools and cultural studies departments to counter the 
other extreme of intolerance of difference. Thus in recent times the traditional 
literary canon has been blamed for entrenching hegemonies of class, race, 
gender and sexuality, and has been replaced by texts which express the interests 
of diverse groups in our increasingly pluralist society, including women, 
aborigines, migrants, punks and gays. Furthermore the canon has been expanded 
to encompass popular texts which express the desires of ordinary members of 
the community and/or the (exploitative?) interests of powerful media and 
marketing conglomerates. In this movement it is clear why departments of 
literary studies are being replaced in universities by departments of cultural 
studies, and why an older model of English literature teaching in schools is 
being replaced by that of critical social literacy. In both sectors of education the 
teaching of the 'core values' of society through a canon of what Matthew Arnold 
called 'the best that has been thought and known' (Gribble, Ed., 1967: 116) is 
being supplanted by teaching the politics of literacy. Often, though, the political 
agendas being pursued are narrowed in focus by unexamined notions of political 
correctness, and politics is seen reductively as a power struggle designed to 
assert the rights of particular groups. Politics, however, can also be about 
negotiating shared values and defining common responsibilities, and thus is 
intimately related to ethics. 
When one looks at the passage of Culture and Anarchy in which 
Arnold's memorable phrase occurs, it is also easy to see why his canon is now 
frequently and unfairly caricatured as representing a monolithic moral code 
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which upholds the hegemony of the ruling class while pretending to serve 
egalitarian motives: 
[Culture] does not try to teach down to the level of inferior classes; it does not 
try to win them for this or that sect of its own, with ready-made judgements 
and watchwords. It seeks to do away with classes; to make the best that is 
thought and known in the world current everywhere; to make all men live in an 
atmosphere of sweetness and light, where they may use ideas, as it uses them 
itself, freely, - nourished, and not bound by them. (Gribble, Ed., 1967: 116) 
The literary canon, while certainly narrow, has never been ideologically 
monolithic (as Harold Bloom, 1994, demonstrates in his book, The Western 
Canon) and it would be a case of constructing a straw man to claim that it was. 
On the other hand, we can now see that Arnold's program of cultural education 
promotes a form of meritocracy where those who are able and willing to benefit 
by becoming cultured in his terms are welcomed into the ruling class, while 
those who are not must remain inferior. However, it is unfair to dismiss Arnold's 
motives as hypocritical since he was as much a product of his age as we are of 
ours. His idea of culture and of what was best within it was certainly narrow by 
our standards, but his conception of education was conditioned by Romantic 
notions of the perfectibility of man, and his idea of class had not yet been 
subjected to Karl Marx's influence, even though the two men were 
contemporaries. 
Moreover, it does not behove proponents of cultural studies to feel 
superior to Arnold, as if they were inhabitants of a more advanced era. The 
motive behind the movement to cultural studies and critical social literacy is the 
same moral impulse as Arnold's: a concern for social justice. And the movement 
itself, as I have been arguing, appears to be as ethically naive in the light of 
Hill's approach to values education as Arnold's idealistically egalitarian program 
of education seems politically naive in the light of the neo-Marxism which 
informs so much of post-structuralism and cultural studies today. There is a line 
of historical development which links Arnold's ideas with those of critical social 
literacy teachers. Yet one difference between them is that Arnold's optimism 
about the power of a moral education to reform society, combined with his 
political naivety, has been replaced by an optimism about the power of a 
political education and direct political action, combined with an ethical naivety. 
Another difference is that Arnold's idea is driven by aesthetic and humanist 
principles, whereas cultural studies is driven by economics and psychoanalysis. 
One thing which they both have in common, however, is that narratives play 
important roles in their educational programs, albeit with different emphases. 
It is not necessary to rehearse here all of that complex, century-long 
phase in the development of the role of literature in society and of the teaching 
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of English in universities and schools from Arnold to the present day, since it 
has been done by others (including F.R. Leavis, Raymond Williams, Richard 
Hoggart and Terry Eagleton.) In very broad outline such a history begins in the 
second half of the nineteenth century with the failure of Christianity, under the 
influences of Romanticism and Darwinian science, to provide an absolute 
foundation for morality. The influence of Darwin is illustrated in my discussion 
in Chapter 3 of A.S. Byatt's dramatic reworking of this theme in her novella, 
'Morpho Eugenia' (although I have held my discussion over until then because 
her text is one of several which I also want to analyse in the light of the 
evolutionary, postmodern and metaphysical ethics introduced in Chapter 2). 
This history also includes Thomas Arnold's shaping of the English public school 
as the training ground for administrators of the British Empire, and his son 
Matthew Arnold's proposal that the moral education of these young men could 
be effected by their exposure not only to the Greek and Roman classics, but also 
to the 'best' of traditional and contemporary English and European literature. In 
the absence of Christian foundations creative writers, such as the late Dickens, 
Conrad and Hardy, produced novels which have a strong element of moral 
questioning - a development which I illustrate in some detail in Chapter 3 in my 
study of Conrad's novella, Heart of Darkness. F.R. Leavis's (1949) idea of 'the 
Great Tradition' built on this criterion of moral questioning and extended the 
canon to include D.H. Lawrence through a Fabian-socialist-Marxist reworking 
of Christian morality. Raymond Williams (1958) continued the Marxist critique 
which was subsequently taken up by critics like Terry Eagleton (1984) in the 
UK and Fredric Jameson (1981) in the US, who combined it with French post-
structuralism, which had itself been directly conditioned by post-war European 
Marxism (as well as by Nietzschean philosophy and Saussurean linguistics). 
The postmodern novel is of course one literary expression of this development, 
as I illustrate in Chapter 3 in my discussion of Aidan Chambers' young adult 
fiction, Breaktime. The ethico-political traditions of feminism andsay liberation 
are intertwined in this history as well - through, for example, such early figures 
as Virginia Woolf and E.M. Forster - and these traditions too have drawn 
latterly upon a combination of neo-Marxist and post-structuralist theories. 
Thus it is clear that Arnold's and Marx's concern for moral education, 
however oppositionary in some ways, have been transformed into our 
contemporary political agendas. What is not so apparent perhaps is why ethics, 
which ought to be seen as integral with politics, has been marginalised in this 
process. Fredric Jameson (1981: 114) provides one answer to this question by 
claiming that ethics has become implicated in the oppressive regime of the 
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dominant power group. 6  Another answer might be found in tracing the tradition 
of aestheticism, culminating in the view that art has nothing to do with morality, 
from the German Romantics through Coleridge, Walter Pater and Oscar Wilde. 
A later influence on literary studies which marginalised both ethical and 
political concerns was the New Criticism. This was itself a kind of aestheticism 
and shared its prioritising of close reading of the text independently of its 
authorial context with post-structuralism. Another important factor was the 
influence of logical positivism and linguistic philosophy in English thought, 
particularly with the view that ethical and aesthetic propositions are simply 
expressions of emotion rather than statements of fact. 
It is significant, however, that in the decades of the 1960s to the 1980s, 
when English literary studies largely abandoned ethical in favour of political 
criticism, there has been a burgeoning of interest in ethics among philosophers, 
so much so that Peter Singer (1994: 2) claims that substantial progress has been 
made in ethics in our time. Moreover there has been a growing interest by some 
philosophers in the role played by stories in ethics from the Classical period, 
through Kant, to the present day. In his book Ethics, Theory and the Novel 
David Parker (1994) traces this 'turn to ethics'. He maintains, for example, that 
the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum 'goes further than Rorty in treating 
literature not merely as a sort of servant of ethics ('helping' it to do its job), but 
as itself moral philosophy.' (34) This, he says, is a theme which informs all her 
work, including especially (1990) Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and 
Literature. Another important contribution to this development has been made 
by Tobin Siebers' (1992) book, Morals and Stories, in which he argues a case 
against the curious history of linguistic ethics from G.E. Moore to J. Hillis 
Miller before turning to a detailed study of 'stories with morals' in the works of 
Homer, Plato, Kant, Austen, Tolstoy and Achebe. Siebers' ethical criticism 
brilliantly re-establishes for our time the age-old link between ethics, literature 
and moral instruction. 
The exploration of this link - especially of the idea that literature can 
itself be a form of moral philosophy - is central to the aims of my study. Thus it 
seems appropriate at this point to invite the reader to do what many readers are 
prone to do - and what postmodern texts (for example 'hypertext' documents) are 
sometimes constructed . to facilitate: namely to jump ahead at any time in order 
to read part or all of Chapter 3. There many of the theoretical points made in 
Chapters 1 and 2 are illustrated - more readily perhaps, depending upon the 
6 Jameson's claim perhaps applies better to morality as I have defined it. However, as I will 
discuss in more detail in Chapter 2, evolutionary psychology lends support to Jameson's view, 
even in regard to ethics which could be seen as the rationalisation of evolved moral values for 
self-interested ends. 
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reader's taste - by my discussion of the works of fiction by Conrad, Chambers 
and Byatt which I have mentioned above. 
In the context of the changing role, and hence the composition, of the 
canon Hill's program of values education seems much more judicious than that 
of most proponents of cultural studies and critical social literacy. He is certainly 
in favour of broadening the range of texts to be studied in schools and 
universities along the lines of cultural studies curricula, but not in favour of 
abandoning those texts which have in the past shaped our society for good and 
ill. And while he is committed to a political agenda, it is a much more openly 
democratic one than that of the ethically unexamined and all too tendentious 
politics which often characterises cultural studies and critical literacy. The great 
problem with Hill's approach is ultimately a practical one: how to cover all of 
this diverse content in a way which will support a happy balance between 
informing students about the nature of the culture(s) which they have inherited, 
inculcating in them those moral values which society has for the time being 
decided will serve all of its citizens better than those of the past, and educating 
them in those critical and creative skills - including the skills of ethics - which 
will empower them to reshape society in the future. Nevertheless, practicalities 
aside, it is clear that teachers need still more theory in their pedagogy - and not 
just literary theory, radical or otherwise. I am arguing that what they need most 
urgently just now is ethics, and a philosophy and methodology of values 
education such as Hill has supplied. From this perspective they will then be in a 
better position to evaluate the truth claims and the ethical and political 
implications of post-structuralist literary theories for the teaching of literature. 
The urgency of this undertaking will become apparent in the remainder of this 
chapter as I look more closely at post-structuralism and its critics. In the next 
section I analyse an essay by Stanley Fish in order to illustrate the paradoxical 
nature of poststructuralism and its propensity to obviate all possible criticisms 
before they start. I follow this in the subsequent section with a summary of a 
variety of criticisms of poststructuralism which do have some purchase. 
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3. Post-structuralism versus metaphysics: play of opposites? 
in an essay entitled 'Rhetoric', Stanley Fish (1990) outlines the long history of 
the debate between rhetorical and 'philosophical' (i.e. metaphysical, particularly 
realist) views of knowledge. Fish's discussion begins with the attack on the 
sophists by Socrates and Plato, and ends with the apparent ascendancy of the 
rhetorical in post-structuralist literary theory and antifoundationalist ethics. On 
the way he cites, as one example of the reinstatement of rhetoric in our time, the 
work of the sociologist of science, Thomas Kuhn, (1962) in his famous book, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Yet Fish overstates Kuhn's view of the 
social construction of scientific paradigms. Indeed, he only mentions in passing 
that Kuhn and others have denied that scientific knowledge is developed in a 
manner which 'leaves us in a world of epistemological anarchy'. (211) 7 Kuhn's 
book is often called upon to support the popular post-structuralist view of 
science as simply another discourse, one with no greater claim to truth than any 
other, but this is to ignore other work in the philosophy of science. 8 
Fish concludes his essay by declaring that it is impossible to decide 
between the conflicting epistemological stances of rhetoric and metaphysics. To 
summarise the conflict he has described, he offers 'the last word' to Richard 
Rorty, a philosopher who, Fish reminds us, 'is himself a champion of the anti-
essentialism that underlies rhetorical thinking': (221) 
There.. .are two ways of thinking about various things... The first.. thinks of 
truth as a vertical relationship between representations and what is represented. 
The second...thinks of truth horizontally - as the culminating reinterpretation of 
our predecessors' reinterpretation of their predecessors' reinterpretation... It is 
the difference between regarding truth, goodness, and beauty as eternal objects 
which we try to locate and reveal, and regarding them as artifacts whose 
fundamental design we often have to alter. (221) 
After deferring to Rorty in having the last word, Fish apparently cannot resist 
adding a final gloss of his own: 'It is the difference between serious man and 
rhetorical man. It is the difference that remains.' (222) As Fish has 
acknowledged, Rorty has found it necessary, at least in practice, to choose 
between the binary oppositions he has described, and to construct a neo-
pragmatist, anti-foundationalist ethics. But Fish has earlier argued that any such 
7 Paul Churchland (1995) comments that 'Kuhn is decidedly conservative in his methodological 
impulses... [He] was not attacking scientific standards. Rather, he was attacking a false and 
confabulatory theory about the nature of scientific standards, a worthy and non-trivial 
philosophical theory called Logical Empiricism, a theory which tried to capture all such 
standards in narrowly logical terms.' (276) 
8 See especially Karl Popper's (1979) evolutionary epistemology, which I invoke again in 
Chapter 2. A useful discussion of Kuhn's work in relation to more recent developments in the 
philosophy of science can be found in Keith Windschuttle's (1994) The Killing of History. 
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choice will ultimately veer back in the opposite direction. (221) It seems that he 
repeats this idea when he says, 'It is the difference that remains', thereby 
invoking Derrida's famous pun contained in his neologism, differance. Hence 
neither the rhetorical nor the metaphysical view can be held finally: while they 
always already differ, they always already defer to one another. If anything can 
be held to be certain, it is this radical uncertainty, undecidability, 
inconclusiveness. Here, as Fish is well aware, he is rehearsing the central 
paradox of post-structuralism: that the certainty of uncertainty is itself uncertain 
and so, according to Fish, we are led back to the certainties of metaphysics only 
to find that they in turn become uncertain again. 
Fish's view of our epistemological quandary may be all very well for the 
theorist in his study, unconcerned with the choices forced upon the practitioner. 
However, if he is right, there are at least two practical implications about which 
he is silent, one clearly healthy and the other somewhat ambiguous. First, his 
undecidability thesis entails a perennial scepticism which is surely a necessary 
hygiene for the worldly philosopher engaged in the praxis of politics, criticism, 
creative writing, teaching, making moral judgements and so on. Whether this 
philosophical practitioner chooses rhetoric or metaphysics (or some synthesis in 
between) as his guide - and choose he must, as the example of Richard Rorty 
demonstrates - it will be better if he remembers that in Fish's world of 
undecidability all such commitments are finally a leap in the dark. Has not post-
structuralism notoriously argued that totalising philosophies - such as the whole 
project of Western metaphysics - have a propensity ultimately to tip over into 
totalitarianism by suppressing the dissenting silences and contradictions lurking 
beneath their beguiling surfaces? Such scepticism is therefore surely salutary - 
after all, would we not prefer every fanatic to admit that he might just possibly 
be wrong? 
But in saying this, have not I already deserted Fish's pose of lofty 
detachment as the historian of ideas, and plumped for the pragmatism of the 
antifoundationalist? At first sight Fish doesn't seem to have gone this far in his 
article, for he is careful to appear admirably non-committal. Yet - and here I 
come to the second, disturbing, implication of Fish's view - in admitting that 
there is an alternative to foundationalism, and especially in declaring that the 
dispute between them is undecidable, has not Fish already predisposed himself 
always to adopt the rhetorical line in the moment when he puts his Olympian 
insight into practice? Merely to say, 'It is the difference that remains', is 
instantly more than an observation - it suggests a commitment, a cry of, Vive la 
differance!' If this is so, Fish is not as detached as he seems, for his apparently 
unbiased description is now revealed as the old rhetoric thinly disguised as 
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impartiality and even more subversive than he pretends. Adopt a radical 
undecidability as an alternative and it sweeps the field clean: farewell 
metaphysics forever, enter the totalitarianism of post-structuralism. Accept 
Fish's account of the inevitability of the self-deconstruction of knowledge - his 
undecidability thesis - and the only way back will have to be via the 
deconstruction of deconstruction. But that is an endlessly recursive process in 
which deconstruction has the first and last word. Take this way and, of course, 
there is no way back at all. We will not only have dismissed metaphysics 
forever, but we will already have passed the brink of scepticism - which at least 
entertains the possibility that metaphysics provides a place to stand - and be 
falling into the bottomless abyss of nihilism where there is nothing left for it but 
to learn to hold hands in the rush of air. 
Is this an overly gloomy view of the triumph of post-structuralism? Let 
me lighten it a little by extending the metaphor of free fall. In our immediate 
environment falling is only fatal if there is terra firma beneath and one's 
parachute does not open. In a bottomless abyss, or in the zero gravity of space, 
parachutes are not necessary and free fall can be exciting for those who master 
its possibilities. Likewise, I do not think that a world without epistemological 
foundations is impossible to live in reasonably happily and responsibly. (Once 
again the example of Richard Rorty will suffice for the moment.) On the other 
hand, far off in space there are said to be singularities known as black holes: 
falling into one of them would almost certainly be fatal! Perhaps the same could 
be said of falling into the mise-en-abime of deconstruction. 
What concerns me most about some practising post-structuralists in 
English and education departments is that realist or idealist (i.e. foundationalist) 
philosophies seem to have been ruled completely out of the question. It is 
especially disturbing to meet what I am tempted to call 'post-structuralist 
fundamentalists 9 who scorn their realist colleagues as 'uninitiated' or as 'residual 
humanists'. Fortunately such scoffers are rare but, from what I have said above 
in questioning post-structuralism's claim to open-endedness, there does seem to 
be in post-structuralism - as in all of the '-isms' it delights in deconstructing - a 
tendency towards an oppressive totalitarianism. It is against this possibility that 
I want to join such eminent critics as Harold Bloom (1994) and Wayne Booth 
(1988) in reviving the kind of healthy scepticism which would allow that even 
latter-day Platonists, such as Roger Penrose (1990, 1995) or Iris Murdoch 
(1992), might be right. Later I will return to their seemingly antiquated claims, 
but my main aim in this study is more modest than theirs: I want to restore hope 
9 An oxymoron with which even those poststructuralists most devoted to paradox would not 
want to labelled. 
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in the possibility of accepting that some truths may exist independently of 
discourse by bringing the insights of evolutionary epistemology into the 
discussion - but more of that in Chapter 2. 
I have been arguing that this hope is ruled out if one accepts, without 
scepticism, Fish's strong view that there is a radical difference between rhetoric 
and metaphysics, that here we have a binary opposition always already in the 
process of deconstruction. Fish has been at pains to present the difference in 
these terms, ostensibly to redress the negative connotations from which the term 
rhetoric has so often suffered, and to make clear its status as an alternative 
which has an equal claim upon our allegiance. In fact, I think he has gone 
further than that and has reversed the old privileging of metaphysics over 
rhetoric in a new privileging of undecidability over decidability. However, Fish 
has already pointed to what I think is a viable way around the black hole of 
deconstruction which he has thus (inadvertently?) opened up. Earlier in his 
essay he discussed the plea of leftist critics such as Terry Eagleton for the 
employment of rhetoric in the cause of creating a more just society. (216) And 
prior to that Fish drew attention to what he subsequently dismissed as a weaker 
defence of rhetoric against the realist attack - that of Aristotle: 
First [Aristotle] defines rhetoric as a faculty or art whose practice will help us 
to observe "in any given case the available means of persuasion" (1355b) and 
points out that as a faculty it is not in and of itself inclined away from truth. Of 
course, bad men may abuse it, but that, after all, "is a charge which may be 
made in common against all good things." "What makes a man a 'sophist'," he 
declares, "is not his faculty, but his moral purpose." 
Aristotle's second defence is more aggressively positive and responds 
directly to one of the most damaging characterisations of rhetoric: "We must be 
able to employ persuasion ... on opposite sides of a question, not in order that 
we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people 
believe what is wrong) but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are" 
(1355a). In short, properly used, rhetoric is a heuristic, helping us not to distort 
the facts but to discover them; the setting forth of contrary views of a matter 
will have the beneficial effect of showing us which of those views most 
accords with the truth. By this argument, as Peter Dixon has pointed out (1971, 
14), Aristotle "removes rhetoric from the realm of the haphazard and the 
fanciful" and rejoins it to that very realm of which it was said to be the great 
subverter. 
But if this is the strength of Aristotle's defence, it is also its weakness, 
for in making it he reinforces the very assumptions in relation to which rhetoric 
will always be suspect, assumptions of an independent reality whose outlines 
can be perceived by a sufficiently clear-eyed observer who can then represent 
them in transparent verbal medium. The stronger defence, because it hits at the 
heart of the opposing tradition, is one that embraces the accusations of that 
tradition and makes of them a claim. (206) 
It is along the lines of Aristotle's 'weaker' defence of rhetoric that I want 
to pursue my assessment of the possibilities for an ethically responsible 
employment of a revised post-structuralism in the search for 'an independent 
reality'. In doing so I maintain that post-structuralism tends to recognise only the 
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recursive construction and deconstruction of binary oppositions whereas it 
might be more realistic to see a range of positions between extremes. In this 
case it exaggerates the problem of referentiality in language at the same time as 
it quite properly reminds us of the dangers of assuming we know more than we 
do. Viewing language as a semi-transparent medium, it seems to me, offers a 
way forward in establishing an ethics of criticism and the teaching of English - 
not exactly a middle way between foundationalism and antifoundationalism, but 
a modest one. It opens up the possibility of identifying some tentative 
foundations for ethics in an external reality which is knowable and 
communicable to the degree allowed by a healthy, systematic scepticism. Thus I 
am not advocating, as Fish seems to be, that one must accept that there is never 
any deciding between the equal and contradictory claims of post-structuralism 
and metaphysics; nor am I advocating, as I think Fish actually does, that, no 
matter how detached one might like to be in theory, one must accept the 
inevitable slide into the black hole of deconstruction in practice; nor indeed am I 
advocating that one must commit oneself, by an act of faith informed by reason, 
to a thoroughgoing realism, and stalwartly resist all the 'evil' blandishments of 
post-structuralism. All of these seem to me unnecessarily extreme positions. 
What exactly I am advocating will become clearer in the next section as I 
outline some trenchant criticisms of post-structuralist ideas, and in the 
subsequent section where I begin to define what can be salvaged from among 
them. 
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4. Post-structuralism and its critics 
I turn now to several critiques of post-structuralist theories in order to support 
my argument that claims concerning the non-referentiality of texts and the 
discursive construction of the self are frequently exaggerated. It is mainly these 
claims which have given rise to the problematic implications of post-
structuralism for ethics and ethical education which I have outlined above. In 
order to keep the content of this study within reasonable bounds, I will illustrate 
the more widely ranging scope of the critiques I have selected by focussing, for 
the most part, on what they have to say about post-structuralism, especially the 
practice of deconstruction as developed by Derrida and his followers, and the 
problems they raise for ethical and political criticism. 
One of the earliest and most stringent attacks on deconstruction has been 
made by M.H. Abrams in his now famous essay, 'The Deconstructive Angel'. 
(1977) David Lodge, in his introduction to this essay, says that 'Abrams' most 
telling argument is perhaps his claim that, in their own discursive practice, 
deconstructionists rely on the communicative power of language which they 
theoretically deny'. Lodge then comments that 'the deconstructionists' reply is 
that such paradoxes and contradictions are to be found everywhere in language 
as soon as one probes beneath the surface'. (Lodge, 1988: 264) Thus, if we 
consider the deconstructionists' response, deconstruction might appear to be 
impregnable: Abrams tries to destroy deconstruction by deconstructing it, 
thereby demonstrating the usefulness and truth of deconstruction. Here we see 
an early example of what has become a familiar impasse in the continuing 
confrontation between the rationalist position of humanists and the anti-
rationalist position of post-structuralists: one side says that post-structuralism is 
self-contradictory and therefore invalid, and the other says that contradiction 
and the invalidity of all argument are features of the very nature of discourse, so 
we had better learn to live with them. There is, of course, no way forward here. 
However, it seems to me that the main force of Abrams' attack lies in his 
contention that deconstruction, at least as it was practised in the US at the time, 
overstates the difficulties of writers in communicating their meaning to their 
readers. 
Richard Freadman and Seumas Miller (1992) in their book, Re-Thinking 
Theory: A critique of contemporary literary theory and an alternative account, 
provide a clear example of the collision between the rationalist and anti-
rationalist positions. They adopt a 'theorised' humanist position and mount an 
extremely scathing attack on Althusserian Marxist theory, and Derridean and 
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Foucauldian post-structuralism. They point out that the program of social 
reform engaged in by Marxist or feminist literary critics depends upon a notion 
of the substantial self as a moral agent, and upon a notion of texts as being able 
to refer to the real world. Yet the post-structuralist elements of contemporary 
literary theory specifically contradict these notions. In Derrida's case Freadman 
and Miller analyse, in logical and empirical terms, three of his doctrines which 
they claim are identified with the ills of 'constructivist anti-humanism', as they 
like to call the kind of post-structuralism they oppose. The doctrines are: the 
repudiation of referentiality in language; the denial of the substantial self; and 
the dissolution of evaluative discourse, both aesthetic and moral. Their critique 
is rigorously logical, as this example illustrates: 
As we see it, Derrida's argument for the indeterminacy of meaning is as follows: 
(1) if a sign has a determinate meaning then the meaning of that sign is present to 
a speaker or hearer; (2) if the meaning of a sign is wholly relational and 
essentially contextual then that meaning is not present to any speaker or hearer; 
(3) the meaning of any sign is wholly relational and essentially contextual; (4) 
from premises (2) and (3)) the meaning of any sign is not present to any speaker 
or hearer; (5) from (1) and (4)) the meaning of a sign is not determinate. This 
argument is valid. Are the premises true? Let us look in turn at premises (1), (2) 
and (3). (126) 
Freadman and Miller go on to do just that, considering as fairly as they can the 
empirical and logical evidence for Derrida's premises. These doctrines fare 
badly under such analysis since Freadman and Miller find them to be logically 
incoherent and contrary to experience. 
Freadman and Miller do, however, find some good among what they 
regard as bad in the advent of contemporary literary theory, as this comment in 
their introduction shows: 
Constructivist anti-humanism, and contemporary literary theory in general, has 
succeeded in presenting itself as radically innovative. In some respects this is no 
doubt the case, and we do not wish to deny that important advances have in some 
instances been made, especially in areas such as feminist and post-colonial 
literary studies. We hope that our respect for some of these advances, and for the 
social, political and ethical concerns that motivate them, will be apparent in the 
pages that follow. Nor do we wish to deny that, as a result of some recent 
developments in literary theory, certain habitual critical assumptions have 
usefully been challenged. (9) 
However, they go on to warn of the disturbingly illiberal face of so much post-
structuralist practice, a totalitarian impulse which I have noted in my comments 
on Fish's essay: 
But we suggest that constitutive features of constructivist anti-humanism are not 
innovative; that in fact they entail a repetition of some old and serious mistakes. 
In particular, we suggest that certain features of this movement - its prioritising 
of systems over individual selves, its sense of the self as infinitely malleable and 
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transformable, its impatience with ethical elaboration, its contempt for dissenting 
accounts of the world - are, at the very least, subliminally totalitarian in 
tendency. (9) 
One has almost inevitably here to note the infamous scandal occasioned by the 
posthumous discovery of newspaper articles which had been written by the 
eminent post-structuralist critic, Paul de Man, when he was working as a 
journalist in Belgium during the Nazi occupation, and in which, it seemed, he 
effectively collaborated in the persecution of the Jews. There is no evidence that 
de Man ever repudiated the views expressed in these articles. Furthermore, 
according to Louis Menand, (1991) Derrida and others defended de Man by 
claiming that his use of deconstruction was evidence of his actual resistance in 
the offending articles to totalitarian oppression, whilst J. Hillis Miller and 
Geoffrey Hartman saw de Man's wartime attitudes as a youthful error which his 
later work on deconstruction laboured to correct. Menand's judicious account of 
the conflicting responses to the de Man 'scandal' by academics who wished to 
defend both de Man and their own post-structuralist theories lends weight to the 
accusation that post-structuralism is incapable of supplying adequate moral 
foundations upon which a critique of collaboration-under-duress with the Nazi's 
Final Solution might be founded. Thus if post-structuralism is not in itself 
totalitarian it might at least offer some scope for totalitarian practices. 
Freadman and Miller devote their last chapter to outlining an alternative 
humanist literary theory which will support a strong ethical and political agenda 
capable of contributing significantly to the emancipation of the individual. 
Finally they illustrate the value of their theory in a 'reading for the ethical' (228) 
of Saul Bellow's novel Mr Sammler's Planet. Thus, whilst a certain generosity 
is apparent in Freadman and Miller's discussion of post-structuralist positions, it 
is also clear that they can countenance no compromise, no synthesis, with what 
they see as post-structuralism's radically flawed views. Yet, when viewed 
alongside the critiques of post-structuralism which follow, it seems that the 
terms of reference of their argument and the empirical evidence which it is 
based upon are too narrow, and that their claims for the referentiality of texts 
and the agency of a substantial self are therefore too strong. 
Another, more moderate, defender of the referentiality of language, the 
possibility of communication and freedom of choice against the elements of 
post-structuralism which threaten them, is the British philosopher and novelist, 
Iris Murdoch. In her (1992) Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, she describes 
post-structuralism as 'linguistic determinism', and mounts an attack on its 
'exaggerations' and 'sleight of hand'. Ranging - much more widely than do 
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Freadman and Miller - through discussions of Plato, Schopenhauer, 
Wittgenstein, Descartes, Kant, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Heidegger, Anselm, Tillich 
and Buber, to name only some of her references, Murdoch makes a powerful, 
though ultimately tentative, case for the continuing relevance to moral 
philosophy of the great Western metaphysical tradition and of the logical 
reasoning required in philosophical analysis. At the same time she demonstrates 
the important contributions of religion, particularly through both Eastern and 
Western mysticism. It is especially interesting that, in an era when Heidegger 
and Derrida pronounced the end of metaphysical philosophy, Murdoch returns 
to its roots in order to recuperate the Platonic idea of the Good, an idea which 
we learn from Plato is apprehended by mysticism, supported by reason, and 
communicated most engagingly through his command of poetic language. 
Murdoch's book is no cowardly or nostalgic retreat into humanism to 
avoid facing up to disturbing attacks on the metaphysical foundations of the 
humanist tradition by the post-structuralists and the pragmatists. Murdoch 
considers deeply and at length the claims of Derrida, and finds them hardly new 
and dangerously overstated. Nor is it just in the chapter headed 'Derrida and 
Structuralism' that she gives evidence to support her case: right through the 
book she pursues an argument which depends equally on empiricism, mystical 
experience, reason, literature, and appeals to the writings of the great 
philosophers of the Western tradition. She devotes two chapters to the subject of 
'Consciousness and Thought' in which she gives a detailed discussion of the 
philosophical concepts of the self and shows that the pursuit of the idea of the 
Good is worthwhile despite very real human limitations. In particular she keeps 
chipping away at the many arguments which have been used to deny the, 
admittedly limited, freedom of the self. Murdoch's book is clearly a work of 
great significance and one that exponents of post-structuralism should not 
ignore. Indeed, those who are convinced that rhetoric has triumphed over 
metaphysics might be impelled at least to think again if they were to read 
Murdoch with an open mind. 
in several recent books Christopher Norris has advanced a powerful critique of 
some of the post-structuralist elements in postmodernism, not only in their 
extreme versions such as those of Lyotard, Foucault, Baudrillard, Deleuze and 
Guattari, and J. Hillis Miller, but also in the more genial pragmatism of Richard 
Rorty. In his provocatively titled book, (1993) The Truth about Postmodernism, 
Norris focuses on the political and ethical implications for contemporary society 
of the justification by post-structuralist theories of relativism, ethical 
pragmatism and consensus belief. He is especially critical of the resulting 
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malaise of intellectuals and their inability to engage in principled criticism of 
government policy in the UK and the US. In a series of extended essays he 
examines a variety of post-structuralist positions, showing how they have 
misread Kant, who, he argues, anticipated their mistakes in his own defence of 
'practical reason', which provides the foundation for both Kant's ethics and the 
whole program of Enlightenment humanism. 
Norris argues that the American literary critic, J. Hillis Miller, fails to 
support his case that language is non-referential when he notes 'the frequency 
with which Kant has recourse to fictive, allegorical, or imaginary episodes' in 
order to advance his argument. This is a matter which is also discussed at some 
length by Tobin Siebers. (1992) Norris reminds his readers that post-
structuralist theories have 'grown up in isolation from other, more cogent and 
productive ways of thinking about the relation between sense, reference and 
truth'. In particular, post-structuralism, especially as applied in deconstruction, 
has 
taken it as gospel (following Saussure) that 'the sign' is the minimal distinctive 
unit of language, rather than the sentence (or the proposition) conceived as a 
bearer of articulate meanings and truth-claims which can then be analysed in 
terms of their logico-semantic and referential status. By ignoring this alternative 
- as developed by philosophers in the broadly Fregean line of descent - post-
structuralist theory has condemned itself, cheerfully enough, to an outlook of 
last-ditch cognitive scepticism, along with a species of thoroughgoing value-
relativism whose sole guiding principle is Lyotard's strictly incoherent notion of 
'judging without criteria'. For such ideas can gain credence only on condition that 
we give up all claims to validity or truth. (87) 
Throughout his book Norris refers to Derrida in only a few brief and 
surprisingly favourable asides. For example, in pointing out that radical literary 
theorists raise language to 'a position of undisputed eminence' and refuse 'to 
acknowledge any argument or truth-claim that does not abide by this textualist 
imperative', Norris says: 
No doubt one source of confusion here is a simplified reading of Derrida which 
latches on to some of his more sweeping pronouncements as regards the 
Western 'metaphysics of presence', and takes him to have shown - once and for 
all - that any talk of truth is inescapably complicit with that age-old logocentric 
regime. On the contrary, as [Derrida] puts it in a recent essay: 
the value of truth (and all those values associated with it) is never 
contested or destroyed in my writings, but only reinscribed in more 
powerful, larger, more stratified contexts... And within those contexts 
(that is, within relations of force that are always differential - for 
example, socio-political-institutional - but even beyond these 
determinations) that are relatively stable, sometimes apparently almost 
unshakeable, it should be possible to invoke rules of competence, 
criteria of discussion and of consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigour, 
criticism, and pedagogy. 
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One could hardly wish for a plainer declaration of the gulf that separates 
Derrida's work from the currency of postmodern-pragmatist thought. (300, 301) 
Norris concludes that postmodern theorists (excluding Derrida) have 
retreated from their prime task of encouraging the critical debate which is 
required to fight religious and other dogmatisms. (He includes here the 
dogmatic approach of some of Derrida's followers - the 'post-structuralist 
fundamentalists' whom I referred to earlier.) He notes, following Jonathan 
Culler, the irony that current literary theory is the product of the 'historical 
scholarship, textual hermeneutics, philological inquiry, comparative source-
studies, sociology of belief and so forth' which undermined revealed dogmatic 
religion. 'Nowadays,' he says, 'this historical trend has been reversed.. .to a point 
where (for instance) deconstruction can be annexed to the discourse of negative 
theology, 10 and where the values of enlightened or secular critique are routinely 
dismissed as an embarrassing throwback to that bad old regime of reason, 
progress and truth'. (302) 
Kant, Norris maintains, was well aware of the dangers 'courted by any 
interest-group or creed, like the current post-modern pragmatist trend, that set 
out to blur the line between... disparate orders of truth claim, and which thus 
ended up by effectively endorsing a wholesale reduction of truth to what is 
presently and contingently "good in the way of belief" '. (303) What is needed 
today, Norris argues, is a careful re-reading of Kant's account of the relationship 
between epistemology, ethics and aesthetics. 
A scholar who agrees with Norris that 'the minimal distinctive unit of language 
[is] the sentence (or the proposition) conceived as a bearer of articulate 
meanings and truth claims' (Norris, as quoted above) is Richard Harland. In his 
first book, (1991) Superstructuralism, Harland outlines the philosophy of 
structuralism and its modification by post-structuralism, while in his second 
book, (1993) Beyond Superstructuralism, he criticises this philosophy by re-
examining its foundation in the linguistic theory of Saussure. In fact he makes 
precisely the same point as Norris, when he says that 'superstructuralism' tends 
to focus on the individual word as the fundamental unit of meaning rather than 
the sentence or proposition, or, as Harland more accurately puts it, the syntagm. 
Harland develops the basic elements of a syntagmatic theory of language which 
provides a better explanation of how language refers to the world. He then 
considers some of the implications of this theory for philosophy, linguistics, 
10 See for example Kevin Hart's (1989) The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and 
Philosophy. 
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literature and textual interpretation. In commenting on Derrida's deconstruction 
of Plato's use of the word pharmakon, Harland says: 
The first thing to notice is that Derrida... picks out only single isolated 
terms. The argument of Plato's text as a whole is outweighed by the 'message' 
of a single word. Of course, many writers seize upon some particular word in 
an opponent's vocabulary and try to turn it against its user. But this is 
essentially a debating ploy. Not so for Derrida. For Derrida, the 'message' of a 
single word is intrinsically more important than any syntagmatically created 
argument. (1993: 214) 
Put like this, Harland's point seems such a commonsense one that it 
might be considered astonishing that Derrida's views have been so influential. 
However, Iris Murdoch's (1992) discussion of Derrida, in Metaphysics as a 
Guide for Morals, suggests some reasons why deconstruction has enjoyed such 
currency. First, it reflected, as much as it created, the spirit of its time. Second, 
Derrida is a brilliantly engaging thinker and writer - perhaps a master par 
excellence of rhetoric - and his coruscating wordplay generates a tantalising 
sense of mystification. Third, he asks searching questions of things which our 
tradition tends to take for granted, and answers them with what Murdoch argues 
are merely half truths. Fourth, post-structuralism is a kind of linguistic 
determinism (since in Derrida's view writing precedes and constructs our 
thinking about the world and the self) and determinism holds a perennial 
fascination for many people since it relieves them of moral responsibility. Last, 
I should point out that Harland's argument is far more complex than I have 
indicated here and goes well beyond any simplistic, commonsense assumptions 
about the way language refers to the world. Thus for many literary critics not 
deeply familiar with the traditions of epistemology and the philosophy of 
language it has not been easy to see precisely where Derrida's linguistic 
philosophy might have gone astray or how his theories might be countered. 
However, like Norris, Harland does not see Derrida as all bad and indeed has 
more time for Derrida than for his followers. (221) 
Harland concludes his argument for what he considers to be his 
particularly new insights into the referentiality of language through the 
operation of its syntagms by saying, 'If these ideas are acceptable, then we have 
moved decisively beyond Superstructuralismi. (226) Many opponents of post-
structuralism would be pleased to hear this news, but it would be premature to 
announce that a post-post-structuralist period had arrived. The fact that post-
structuralist ideas are still exercising a powerful influence in the humanities is 
evidence that such a day has not yet dawned. Thus there remains the necessity 
of studying more closely Derrida, Foucault and others, along with the 
alternative theories which are on offer, including Harland's and the ones which 
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Norris mentioned above. After all, determinism and relativism have a way of 
rearing their heads in different forms throughout history - in this case as the 
linguistic determinism and moral relativism of some versions of post-
structuralism. Clearly, if they are not absolute conditions of our existence, they 
at least appeal to an enduring human need: perhaps the Nietzschean desire for a 
Dionysian liberation from the burden of Apollonian moral responsibility. But 
such a liberation from Nietzsche's 'slave mentality' may in fact lead to a worse 
kind of slavery - as we may be learning in the postmodern dystopias of Western 
civilisation, where moral relativism and an extreme pluralism, which borders on 
complete individualism, are celebrated as the end of historical development. 
Here an illusion of individual freedom, along with materialistic desires and the 
power to satisfy them, has become a necessary ingredient in the manufacture of 
a global commodity market by multinational corporations - a point which forms 
part of Deleuze and Guattari's (1983) argument in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia concerning the moral bankruptcy of late capitalism. 
Moral autonomy has still to be paid for at the high price of (among other 
things) serious study and principled, reasoned critique. Nevertheless, with all 
that, it will be necessary to teach our children, especially in literary studies, to 
cope with and even to enjoy some Derridean 'play'. Derrida is surely right in his 
claim that 'play', or differance, is a condition of discourse though not, I would 
argue, a totally disabling one. Indeed, as I maintain in discussing post-
structuralist and pragmatist ethics (Chapter 2) and Conrad's Heart of Darkness, 
(Chapter 3) a degree of indeterminacy in language may well be one of the 
conditions of possibility for moral autonomy itself. For if ethical reasoning in 
language could be as inexorable in its logic and in its reference to the world as 
mathematics seems to be, there could ultimately be no freedom of choice. As it 
is, in many complex situations ethics can only enlighten and guide our 
judgement - its analysis cannot be computed and so it cannot dictate ends and 
means. Thus we are frequently left to choose between reasonable alternatives, 
and to evaluate the wisdom of our choice in hindsight by its results. 
Compared with the previous critiques, Joseph Carroll's recent book, (1995) 
Evolution and Literary Theory, launches an even less sympathetic attack on 
what he argues are the unjustified assumptions and flawed logic of post-
structuralism, the central tenets of which he characterises as textualism and 
indeterminacy. Since post-structuralism has become the dominant paradigm in 
literary and cultural studies he does not expect that his critique will be 
fmmediately accepted. However, he argues that the paradigm which will 
ultimately supplant post-structuralism is not the return to metaphysical idealism 
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posited by Miller and Freadman, Murdoch, Norris and possibly Harland. Indeed, 
as my discussion of Fish's essay has revealed, post-structuralism is the negation 
of idealism and therefore inextricably dependent upon it. Hence post-
structuralism sets up a false dichotomy between belief in the possibility of 
knowing the absolute truth and belief in a radical scepticism. Carroll reminds 
his readers that there is another alternative: the procedural scepticism of 
scientific realism and naturalism, perhaps best represented in the evolutionary 
epistemology of Konrad Lorenz (1978) and Karl Popper. (1979) 
In subsequent chapters I will pursue the possibilities for ethics, ethical 
criticism and critical literacy teaching which are inherent in evolutionary 
epistemology. For now it will suffice to say that, according to Carroll, Popper's 
methodology of science allows for the imaginative proposal of hypotheses - i.e. 
tentative 'truths' based on observations of nature, the logical analysis of data and 
intuition - which are open to revision through the construction of experiments 
designed to test their falsifiability. In this way science is able, in theory, to 
proceed in an orderly manner towards the construction and reconstruction of 
theories which provide more and more accurate representations of nature, 
representations that include ever more precise details hierarchically organised 
within an ever-expanding framework. In other words, science aims at a totalised 
system of knowledge but is insured against the danger of authoritarianism, 
inherent in such systems, by its in-built procedural scepticism. In practice of 
course - as sociologists of science, beginning with Thomas Kuhn, (1962) have 
pointed out - various kinds of human error interfere with this process, but there 
are checks and balances operating within the international community of 
scientists which work to obviate these problems in the long term. Fundamental 
to the practice of science is the recognition that its hypotheses must pass the 
twin tests of logical coherence and empirical evidence. Science's products must 
not only seem plausible but they must also work - and of course they frequently 
do, dramatically and sometimes terrifyingly. There is an assumption here that 
the reality which science purports to describe - particularly when it does so in 
mathematical terms - is itself logically coherent, but this too is merely a 
hypothesis which must stand up to the test of empirical evidence. So far the 
evidence that mathematics accurately refers to the world has been 
overwhelming, as can be seen for example by the necessity of incorporating 
Einstein's theory of general relativity in designing the algorithms employed in 
satellite global positioning technology. 
In contrast to this view of science as a form of knowledge on which we 
constantly stake our lives, Carroll points out that only an insane person would 
act, outside the theoretical realm of critical discourse, on the view attributed to 
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oversimplified post-structuralist theory that all language is indeterminate and 
that there is nothing beyond text. The professor of cultural studies, animatedly 
explaining these doctrines to his colleagues while crossing a busy street, would 
almost certainly jump out of the way of an oncoming vehicle when a colleague 
cries, 'Look out for the bus!' Furthermore (as Abrams pointed out in 'The 
Deconstructive Angel', mentioned above), the professor would only have 
bothered to explain his ideas to his colleagues if he had some confidence that 
they could gain from his discourse a reasonably accurate understanding of what 
he meant. This type of argument may strike some post-structuralists as a cheap 
shot. However, Carroll goes to great lengths to illustrate what he claims are the 
extremity and illogicality of some of the assertions of Derrida, Foucault and 
other post-structuralists of every conceivable stripe. His section entitled the 
'Truistic/Radical Shuffle' (56-68) is a particularly detailed and revealing analysis 
of the varieties of fallacious argument used by many of the most respected 
proponents of post-structuralist literary theories. 
The main purpose of Carroll's book is to offer what he maintains is a 
more accurate theory of literature and criticism situated within the wider 
framework of evolutionary biology, which in turn is situated within the 
ascending hierarchy of scientific constructs consisting of genetics, molecular 
biology, chemistry and physics. It is this new paradigm - a carefully contrived 
literary theory based on the idea of natural selection - which allows Carroll to 
criticise post-structuralism most effectively. Recent applications of evolutionary 
biology have begun to revolutionise such subjects as neurology, psychology, 
psychiatry, epistemology and ethics, and they have profound, though as yet little 
explored, implications for anthropology and sociology. The first part of Carroll's 
book, entitled 'A Darwinian Critical Paradigm', extends this revolution to 
literary theory in ways which seem highly plausible, and in a later section he 
discusses some of Darwin's and the more recent sociobiologists' explanations of 
the development of altruism among human beings. 
Carroll's Evolution and Literary Theory is, to my knowledge, the first 
major attempt to develop a literary theory founded on evolutionary principles. 
Basic to his thesis is Darwin's simple but powerfully explanatory hypothesis that 
organisms have been adapted to their changing environments by the processes 
of natural selection. Hence it is reasonable to hypothesise that the highly 
elaborated forms of language, including literature, which characterise human 
organisms, are adaptive mechanisms through which humans have ultimately 
gained reproductive success in their physical and social circumstances. If 
language did not refer in an adequately determinate manner to realities beyond 
itself then it could not have conferred this advantage. Of course, the generally 
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adaptive nature of language does not preclude the development of cultural 
constructs which do not accurately reflect reality, but they cannot last if they are 
so inaccurate that they endanger individual human survival. The great success of 
the introduction of the scientific method is that it has institutionalised a 
procedure for correcting some of these misconceptions, and so has 
revolutionised societies which have embraced it. 
The ambivalent results of the ensuing exponential advance of technology 
in those societies are, of course, clear to many people, especially those who care 
about social, ecological and aesthetic values. The fact that these extremely 
powerful technologies, which science has made possible, often threaten such 
values has perhaps blinded literary-minded people to a more fundamental fact: 
that science - as I will show later in discussing recent findings concerning the 
workings of the brain - offers the most reliable development to date of the 
common sense which has proved, in evolutionary terms, such a successful 
adaptation of human organisms to their physical and social environments. 
Science certainly takes us well beyond the scope of common sense, sometimes 
even contradicting its findings, yet the operations of science remain consistent 
with it. 11 Thus one might reasonably expect that at least some of the traditional 
or commonsense wisdom about the function of literary texts could prove to have 
enduring value. Furthermore, scientists like Stuart Kauffman (1995) are now 
learning to combine the reductivist process of identifying the patterns and laws 
which underlie varying levels of complexity in nature, with an understanding of 
how simple initial conditions and principles, combined with natural selection, 
can generate more and more stunningly intricate forms all the way up to the 
human brain - and perhaps even to human culture. Kauffman suggests for 
example how these ideas might be applied in determining laws of economics. 
Thus, when Carroll argues that literature can, in principle, be studied 
scientifically as a product of the adaptation of human organisms to their social 
and non-social environment, his claim could be seen to rest upon even firmer 
foundations than he has been able to incorporate in his book. 
Science, while espousing a procedural commitment to a thoroughgoing 
materialism, is nevertheless grounded on the assumption that the physical 
processes of nature are governed by a coherent set of principles which are 
accessible to human thought. This accessibility - particularly evident in the 
extensive correspondence between mathematics and the structure of the universe 
which I have mentioned already and which has been noted by Paul Davies 
11 I am aware of how naive these observations might appear to those who argue that common 
sense, and indeed science itself, is entirely a construct of discourse and therefore bears no 
relationship to an external reality. However, as I explain more fully in Chapter 3, I consider that 
to be an extreme view which ignores the evidence of evolutionary biology and neuro-science. 
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(1992) - is a remarkable, though perhaps not ultimately surprising, notion. After 
all, our brains are the product of the natural order of random mutation, survival 
of the fittest and emergent complexity, and therefore one might reasonably 
suppose that our thought processes would be consistent at some level with the 
fundamental processes of the universe. The consideration of these principles 
takes us into the domain of metaphysics, and to the positing of the existence of a 
Logos in the form of the scientific laws which are in one sense immanent in, and 
in another sense transcendent of, nature, since these laws govern the evolution 
of the universe from the simple conditions which prevailed immediately 
following the Big Bang to the astonishing complexity which we now observe 
around and within us, especially in the form of our own brains. 12 
However, despite science's logocentric implications and totalising 
ambitions, evolutionary epistemology does not suggest that we have direct 
access to the absolute truth about these laws - unless, as Roger Penrose (1995) 
suggests, it is in the form of partial insights gained by means of intuitions, 
which nevertheless must be checked by rational and empirical processes. We 
must be content with theories which are approximations to truth, and a process 
which promises greater accuracy in our understanding of the complexities of the 
universe and the generalisations which describe the relationships between them. 
It is a process which cannot prevent us from falling from time to time into a 
variety of short- or long-lived misconceptions, but which offers a method of 
correcting these eventually. With this in mind, it may prove possible for a 
theorist who is more sympathetic to post-structuralism than is Carroll to 
systematically incorporate some post-structuralist ideas about the problematic 
nature of textuality and human understanding into an evolutionary 
epistemology. In the next section I salvage one of these ideas - deconstruction - 
for later inclusion in this expanded epistemology. However the fulfilment of that 
task is beyond the scope of this project: in my exploration in Chapter 2 of a 
possible direction for ethics after post-structuralism, I pursue particular ideas 
about evolution, poststructuralism and metaphysics in the hope of merely 
opening up some avenues for their synthesis. 
12 It probably makes no more sense to ask where these laws come from than it does to ask what 
preceded the Big Bang, since it is part of that particular theory of origins that time as well as 
space was created in the quantum singularity which expanded into the universe as we know it 
today. 
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5. Ethical deconstruction: oxymoron or imperative? 
The reader will recall the irony of my 'deconstruction' of the essay by Stanley 
Fish in order to demonstrate the ills of deconstruction, particularly its tendency 
to consume its supposed opposites. Of course, I too am using the term 
'deconstruction' in a simplified manner, since I do not pretend to have achieved 
the complexity of textual analysis which Derrida demonstrates in his work. 
Nevertheless, I have argued that Fish is not completely in control of his 
utterances and that the implications of what he has said undercut what he seems 
to have intended. But, as the critics discussed above have noted, there is nothing 
new in this contention: language is a notoriously slippery medium and it would 
be arrogant - indeed, unethical - to pretend that everything we say or write 
exactly expresses our meaning, let alone the absolute truth. It is indeed a 
characteristic of texts to be somewhat indeterminate, but it does not follow that 
therefore all our utterances refer only to themselves. Language is capable of 
conveying at least some knowledge of truths beyond itself. We are not 
completely trapped in the prison-house of language, nor are we totally 
constructed by it. Our knowledge of external reality is no doubt severely 
limited, and we may indeed be largely constructed by language and other forms 
of discourse, but we can, by seeking the truth in conversation with all human 
kind, using logical and empirical procedures, draw nearer to a grasp of realities 
which exist independently of our reconstructions of them. If deconstruction is 
taken to entail that all conflicting truth claims are completely undecidable, then 
I judge its use of deconstruction to be erroneous and therefore unethical. But if 
deconstruction merely exposes a characteristic of language which renders it less 
than completely reliable, then I judge its use to be ethical, for here we are 
expressing a fact about the nature of a human phenomenon. 
Is ethical deconstruction therefore an oxymoron? Clearly I do not think 
so. Rather it is a moral imperative - as indeed is the development of an ethics of 
literary criticism in general and of the teaching of critical literacy. If we seek 
truth, then we are obliged, among other things, to deconstruct texts in order to 
expose their gaps and silences, and thereby their pretensions to a degree of 
reference to truth which is unjustified. Deconstruction may be seen as the 
destruction of all meaning, purpose and power beyond that which we define for 
ourselves and our own aggrandisement. But, as I understand it, our awareness of 
deconstruction demonstrates that, in spite of all the ways in which language and 
culture have constructed and enslaved us, we still possess some freedom to 
deconstruct and reconstruct ourselves and our culture little by little. The effort 
needed to do so may be very great, but the questions must be faced: what will 
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we choose; how shall we live? These are questions of ultimate value, and only 
by joining in the age-old conversation of mankind concerning religions, 
ideologies and ethics can we hope to construct for our age a more 
comprehensive and achievable vision of what we should aim for. I will pursue 
this topic in greater depth in the course of this study, but for the moment I offer 
a final word from Jacques Derrida himself on the subject of the ambivalent 
value of deconstruction: 
I would say that deconstruction is affirmation rather than questioning, 
in a sense which is not positive: I would distinguish between the positive, or 
positions, and affirmations. I think that deconstruction is affirmative rather 
than questioning; this affirmation goes through some radical questioning, but is 
not questioning in the final analysis. (Salusinszky, 1987: 20) 
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6. A new theory of ethics? 
If indeed a morally responsible approach to the application of post-structuralism 
in literary criticism and English teaching is to be implemented, one which 
questions its assumptions and exaggerations, where can we turn to find a basis 
for the criteria by which we are to make our judgements? Since I have been 
allowing some validity to less extreme versions of post-structuralism - 
especially to their distinctive characteristic of deconstruction - it is clear that any 
post-post-structuralist theory of ethics must acknowledge its own inherent 
reflexivity and instability - its own propensity to self-destruct. In this sense it 
will need to be a postmodern ethics, whatever else it may incorporate. But 
where could one look to establish the foundations for such an ethics? From what 
I have suggested so far, these foundations must be tentative, but they should 
offer at least the possibility of leading us to a better grasp of the realities of our 
physical, social and psychological circumstances, realities which will 
significantly shape any worthwhile ethics. 
Of course, there are many ethical theories on offer. How can we choose 
between them? Is it possible to synthesise some of them into a new theory? Or 
must we be content to live in a world of ethical as well as cultural pluralism, as 
Wayne Booth (1988) suggests in his profoundly urbane work, The Company we 
Keep: An Ethics of Fiction? Even if it proves possible to construct a more 
truthful and effective ethics for our age, it may be a long time (if ever) before it 
gains wide acceptance, and so in the meantime we will be obliged to cope in a 
milieu of pluralism. But why should that trouble us? Many people prefer it that 
way, since pluralism seems to offer a great deal of personal choice and an 
exciting diversity in our social relationships. However, there are always serious 
conflicts of interest even in the most homogeneous communities, and hence they 
are likely to be more prevalent in pluralist societies, in spite of the pretensions 
of such societies to the virtue of tolerance. What pluralism often lacks is 
sufficient agreement about basic moral values by which clashes of interest can 
be resolved. Tolerance, it might be said, is the saving virtue of pluralism, yet it 
is obvious that not all differences can be tolerated. 13 
Post-structuralism, with its tendency to encourage extreme relativism 
through the dissemination of multiple interpretations, is the philosophy par 
excellence of pluralism. Indeed, it has been suggested that post-structuralism, in 
spite of the fact that it has some of its roots in Marxism, is actually complicit 
with the interests of the power brokers of late capitalism in fostering the 
13 Consider, for example, the case of Australian citizens who wish to practise circumcision of 
their daughters according to the traditions of their ethnic heritage. This custom has been 
specifically (and justly, I believe) proscribed by Australian law. 
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fragmentation of society into a multiplicity of niche markets. (Jameson, 1991; 
Gee, 1993) But while post-structuralism seems to offer a foundation in the 
nature of language for the values of individual freedom and toleration of 
differences, it can promise no guidance at all when individual interests 
intolerably conflict, as they inevitably do. 
It may be, of course, that such guidance is too much to hope for, but I am 
not yet convinced that we should give up looking for ethical theories which 
reflect more accurately our changing circumstances and understandings. Indeed, 
it would be irresponsible to abandon the prospect of making real progress in 
ethics. What follows, then, is an examination of a few of the possibilities for 
ethics today, and a modest attempt to assemble from among them at least some 
of the essential ingredients of a new theory. Of course I am well aware that, 
after post-structuralism, any plan to construct a theory smacks of the totalising 
pretensions which are the target of deconstruction. However, in welcoming the 
healthy scepticism which post-structuralism facilitates, it is not necessary to 
accept that it entails the impossibility of constructing more accurate, though still 
partial, models of reality. 
In my reading of contemporary ethics and literary theory I have 
identified at least three general approaches which have so far been applied to the 
construction of a new theory of ethics. The first is to carry on with ethics as if 
post-structuralism either did not exist or was patently beneath contempt. To 
many enthusiasts for radical literary theory this approach will seem hopelessly 
naive, yet useful work is being produced by philosophers who pay little or no 
attention to post-structuralism: for example James Rachels' (1992) fascinating 
book on Darwinian ethics, Peter Singer's (1975) influential work on animal 
liberation, and the revival of Aristotle's virtues ethics (e.g. Geach, 1977 and 
Nussbaum, 1988). Each of these has the capacity, at least in part, to provide 
workable foundations for ethical literary criticism and critical social literacy. 
The second approach is to criticise and largely reject post-structuralism 
as fundamentally anti-ethical, a wrong turning in ethical inquiry. In this view the 
way forward would be to return to the metaphysical tradition and, picking up 
where Kant and others left off, pursue once more the rationalist, Enlightenment 
program. The work of Freadman, Miller and Norris illustrate this position - 
though, as we have seen, Freadman and Miller partially exempt Foucault from 
their critique, and Norris partially exempts Derrida. 
The third approach, rejecting the second approach's criticism of post-
structuralism as totally anti-ethical, and seeing this critique as a reactionary and 
simplistic misreading of theorists like Derrida and Foucault, sets out to 
articulate a thoroughly post-structuralist ethics. Don Cupitt (1987) in his book, 
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The Long-Legged Fly: a theology of language and desire, gives a sample of 
what such an ethics might look like.I 4 Of course, if a post-structuralist ethics 
proves satisfactory in the long run, then it would undercut the above critiques of 
post-structuralism as an inadequate foundation for critical social literacy. So be 
it: I would genuinely welcome that possibility. 
However, my proposal, outlined in the next chapter, is a more 
conciliatory one: I want to suggest that a productive synthesis of elements of 
these three approaches is possible. Yet my ultimate concern lies deeper. There 
are signs that - contrary to the open-minded, questioning and destabilising spirit 
of Derrida and Foucault - post-structuralism has already been accepted as the 
new orthodoxy, the latest dogma, the politically correct position for the 
upwardly mobile literary critic or English teacher to adopt. This totalising of 
what, in my view, remains an incoherent field of inquiry might appear to some 
to provide the grounds for a reassuring moral code, a prescription for how the 
modern critic and teacher should think and act. But there is always the danger 
that the moral code of the dominant group (in this case vocal post-structuralists) 
will be enforced in a totalitarian manner. On the other hand, ethics as I have 
defined it, because it goes on asking the question, 'How should we live?' in ever 
changing circumstances, is the implacable enemy of totalitarian regimes. This is 
one reason why I am advocating that English critics and teachers, who believe 
in the (albeit limited) freedom of the self and the (albeit problematic) reference 
of texts to reality, should attend once more to the on-going conversation about 
ethics, relating it fruitfully to their conversations about literature and literacy. 
14 See also Barker, 1994, and Caputo, 1989. 
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Chapter 2 
Possibilities: the attraction of evolutionary ethics 
1. Evolutionary epistemology: foundation for a new synthesis 
The advent of post-structuralist theories has so unsettled popular assumptions 
concerning the philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics that it 
has made literary critics and English teachers aware that a deeper understanding 
of their subject obliges them to engage with these fields of inquiry. Furthermore, 
I am suggesting that this may also involve questions to do with the philosophy 
of mind, and the philosophical implications of mathematics, quantum physics, 
evolutionary theory, neurology, the new science of self-organising systems and, 
of course, ethics. In seeking foundations for ethical literary criticism and literacy 
teaching, it makes sense to begin by looking for some more solid ground in 
epistemology which underpins all of the other branches of philosophy and 
science mentioned here. With this in mind, an appropriate means of 
schematising, and perhaps synthesising, the current possibilities for ethics which 
seem to me most fruitful has been offered by Francis Heylighen (1993) in a 
brief overview of the development of epistemology in the Western tradition. 15 
Heylighen suggests that, amidst a confusing array of conflicting views, 
the history of epistemology reveals a clear trend 'from a static, passive view of 
knowledge towards a more and more adaptive and active one.' Ignoring the 
sophists' version of pragmatic epistemology, he begins with Plato's view that 
knowledge is the awareness of absolute, universal Ideas or Forms existing 
independently of any subject trying to apprehend them. Aristotle, while 
emphasising the need for logical and empirical methods of knowledge-
gathering, still accepted the belief that such knowledge was an apprehension of 
necessary and universal principles. After the Renaissance two main 
epistemological views dominated philosophy: empiricism, which holds that 
knowledge is produced by sensory perception; and rationalism, which sees it as 
the result of rational reflection. Through its application in the experimental 
sciences, empiricism has led to the still commonly held 'reflection- 
15 Support for Heylighen's linking of epistemology and ethics within an evolutionary framework 
may be found in Michael Bradie, (1992) The Secret Chain: Evolution and Ethics. Bradie 
undertakes a cautious historical and philosophical analysis of the relevance of evolutionary 
considerations to the development of human moral systems. 
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correspondence theory' of knowledge. In this view knowledge has no a priori 
existence but has to be developed by observation, resulting in a kind of mapping 
or reflection in our minds of external objects through our sensory perceptions. 
This knowledge is considered to be absolute in that it truly corresponds to a part 
of external reality, even though it may leave out many details and may never 
achieve completeness. Kant developed an important synthesis of empiricism and 
rationalism in which knowledge results from the organisation of perceptual data 
on the basis of innate cognitive 'categories', including space, time, objects and 
causality. These categories are absolute in that they are static and given, yet they 
afford only subjective knowledge and deny a purely objective representation of 
things-in-themselves. 
According to Heylighen the next stage in the development of 
epistemology is pragmatism, which he identifies in part with logical positivism 
and conventionalism. Here knowledge consists of models which attempt to 
represent the environment in order to give the simplest solutions to whatever 
problems are selected. No model can capture all the details of an aspect of 
reality or represent all aspects of reality, and so we must accept the parallel 
existence of different, even contradictory, models. Questions concerning the 
ultimate reality behind the model are meaningless. Models are built from parts 
of other models and empirical data on the basis of trial and error and intuition. A 
more radical epistemology is to be found in constructivism which assumes that 
all knowledge is built up from scratch by the knower. In this view, which is 
similar to post-structuralist ideas, there are no 'givens' of empirical data, innate 
categories or cognitive structures, and there is no notion of correspondence to 
external reality. Heylighen comments that, because of this lack of connection 
between models and the things they seem to represent, constructivism may lead 
to an extreme relativism in which any model constructed by the subject is 
considered to be as good as any other, and there is no way to distinguish 
between adequate or 'true' knowledge and inadequate or 'false' knowledge. 
However, he maintains that there are two approaches which try to avoid the 
dangers of such an 'absolute relativism'. Individual constructivism assumes that 
the individual attempts to achieve coherence among different pieces of 
knowledge by tending to reject constructions which are inconsistent with the 
bulk of other knowledge, and by maintaining constructions which succeed in 
integrating previously incoherent notions. Social constructivism sees consensus 
between different subjects as the ultimate criterion to judge knowledge as 'true' 
or 'real'. In the more radical forms of constructivism knowledge is held to be 
more or less independent of 'external reality' since the nervous system is 
incapable of distinguishing between a perception caused by an external 
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phenomenon and a hallucination caused by a purely internal event. Thus the 
basic criterion of knowledge is that different mental entities or processes within 
or between subjects should reach some kind of equilibrium based on social 
consensus or internal coherence, an equilibrium which is therefore always 
changing. The recent development of various forms of evolutionary 
epistemology - notably in the work of Karl Popper (1979) and Donald Campbell 
(1974) - offers a broader or synthetic view, Heylighen believes. Here knowledge 
is assumed to be constructed by the subject or group of subjects in order to 
adapt to their environment at different levels: biological, psychological and 
social. Construction occurs through more or less blind variation of existing 
pieces of knowledge and the selection of new combinations which contribute 
most to the survival and reproduction of the subject(s) within their particular 
environment. In this way, although no objective correspondence is assumed, the 
external world again enters the picture through an equilibrium between the 
products of internal variation and different internal or external selection criteria. 
Absolutism or permanence has disappeared, but knowledge remains a passive 
instrument of survival developed in organisms through the processes of natural 
selection. Nevertheless, a degree of referentiality is restored to knowledge 
through evolutionary epistemology. 
An even more recent, and perhaps more radical approach extends this 
evolutionary view to make knowledge actively pursue goals of its own. This 
view, known as 'memetics', was first suggested by Richard Dawkins (1976) in 
his book, The Selfish Gene. Just as genes can be seen as encoded pieces of 
information replicating themselves by means of the bodies which they inform, 
and adapting to changing environments, so pieces of knowledge, or 'memes', 
can be seen as being transmitted from one individual or group to another, often 
outliving those organisms, and ultimately adapting to the environment by their 
own evolutionary processes of random mutation and the natural selection of 
those memes which provide the greatest survival value. However, it is possible 
for a meme to proliferate in the short term (in evolutionary time scales this may 
sometimes mean thousands of years) even though the knowledge it induces in 
any individual carrier may be wholly inadequate and even dangerous to 
survival. This is possible as long as the meme is sufficiently 'convincing' to new 
carriers who live long enough to pass it on. 
In this epistemology even the subject of the knowledge has lost its 
primacy and knowledge has become a force of its own, as is perhaps evidenced 
by the rapid proliferation of superstitions, fads, and irrational beliefs which have 
spread around the globe. Memetics, like social constructivism, attends to 
communication and social processes in the development of knowledge, but 
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instead of seeing knowledge as constructed by the social system (i.e. by 
language and other discourses), it sees social systems as constructed by 
knowledge processes. A social system, Heylighen says, can be defined by the 
fact that its members share the same meme. Even the modern concept of the self 
could be considered a result of memetic evolution. For example Charles Taylor 
(1989) has argued in The Sources of the Self that our modern notion of the self, 
originally formed by the Judaeo-Christian religious traditions, has been re-
shaped by the powerful and often oppositionary traditions of the Enlightenment 
and Romanticism. 
Further to Heylighen's description, I should point out that, while 
memetics has gained considerable attention in recent years, it remains a highly 
problematic concept. The relationship between memes and genes is still only 
that of an analogy - though perhaps it will prove a fruitful one as analogies have 
so often done in the past by suggesting questions and hypotheses for further 
investigation. 16 Meanwhile there is no such clear understanding of the 
adaptation and selection of memes, as there is of genes whose behaviour is 
fairly well understood in terms of their chemistry and physics. The fact that 
Heylighen exercises sufficient agency to judge some memes as irrational beliefs 
suggests that he believes that human individuals are not entirely at their mercy, 
or at least that the conflict between different memes provides us with positions 
from which to stage critiques and create new syntheses. Indeed, Heylighen's 
practice in general makes it clear that a sufficiently well educated human can 
consciously attempt to produce memes which he judges to be broadly adaptive. 
Moreover, this ability might be expected among organisms which have evolved 
to a level of consciousness that allows them to understand and therefore 
manipulate some of the processes of their own further evolution. Thus, while I 
accept that many ideas do proliferate largely beyond the control of those who 
seek to manipulate them, I remain much happier with Popper's account of 
evolutionary epistemology, particularly as it leaves more room for the agency of 
the subject in developing a knowledge which might approximate to external 
reality. 
Heylighen presents his summary of the history of epistemology as a 
process of development in our understanding from philosophical idealism, 
through naive realism, to a somewhat sceptical evolutionary constructivism. He 
admits that we are now faced with a strong temptation to lapse into a purely 
anarchistic or relativist attitude in which it seems impossible to formulate any 
reliable, general criteria for distinguishing 'good' and 'bad' knowledge. However, 
16  A further discussion of the importance of analogies in science appears in my study of A.S. 
Byatt's Morpho Eugenia in Chapter 3. 
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he also suggests that in practice 'intuition' (however this presumably adaptive 
subconscious process may operate) usually helps us to distinguish perceptions 
from hallucinations, and unreliable predictions from reliable ones. Furthermore, 
the systematic insights of evolutionary theory assume a notion of natural 
selection which can be understood to some extent. And, while no one criterion 
seems adequate to found a theory of knowledge, we can identify multiple and 
sometimes contradictory selection criteria, such as correspondence, coherence, 
consensus, predictability, falsifiability and survivability, which could perhaps be 
built into a simple, generalised conceptual framework, thus providing an 
epistemology which supersedes all of the theories which Heylighen has 
outlined. 
Heylighen's account is of course over-simplified - for example he 
ignores the presence of constructivist views from the sophists of ancient Greece 
onwards which Fish demonstrates in his account of the persistence of rhetoric - 
yet it is probable that our understanding of different epistemological positions 
has advanced to the point where it may now be possible to formulate a new 
theory. Indeed, Heylighen is committed to testing his scientifically reductive 
hypothesis about evolutionary epistemology as one of the editors (the others are 
C. Joslyn and V. Turchin) of a fascinating experiment, known as the Principia 
Cybemetica Project, which was started in 1989 and is still being conducted at a 
site bearing that name on the World-Wide Web. Here they are gathering a 
network of incomplete texts on such fundamental questions of philosophy as: 
Who am I? Where do I come from? Where am I going to? What is knowledge? 
What is truth? What are good and evil? What is the meaning of life? The new 
element in this project is the belief that in our 'information age' systems science, 
or cybernetics, can provide the basis for contemporary philosophy. The founders 
of the project start from the thesis that systems at all levels have been 
constructed by evolution, which they define as 'a continuing process of self-
organisation, based on variation and natural selection of the "fittest" 
configuration. Evolution continuously creates complexity and makes systems 
more adaptive by giving them better control over their environments.' 
(Heylighen, 1994) 
As this quotation suggests, Heylighen, Joslyn and Turchin, and their 
various contributors, draw upon the latest developments in evolutionary theory, 
especially the application of the mathematical theory of complex self-organising 
systems in computer modelling of evolutionary and ontogenetic processes, 
which the biologist Stuart Kauffman (1995) explains in his book, At Home in 
the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity. 
Kauffman is careful to warn his readers that his proposals, made on the basis of 
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his team's extensive work at the Santa Fe Institute, are still only hypothetical, 
but they have reached the stage where he can offer them seriously. If, he says 
with justifiable excitement, he turns out to be right, then the fundamental 
structure of our universe gives rise to an 'order for free' in open-ended 
thermodynamic systems, driven paradoxically by the law of increasing entropy. 
(A familiar example of such spontaneous order occurring in a system which is 
'running down' is the vortex produced in the bath water over the drain hole when 
the plug is removed.) Hence the amazing complexity of human beings may not 
be the result of some fantastic accident in defiance of the most overwhelming 
odds, but instead only to be expected in such a finely tuned universe. Among 
other things, the editors of the Principia Cybernetica Project adopt from 
complexity theory the concept of 'phase transition'. They see this as the 
emergence of a new level of control, Which they call a 'metasystem transition', 
regarding it as the quantum of evolution. In fact they call their philosophy 
'Metasystem Transition Theory', which includes 'a metaphysics, based on 
processes or actions as ontological primitives; an epistemology, which 
understands knowledge as constructed by the subject or group, but undergoing 
selection by the environment; and an ethics, with survival and the continuance 
of the process of evolution as supreme values'. (Heylighen 1995) At this stage 
their evolutionary ethics appears to be fairly rudimentary, but it has raised 
questions about such disturbing topics as the removal of moral responsibility 
from individuals interacting with virtual realities, (Cranford 1996) the 
construction of different selves in cyberspace, (Dowling 1996) and the possible 
evolution of humans as 'super- or meta-beings' who would become 
cybernetically immortal, perhaps by surviving in a silicon-based electronic 
network. (Heylighen, 1996) 
Such a post-biological future for our species has been proposed as a 
direct, if rather distant, outcome of the nub of the Principia Cybernetica 
experiment, which involves the use of computer technology to 
develop a large philosophical text from many internet nodes which are linked 
together with different relationships. Readers can navigate among the many 
concepts, guided by their individual understanding and interests. Disparate 
material can be integrated together while being written and read by 
collaborators from all around the world, undergoing variation and selection. 
Thus we apply theories about the evolution of cybernetic systems to the 
practical development of this very system of philosophy.' (Heylighen, 1993) 
In this way the editors are also attempting to solve the complex problem of re-
integrating the explosion and fragmentation of knowledge which is taking place 
in our time. In particular they are linking the sciences of complexity, artificial 
intelligence, artificial life, cognitive psychology, evolutionary systems and 
74 
memetics. However, the application of the concept of natural selection to this 
process of knowledge development is somewhat problematic, since clearly there 
are many conscious, intentional operations occurring in generating, selecting, 
rejecting, shaping and linking ideas. Thus it might be more accurate to see the 
process as a combination of natural and artificial selection. 
The Principia Cybemetica Project offers a useful and particularly appropriate 
means of synthesising ethical as well as epistemological theories. Its proposed 
method of developing knowledge through an evolutionary process of natural 
(and, as I maintain, artificial) selection seems to fit with my own experience of 
gathering, generating, selecting, rejecting, and synthesising ideas in this study - 
mental operations which occur both unconsciously, or naturally, and 
consciously, or artificially. Moreover, the Principia Cybemetica Project's key 
thesis, that the processes of biological and cultural evolution are fundamental to 
the development of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics, had in my own work 
moved from just one of a number of competing theories to the dominant place 
before I encountered Joseph Carroll's book, Evolution and Literary Theory, and 
the Principia Cybernetica Project. This process can be observed in the five 
papers which I have produced in the course of this study, and in which I have 
explored a variety of ethical theories and approaches to ethical criticism. (Pride 
1992, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1995) My allegiance to particular positions has been 
driven by a desire to accommodate the best of both Platonic idealism and post-
structuralist scepticism. In doing so I have considered James Rachels' and Peter 
Singer's evolutionary ethics (an example of Heylighen's epistemological 
evolutionism); C. S. Lewis's deontological ethics (absolutism); Freadman and 
Miller's humanist ethics (empiricism and rationalism); Norris's Kantianism; the 
ethical pragmatism of Richard Rorty and others as described in the work of 
David Parker; the pragmatist and, later, absolutist ethics of Jurgen Habermas; 
the post-structuralist ethics of Geoffrey Harpham (constructivism); the ethical 
pluralism of Tobin Siebers; and the postmodern ethics of Zygmunt Baumann 
who draws heavily on the phenomenological ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. My 
main purpose in these papers was to suggest various avenues for research, any 
of which could be used to reinstate ethics at the heart of literary criticism and 
teaching. But I also hoped that eventually a new synthesis in ethics might 
emerge, one which would be more valid, though inevitably far from perfect, and 
which would more effectively support this project. 
Since encountering James Rachels' (1990) book, Created from Animals: 
the Moral Implications Of Darwinism, at the beginning of my study, it seems 
that philosophical naturalism - entailed by the concepts of physical, 
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psychological and social evolution through mutation, self-organisation and 
natural selection - has begun to act (in the language of complexity theory) as a 
major 'attractor' in my thinking. Around it other key concepts or 'attractors' 
(such as, in Heylighen's terms, absolutism, empiricism, rationalism, pragmatism, 
constructivism, relativism and evolutionism) are beginning to fall into a 
complex pattern within the conceptual space which I have been exploring. I 
cannot pretend that I have been able to review the whole history of ethics, or 
even all of the theories which moral philosophers are debating today (such as 
virtues ethics, feminist ethics and John Rawls', 1971, theory of justice) in order 
to position each of them within this scheme - nor am I at all certain it would yet 
be possible anyway. However, I think it highly likely that evolutionary theory 
will enable a more powerful synthesis in the domain of ethics, as it already is in 
the neurological and cognitive sciences. Rachels' book, mentioned above, is a 
striking example of the potential of evolution to provide new insights in ethics; 
Michael Gazzaniga's (1994) work, Nature's Mind: The Biological Roots of 
Thinking, Emotions, Sexuality, Language and Intelligence is an example of the 
application of evolutionary ideas in understanding the workings of the brain; 
• and Robert Wright's (1995) illustration of the new science of evolutionary 
psychology through a biography of Charles Darwin, The Moral Animal: 
Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday Life, is an example of how evolutionary 
theory is revolutionising both psychology and ethics. 
In the remaining sections of this chapter I discuss a series of texts in 
order to identify some elements of a possible synthesis of post-structuralist, 
pragmatist, postmodern, and metaphysical ethics with evolutionary ethics. I 
begin with evolutionary ethics in order to extend the framework established in 
the present section (and in my discussion of Joseph Carroll's, 1995, work in 
Chapter 2.4) and to make it clear how the theory of evolution provides a deeper 
explanation for the most useful insights of what I see as the post-structuralist-
pragmatist-postmodern coalition. I am using the term 'deeper' here in the sense 
provided by the hierarchical structure of science: thus sociobiological 
phenomena can be explained in terms of natural selection theory which can be 
explained in terms of genetic mutation, then molecular biology, chemistry, and 
ultimately atomic, particle and quantum physics. In view of the fact that I am 
proposing such scientific-materialist foundations for morality and hence for 
ethics it may seem surprising that I am also suggesting that metaphysics could 
be re-instated in this context. However, anyone familiar with discussions of 
quantum physics will be aware that at this level of research mathematical 
physicists are broaching fundamental - i.e. metaphysical - questions about the 
nature of existence. From the remainder of this chapter, then, I hope that there 
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will emerge the rudiments of an evolutionary-postmodern-metaphysical 
synthesis which Zohar and Marshall (1993) call 'quantum ethics', and which I 
am calling, after Zygmunt Bauman (1993), an ethics of 'disillusionment and re-
enchantment'. 
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2. Evolutionary Ethics: the limits of biology 
Continuing modernity's rationalist-empiricist project, while eschewing the 
crude social Darwinism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and ignoring 
the post-structuralists' questioning of referentiality and agency, the moral 
philosopher James Rachels (1990) has developed an argument for an 
evolutionary ethics in his book, Created from Animals: the Moral Implications 
of Darwinism. He maintains that humans have evolved as social animals among 
whom a modicum of altruism is necessary for survival. Central to his argument 
is the notion that self-consciousness and the degree of free will (or agency) it 
confers on us are also essential to our success as a species. Care for others is 
something we not only can choose but also should if we wish our species to 
survive. Furthermore, Rachels argues that our survival is interdependent with 
the survival of the widest possible variety of other species within the earth's 
ecosystem, and for our own sake we should care for them. This is a 
consequentialist (or utilitarian) theory of ethics, though its results are not only 
measured in terms of mere survival: we also have a duty to protect the quality of 
life of members of our own and other species by not causing them unnecessary 
pain. Rachels arrives at this view by arguing that as self-conscious beings the 
quality of our lives is of value to us; therefore it is reasonable to suppose that the 
quality of others' lives must also be valuable to them in proportion to their 
degree of self-consciousness; and consequently we should not do to them what 
we would not want them to do to us. Thus, just as we condemn racism on such 
grounds, we should also condemn what he calls 'speciesism'. 17 We should 
instead pursue a form of moral individualism which extends to individual 
members of all species, treating like cases alike and distinguishing between 
individuals only on the grounds of relevant differences. 
Rachels claims that his theory avoids committing the naturalistic fallacy 
- the logical mistake of deriving 'ought' from 'is' - by arguing that, while 'is' 
cannot logically entail 'ought', nevertheless the one can lend support to the 
other. For example the (supposed) fact that pigs possess enough self-
consciousness to suffer from fear of their impending death in a slaughterhouse 
does not necessarily mean that we ought not to slaughter them, but it does offer 
a significant reason for reconsidering our treatment of pigs. At least it might 
mean that we ought not to slaughter them in a way that provokes terror. Hence, 
while no complete justification might be found for a particular moral act, it 
could be strongly indicated by an array of sufficiently weighty reasons derived 
17 A term invented by the psychologist Richard Ryde and popularised by Peter Singer's (1975) 
book Animal Liberation. 
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from our understanding of the facts of the case within a prevailing world view. 
Rachels argues that the movement in the modern period from a creationist world 
view, based on religious belief, to an evolutionary one, based on scientific 
understanding, supports a radical reappraisal of the old belief in the dignity of 
man. It is no longer reasonable to assume that man occupies the pre-eminent 
place in the cosmos and that all other creatures exist to serve him. Instead there 
is a widespread recognition in Western society that humans are merely animals, 
that we might not possess an eternal soul, and that we differ from other animals 
in degree rather than in kind. For while it is true that humans have developed 
vastly more complex languages (and presumably a greater degree of self-
consciousness) than our nearest relatives among the primates, we also know that 
we share 98.4% of our DNA with them. (Diamond 1991: 2) These ideas have 
led Rachels to call his ethical theory 'morality without hubris'. (1993: 180) 
Rachels' view that an evolutionary ethics can be founded partly on the 
notion that humans have evolved as social animals, whose survival depends 
both on a degree of altruistic cooperation, including particular care for their 
young and for their siblings, and partly on their reasoning powers, is supported 
to some extent by the relatively new field of sociobiology, 18 established by 
Edward 0. Wilson, (1980) and developed largely by Robert Trivers, (1985) J. 
Maynard Smith (1982) and Richard Dawkins. (1982, 1986) Here one scientific 
approach which has been very successful is Maynard Smith's application of the 
mathematics of game theory, through computer modelling, to explain such 
phenomena as the evolution of altruism, especially between siblings, in animal 
populations. However, Rachels expresses some scepticism about the way 
sociobiology has been applied to ethics: 
One problem is that, while sociobiological results may be important for moral 
deliberation, they are important in a way that is different from what Wilson and 
his followers suggest. Suppose it were true that male dominance is an 
unavoidable consequence of human nature. It would not follow that the 
feminist analysis of its evils is false. Feminists might still be right that women's 
lives are impoverished when they are consigned to an inferior social status. 
What would follow, perhaps, is that male dominance is ineradicable. But that 
would be only like discovering that a dread disease is forever incurable. We 
might have to live with that knowledge, but we surely would not be forced to 
think it a good thing. Nor would we have to cease our efforts to ameliorate the 
suffering of the disease's victims. Similarly, we could continue to regret male 
dominance, and we could go on trying to minimize its effect - by continuing to 
extend the legal protection of women's rights, by insisting that they be paid 
equal wages for equal work, and so on. Nothing in sociobiology could imply 
otherwise. (1990: 78) 
18 Sociobiology should not be confused with social Darwinism, the much earlier and largely 
discredited application of evolutionary theory to theories of social and moral development 
especially by Herbert Spencer. 
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It may well be that further careful research by sociobiologists will reveal 
a much clearer picture of the range of human behaviours which have been 
genetically determined by the processes of natural selection, and so enable us to 
understand the limiting factors which we have to deal with. However, biology 
also reveals that humans, like other organisms, are not only genetically 
determined but also shaped by the physical and social conditions in which they 
grow to maturity. Undoubtedly, therefore, we are partly determined by 
discourse. The mixture of weightings which should be assigned to the multitude 
of factors within each of these different areas of influence in determining human 
behaviours must be very complex and perhaps ultimately impossible to assess 
fully. However, continued development and application of evolutionary theory 
in sociology and other human sciences is likely to throw new light on who we 
are and what it is reasonable to suppose we can be. At least it is clear that 
humans have evolved a rather impressive combination of consciousness and 
reasoning power in the process of adapting so successfully to our environments. 
These characteristics have allowed us to develop both scientific and ethical 
understandings - in other words, systematic forms of consciousness which give 
us a greater degree of control over ourselves as well as our environment. But 
whilst on the basis of our increasing knowledge we exercise the power to dream 
up fabulous and unlimited futures for ourselves and to turn some of those 
dreams into reality, we are also finding that there are in fact limits to what we 
can and should do. Science of course deals with what we can do, while ethics is 
the study of what we should do. Biology and sociobiology are just two related 
areas of science which are defining the limits of what we can do, and they 
should be allowed - judiciously of course - to contribute to our ethical 
deliberations. 
Another area of scientific inquiry in which evolutionary theory is playing a 
fundamental role, and which ought to be considered in devising epistemological 
and ethical (as well as political, educational and literary) theories, is the study of 
the workings of the brain. Various experts have attempted to describe for the 
laity recent developments in this field, together with their own particular 
hypotheses. 19 One of the most convincing of these accounts has been given by 
the philosopher, Paul Churchland, (1995) in his book, The Engine of Reason, the 
Seat of the Soul: a philosophical journey into the brain. This is a fascinating and 
important work, but I only have space here to refer to a few points most relevant 
to my discussion. Churchland is a materialist who argues on the basis of 
19 See for example Daniel Dennett (1991), Michael Gazzaniga (1994), Francis Crick (1995), 
Roger Penrose (1995) and David Chalmers (1996). 
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empirical research that the brain is a parallel processor (as distinct from the 
linear processors used in the common computer) which is responsible for all of 
the powers of mind including consciousness, reason and choice. All neural 
networks in animals work in the same way, using a mechanism which he calls 
'vector coding', and so it is reasonable to suppose that all but the simplest 
animals possess a degree of consciousness. Churchland also argues that artificial 
neural networks will eventually be constructed to duplicate consciousness. 
Meanwhile primitive artificial brains (often just linear processing simulations of 
parallel processors) have been able to reproduce simple sensory representations 
and pattern recognition - including samples of the kinds of pattern recognition 
basic to vision and language. Churchland thinks that language is not unique to 
humans, but is a product of mental processes (i.e. vector 'coding) which are 
common to both humans and animals. Human language is, as far as we know, 
more highly developed and, particularly through writing, has provided us with 
an expanding repository of knowledge both of the commonsense variety and of 
the more elaborate and accurate type afforded by science. In this way we are 
able to build on the human achievements of the past. Churchland sees the 
content of human consciousness as largely constructed by culture, yet 
fundamentally conditioned by the subconscious, pre-linguistic mental processes 
which are the legacy of genetic evolution. For example what we call 'instinct' is 
certainly the product of innate vector coding processes, and it may be that the 
subconscious reasoning abilities which we recognise as intuition are of a similar 
kind. 
An important aspect of vector coding is that it produces the neurological 
equivalent of maps, models or prototypes of the external realities conveyed to us 
through sensory impressions. We can have no way of directly knowing how 
accurate these pototypes really are; however, a degree of functional 'accuracy' or 
referentiality is guaranteed by the fact that our construction of them is 
sufficiently well adapted to our environment to have ensured the survival of our 
species. These prototypes exist at all of the different levels of processing in our 
brains, from basic visual pattern recognitions up to large linguistic and cultural 
constructs. Commonsense knowledge is just such a prototypical model of the 
world, and is therefore capable of further unconscious adaptation as our physical 
and social environments change. Moreover, the recording of these prototypes in 
language allows us to reflect consciously upon them and to refine them through 
the application of communicable, methodical processes such as those of science 
and mathematics. Churchland shows for example how science advances by the 
application of analogical thinking, a clear instance being the way our 
understanding of the nature and behaviour of light has been sharpened by 
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comparing it to both a wave and a particle, items with which we are familiar 
through direct everyday experience. Hence Churchland says, 
...the role of learned prototypes and their continual redeployment in new 
domains of phenomena [is] central to the scientific process. Specific rules or 
'laws of nature' play an undeniably important but nonetheless secondary role, 
mostly in the social business of communicating or teaching scientific skills. 
One's scientific understanding is lodged primarily in one's acquired hierarchy 
of structural and dynamical prototypes, not primarily in a set of linguistic 
formulas. 
In parallel fashion. ..our knowledge of a language may well be 
embodied in a hierarchy of prototypes for verbal sequences that admit of varied 
instances and indefinitely many combinations, rather than a set of specific 
rules-to-be-followed. (143) 
The construction of prototypes therefore appears to be fundamental to all 
thinking; indeed, it is the very stuff of concept formation. It is easy to see how 
the deployment of analogies underlies the processes of description, criticism and 
creativity. They are most clearly seen, perhaps, in the linguistic devices of 
metaphor and metonymy. The use of models is no less basic in areas of social 
understanding such as politics, law and morality. 
Moral knowledge could be seen, then, as a set of learned prototypical 
examples of social behaviours such as 'cruelty and kindness, avarice and 
generosity, treachery and honour, mendacity and honesty' (144) rather than a 
collection of rules or principles. And therefore, Churchland argues, 
...moral learning will be a matter of slowly generating a hierarchy of moral 
prototypes, presumably from a substantial number of relevant examples of the 
moral kinds at issue. Hence the relevance of stories and fables, and above all 
the ongoing relevance of the parental example of interpersonal behaviour, and 
parental commentary on and persistent guidance of childhood behaviour. (144) 
Effective moral learning will arm children against the corruptions of self-
deception, self-service, group-thinking and fanaticism. The most penetrating 
moral insight will be exercised by those who can see a situation in more than 
one way and who can judge the accuracy and relevance of those competing 
interpretations. What will be required is a rich moral imagination combined with 
powerful critical abilities, and here a distinct advantage will be gained from an 
education which brings ethical reasoning to bear on a wide range of textual 
experiences in order to supplement the child's necessarily limited life 
experience. 
This process sounds like the beginnings of an ethically aware approach 
to critical social literacy. Reliable theory of all kinds will be of some use in 
developing and teaching such a program, but what will be most effective in 
educating the student, according to Churchland's account, is the modelling of 
real life experiences (especially in narratives), judging the relative value of the 
82 
different insights gained through those models, and then putting that wisdom to 
the test in their own experience. Colin Lankshear's (1994) discussion paper on 
critical literacy seems to be in keeping with this approach, when he points out 
that critical judgement of a particular discourse (which we may now define as a 
relatively coherent set of prototypes) only becomes possible when one is 
enabled to step outside it by entering another discourse. For example I have 
tried in this study to critique the discourse of post-structuralism from the point 
of view of the discourses of ethics and evolutionary theory. Even within wide-
ranging discourses like ethics and biology there are many conflicting models, 
each of which can provide perspectives from which it is possible to criticise the 
others. However, evolutionary epistemology supports the contention that texts 
are at least partially judged against experiences which are non-linguistic, non-
discursive - i.e. physical and social experiences which are felt in the brain - and 
that the ultimate test is whether they help or hinder our survival as a species. 
Clearly these biological limits to the adoption of discursive models of the real 
world still leave plenty of room for disagreements which in our society do not, 
in the short term at least, seem to threaten the transmission of the individual's 
genes - though there are of course societies in which people are killed for their 
political or religious views. One might, therefore, expect that discussion in our 
critical literacy classrooms would remain fairly open-ended and lively. 
While Churchland has given a very plausible account of the construction 
of consciousness and creativity by the computational processes of the recurrent 
neural networks of the brain (and hence the possibility of building an artificial 
brain), he does not discuss the existence and nature of free will. However, free 
will, or at least the ability to choose between rival interpretations (i.e. agency), 
seems to be implied in all that he says about the ability of the brain to construct 
models, to reflect upon their accuracy and to act upon reasoned judgements. The 
invisibility to consciousness of much of the processing which goes on in the 
brain means that the reasons for most of our everyday decisions remain a 
mystery to us. It is plausible, therefore, to suppose that these decisions might in 
fact be fully determined by an extremely complex conjunction of innate, learned 
and environmental factors, but since we will probably never be able to describe 
these determinations fully we will remain incapable of accurately predicting 
behaviour. Thus we will retain at least the illusion of free will. 
But what more do we expect of the concept of free will anyway? Perhaps 
all we need is the occasional reassurance, upon reflection, that we have been 
unconsciously making generally appropriate responses to the constantly 
changing conditions of our lives, and the feeling that, faced with a difficult 
choice, we are able to consciously deploy our powers of symbolic representation 
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in reflecting, analysing, imagining alternative actions and predicting 
consequences, in order finally to will to do one thing or another. In constructing 
this description of what free will might mean to us I have found myself 
constrained to reintroduce the term 'will' at the end, thereby making my 
definition circular. The fact is that brain science has not yet satisfactorily 
explained the nature of what we call let alone what we call 'free will'. 
Francis Crick (1994: 265-268) sees 'free will' as an illusion created by our 
inability to describe to ourselves all the reasons for our 'choices', and 'will' as a 
mental operation which may have a precise location in the brain. He recounts 
the case of a woman who had suffered localised and temporary brain damage 
and who reported upon recovery how she had lost her desire to act while 
retaining her normal awareness of herself and her surroundings. Thus Crick is 
able to suggest an exact site in the brain which is at least associated with the 
will. 
When it comes to morality and law, however, the question of whether or 
not free will is an illusion becomes much more important than any 
psychological need to feel that we are rational and free agents. Here we are 
confronted with the question of moral responsibility. If free will is an illusion, 
then morality and law cannot hold us personally responsible for our actions, and 
thus the role of moral and legal codes in society is simply that of another social 
mechanism which has been constructed by natural selection for determining 
adaptive behaviour. Roger Penrose (1995) faces this issue squarely in his 
extraordinary attempt to explain consciousness in monist (i.e. scientific 
materialist rather than dualist) terms as the result of the evolution of non-
algorithmic quantum processes in the brain. Ultimately he remains speculative 
and vague about the causes of free will, but he predicts that a new theory of the 
quantum-state reduction process will be needed to explain the phenomenon of 
consciousness, and that this will show that free will resides somehow in the 
indeterminacy of quantum states prior to their reduction. He argues that such a 
new theory - a quantum-gravitational theory - will be necessary in any case to 
resolve the present conflict between the two most fundamental, powerful and 
experimentally best supported theories in modern science: quantum mechanics 
and Einstein's theory of general relativity. Churchland agrees with Penrose's 
view that non-algorithmic processes are necessary in producing the powers of 
the brain, including consciousness, but rejects his hypothesis that these non-
algorithmic processes are the result of quantum operations. Churchland (1995: 
246-250) points out that the vector coding employed in the parallel processing 
used by both natural and artificial neural networks is in itself non-algorithmic 
since it is an analogue rather than a digital process. However, Churchland has 
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based his objections on the material contained in Penrose's (1990) earlier book, 
The Emperor's New Mind, and he remains silent about the question of exactly 
how free will can be created by vector processing. 
Even more startling than Penrose's approach to resolving the problem of 
free will and determinism is that of the mathematical physicist, Frank Tipler, 
(1996) who has produced a controversial work entitled, The Physics of 
Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead. Based 
on an evolutionary view of the universe and a thorough knowledge of particle 
physics, this is a serious mathematical and empirical argument for the existence 
of God (or what Tipler also calls the 'Omega Point'), heaven and hell, the 
resurrection of the dead, and the reconciliation of free will and determinism. 
Paul Davies, (1994) commenting on an earlier version of Tipler's theory, points 
out that it depends on particular physical models of the universe - especially in 
its last phases - proving to be correct. However, Tipler has proposed a number 
of empirical tests which will be performed on certain predictions of his theory, 
using the extremely high-powered particle accelerators which are currently 
under construction. Also his book contains a technical appendix for scientists 
which allows them to check his mathematical reasoning. If, indeed, Tipler's 
theory survives these tests there will be more reason to believe that our sense of 
a degree of freedom of choice is not an illusion. 
Churchland and other experts in neuro-science have more to say about 
the implications of brain science for our understanding of morality and ethics, 
but the above account will suffice to set the scene. I will return to some of these 
ideas in tracing the outlines of a new synthesis in ethics, and in discussing the 
literary texts introduced in Chapter 3. But first I will illustrate briefly how some 
attempts to construct post-structuralist-pragmatist-postmodern approaches to 
ethics have offered us ways of coping with the bewildering pluralism, relativism 
and incipient nihilism which characterise postmodernity, and how these 
approaches make more sense within an evolutionary framework. 
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3. Post-structuralist ethics: the limits of language 
In an unpublished paper, (1993) 'The Turn to Ethics in the 1990s', and later in 
his book, (1994) Ethics, Theory and the Novel, David Parker provides a lucid 
introduction to some significant recent developments in literary theory and 
moral philosophy. Parker notes a number of striking features of literary criticism 
in the 70s and 80s: 
1. the lack of interest among literary theorists in the relationship between 
ethics and literature, in spite of the fact that it has been an era of great ferment 
in moral philosophy; 
2. the persistence of interest in moral interpretations of texts at the level 
of undergraduate pedagogy, influenced by a critical tradition 'formed by the 
likes of Aristotle, Pope, Dr Johnson, Matthew Arnold, Henry James, F.R. 
Leavis and Lionel Trilling'; (Parker 1993: 2) 
3. the burgeoning of 'engaged, urgent, practice-oriented literary theory... 
concerned with [political] issues of race, gender, class and sexuality'; (3) 
4. the implicitly ethical nature of political and post-structuralist criticism 
in their concern that the 'logic of binary oppositions is also a logic of 
subordination and domination'; (4) 
5. the development by some forms of feminism of 'a picture of human 
flourishing not simply in terms of "thin" concepts such as justice and equality 
but also drawing on "thicker" conceptions of human character which tend to 
revalue such goods as connectedness, emotional responsiveness and care as 
alternatives to an allegedly masculinist concern with moral autonomy, 
rationality and obligation'; (4, 5) 
6. the privileging by some forms of feminism and much neo-Marxist 
criticism of politics over ethics, where ethics is always suspect and in need of 
deconstruction because it 'legitimates by universalising into a system of binary 
oppositions the characteristics of one group or class versus another'. (7) 
Into this ferment, Parker argues, following the classicist and moral 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum, there is a great need to inject 'the organising 
questions of moral philosophy'. (3) In particular he makes an eloquent plea for 
an ethics of non-judgmentalism, 'an ethical vocabulary in which to articulate the 
humanly destructive impulsions that can lurk precisely in the thirst for 
righteousness, including political righteousness.' (9) Parker admits the difficulty 
of talking about ethical inquiry 'post-Marx, post-Nietzsche, post-Saussure and 
post-Derrida' (10) but he points out that in recent years there has been a distinct 
move by deconstructionists and their commentators to make explicit the 
previously tacit ethics of post-structuralist theory and criticism. Here he cites 
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minor elements of the work of Kristeva, Derrida and de Man; and major texts 
such as: Barbara Johnson, (1987) A World of Difference; J. Hillis Miller, (1987) 
The Ethics of Reading; Tobin Siebers, (1988) The Ethics of Criticism; Simon 
Critchley, (1992) The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas; and 
Geoffrey Galt Harpham, (1992) Getting it Right: Language, Literature and 
Ethics. 2° 
Parker goes on to suggest some reasons why deconstruction has seemed 
antipathetic to ethics in the past and has been so slow in engaging with it. One 
reason is that deconstruction 'has insisted that literary meaning is finally 
undecidable, so the very notion of determinate "moral questions" or "dilemmas" 
is defeated in the end by instabilities within language itself.' (12) Another reason 
is that 'deconstruction has presented the inner life of moral deliberation, 
intentionality and choice not as something prior to language [as we have seen 
Churchland does - at least in part] but as a mere effect of language. Thus the 
supposedly autonomous rational subject of Kantian ethics is decentred into the 
various different discourses of which he is constituted.' (12) Against these 
difficulties Parker argues that deconstructionists, such as de Man, offer 'a set of 
false alternatives: either subjectivity is a transcendental signified or it is just an 
effect of language; either morality is grounded in such metaphysical concepts as 
"man", "love", or "self" or it is nothing but a "language aporia".' (13) 
One pathway between these extremes has been suggested by the literary 
critic Geoffrey Harpham's (1992) radical rethinking of ethics in the light of post-
structuralist literary theories. This approach is designed, he says, to go beyond 
left-wing, right-wing and anti-ethical assumptions which hinder the debate 
about the nature and relevance of ethics today. In his book Getting it Right: 
Language, Literature and Ethics Harpham locates ethics in the acts of making 
and reading texts rather than simply in the texts themselves. In trying 'to 
understand what constitutes "ethics itself," to understand the ought, the "resisted 
imperative," that centres all ethical discourses', he demonstrates that 
... 'otherness' touches all aspects of ethics, beginning with the most important 
ethical terms, such as 'freedom', 'obligation', 'subject', and 'ought' itself. All of 
these, when used in a specifically ethical context, are inhabited and inhibited by 
othernesses, energies that contradict their manifest meanings. The phenomenon 
of 'otherness' applies equally.., to the obligations of the individual, the structure 
of ethical terms, the subject as constructed by ethics, and even to the position of 
ethical discourse with respect to other discourses. Like any institutionalised and 
professional discourse, ethics seeks clarity and precision; it posits rules, laws, 
conditions, implications, entailments, values, hierarchies. In the case of ethics, 
however, all this positing is both necessitated and frustrated by a radical and 
20 Another interesting attempt to draw out the ethical implications of poststructuralism can be 
found in John D. Caputo, (1989) 'Disseminating Originary Ethics and the Ethics of 
Dissemination'. He sees the proliferation of meanings opened up by deconstruction as fostering 
an ethics of openness to life. 
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ineradicable unclarity built into the discourse itself. If this unclarity could be 
respected as constitutive, if the quest for a certain kind of lucidity could be 
suspended, then ethics might discover some path between, or other than, the 
depressing reduction to strictly logical rules and a more or less covert 
utopianism, paths that largely define the possibilities for ethics today. (2,3) 
Harpham's approach employs post-structuralist concepts in order to portray 
ethics as a potentially liberating rather than simply limiting activity. 
Harpham also faces up to one of the great puzzles of ethics: how is it that 
a sense of morality can be universally shared by all peoples and yet particular 
moral codes can differ from community to community? In discussing this 
phenomenon he makes the following distinction between ethics and morality: 
My candidate for a truly universal imperative, a law which would work the way 
that Kant, for example, saw such a law as working, is 'Act on principle'. This 
apparently vacuous but truly noncontingent imperative does not specify or 
warrant any particular act, choice, or decision. Ethical legitimacy for particular 
acts can only be claimed through a synergistic convergence of 'Act on 
principle' and some more definite or specific code - an other within ethics that, 
out of respect for a traditional distinction, I call morality... What interests me is 
the lamination of two kinds of prescription, with the moral representing a class 
of contingently desirable acts - 'Honor thy father and thy mother'; 'Don't steal 
that book'; 'Help your brother tie his shoes' - whose contingency is transcended 
but not fully cancelled by the appeal to the universal. Saturated with 
particularity and circumstance, morality fuses interest with principle, both 
fulfilling and negating the global imperative on which it depends for its 
effectiveness. (3) 
Harpham tries to account for the universality of ethics 'by exploring language as 
a primary site of the phenomenon of a "global" imperative operating in tension 
with local choices and acts.' (3,4) However, he does not see language as an 
agent in itself which determines its users' moral values - though particular 
languages might enshrine particular cultural values. Rather, he argues that the 
use of language by its very nature - its tendency to disseminate rather than fully 
determine meaning - requires certain kinds of choices which are essential to 
ethics, and that it is this which makes language itself seem to have an ethical 
dimension. Harpham then turns to the psychoanalytic concept of 'conversion' as 
another site of universality, tracing it through Freudian analysis to the ethics of 
narrative. Finally he investigates the role of ethics in literary creation, 
commenting on the oddity of the fact that 'the process of creation has been 
considered to be beneath the attention of the critical community concerned more 
with the creativity of understanding than with the understanding of creativity.' 
(5) Throughout his book Harpham maintains that ethics cannot ultimately be 
disengaged from other areas of human practice, 'but rather that it is best seen as 
a factor of "imperativity" immanent in, but not confined to, the practices of 
language, analysis, narrative, and creation'. (5) 
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In his final chapter Harpham discusses Joseph Conrad's The Secret Agent 
in the light of Conrad's comments on the creative process as recorded in letters 
and prefaces. Harpham's deconstructive analysis of Conrad's ironic method 
leads him to conclude that literature is incapable of promoting the good without 
ambiguity, and that consequently it is the writers and readers of literature who 
are obliged to take the responsibility and risk of making the moral choices 
which texts confront them with. 
Occurring under the sign of irony, creations, as written fictions so 
palpably and painfully demonstrate, are not moral agents... for their effect is 
never unambivalent. Those looking to literature for the promotion of the good 
seek agency in the wrong place, for everything in a creation is shadowed and 
compromised by its others. Creations are rather the cause or the effect of 
agency - the burden of which, however, falls on those who must make 
decisions based on evidence that is conflicting and imprecise, on those who 
must choose and act on principle despite the suspicion that principle is 'at 
bottom identical' with interest. There may be, as some have argued, 21 a textual 
'imperative' not to decide on a correct or final interpretation and not to permit 
the emigration of moral truths from the text to the world. Conceived in this 
way, 'literature' is a figure for agency's anarchic ungroundedness. But anarchy 
bears its own obligations; and the horizon of indecision is reached whenever 
necessity imposes upon agents a fresh imperative to hazard simplicity despite 
its secrets: to understand, to make, to create and recreate not just the text and its 
meaning, but themselves and the world. (219) 
This brief account of Harpham's work throws light on the distinction between 
the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' and provides the beginnings of an explanation of 
why ethics is persistent and inescapable in literature, theory and criticism. It also 
offers a glimpse of one form ethics has taken in response to post-structuralism. 
Moreover, his conclusion rings true to our experience as readers and writers and 
to our sense of ourselves as relatively free moral agents: that while language and 
literature are saturated in the ethical, they cannot relieve us of the final 
responsibility of choosing, among the options offered, that which after rational 
analysis and discussion we must simply trust to be good. 
While I would argue that Harpham tends to exaggerate the 
indeterminacy of language and fictions, he nevertheless illustrates an important 
consideration: that language is indeed limited in its ability to define its referents. 
Hence ethical theories will reveal gaps, silences and contradictions, and will be 
open to differently interested interpretations. The same is true of moral tales. 
Such 'dissemination' might be seen as a source of frustration to moral 
philosophers, ethical critics, and ordinary citizens, yet perhaps it might also be 
valued as a condition of human freedom. Dissemination leaves room for ethical 
choice because it generates possibilities, alternatives and uncertainties. A 
completely determinate ethics, with its universal principles, exhaustive rules and 
21 Most famously, for example, J. Hillis Miller (1987) in his book, The Ethics of Reading. 
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illustrative fables - if such a thing were possible - would obligate all of the 
people all of the time. This would so circumscribe our lives that it would 
probably be unbearable, accustomed as we are to living with ethical 
uncertainties and taking more or less calculated moral risks. Such constraining 
circumstances might be expected to evoke a sharp rise in dissidence among 
some people and lassitude among others - as the experience of totalitarian 
regimes would seem to demonstrate. 
An evolutionary view of the development of language, culture, morality 
and ethical reasoning provides a fairly plausible explanation of the less than 
completely determinate nature of these phenomena. All of them can be regarded 
as mechanisms by which individual organisms have adapted to their physical 
and social environments. In other words, as they have emerged incrementally 
and randomly within populations over long periods of time, they have been 
selected by their survival value in the context of particular environments. Thus 
the mechanisms do not have to work perfectly or fit together completely 
coherently to be effective; they just have to be sufficiently referential and 
determinate to enable the genes of the organism to be passed on. Biologists have 
noted this quality in all of our physiological adaptations too: we are the products 
of a natural bricolage and therefore may be by nature bricoleurs. But we do not 
act totally by trial and error: having evolved as reasoning animals we are able in 
varying degrees to chart and correct our course in advance. 
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4. Pragmatist ethics: the limits of culture 
In the essay cited above, where he depicts ethics as somewhat marginalised by 
post-structuralism, David Parker (1993) introduces a more viable approach to 
ethics in recent moral philosophy, particularly in the work of Charles Taylor 
(1985, 1989) in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers and 
Sources of the Self. He gives a brief account of Taylor's conception of the self 
and its relationship to language, the importance of practical reason and moral 
intuitions, and the way Taylor rejects post-structuralism's reduction of 
knowledge and social relationships to language games. He advances a strong 
case for pursuing the relevance to the theory and practice of literary criticism of 
the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum, Bernard Williams, John 
Rawls and Richard Rorty, all of whom have some affinities with Taylor and can 
be described as ethical pragmatists. 
Parker also notes that the 'turn toward the ethical' which he has identified 
within literary studies is closely connected to a turn to the literary within ethics. 
According to Richard Rorty, the culture of positivism is being replaced in our 
time by the culture of pragmatism. Ethics is ceasing to look for its foundations 
in metaphysics, and is turning to our traditions, to literature and the arts, as sites 
of the culture's deepest moral questioning. However, there is a danger in this, 
Parker warns, since those traditions can enshrine 'the systematic 
disempowerment of important groups, such as women, homosexuals and racial 
minorities.' (22) Thus there will always be a need for 'political criticism as an 
external perspective on the ethnocentric, conservative tendencies of anti-
foundationalist ethics.' (23) In the end it seems that Parker looks to an on-going 
dialogue between various approaches to ethics, including feminist and 
Habermasian universalist ethics, but his preference is still for Taylor whose 
'tradition-based argument... doesn't set itself against Enlightenment ideals [of 
human rights and equality founded in sceptical reason], but treats them as an 
integral part of that full range of mutually-conflicting goods we actually live by, 
and need to live by in order to live as well as we can.' (24) 
In the light of Parker's last point, and keeping in mind the notion of the 
(albeit limited) freedom of the subject which I am defending in this study, I 
reiterate that I do not see how ethics could ever supply a systematic answer to 
all our moral dilemmas. Futhermore, if it did, such a total system would spell 
the end of freedom of choice. Interestingly, deconstruction, the enemy of 
totalising systems, provides one explanation of why this is so - a point which I 
take up in the next section. 
Whereas Harpham, from his post-structuralist perspective, found an 
explanation for the universality of ethical concerns in language, Parker's 
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pragmatist view seems to locate this universality in the fact that everywhere 
human beings negotiate with one another in maintaining social structures. Both 
approaches entail an ineradicable moral relativism. Harpham locates this 
indeterminacy in the openness of texts to individual interpretations, while 
Parker also locates It in cultural differences. Yet neither of them sees relativism 
as a fundamental problem: rather it is a welcome element in human diversity 
and freedom. Parker, however, acknowledges that moral relativism is often the 
occasion for bitter conflict between individuals and (sub-)cultures when he 
pleads that one of the 'mutually-conflicting goods' we live by should be non-
judgmentalism, or tolerance. But is this not a call for the universal acceptance of 
a moral precept? Indeed it is, and engagement in the ensuing arguments is 
integral to the pragmatists' commitment to ethics. However, the ineradicability 
of relativism can be seen in Parker's assertion that the goods we need to live by 
are mutually conflicting. As I have illustrated previously, against the value of 
tolerance we must also set the need, in certain circumstances, to condemn 
destructive behaviours. Thus pragmatism does not deny the necessity of ethical 
analysis and negotiation: rather we are obliged by the need to maintain social 
relationships to engage in a constant process of defining the moral concepts 
which will guide our conduct, negotiating between differing views about what 
concepts are relevant, and defining how they should be applied in differing 
circumstances. Ethical considerations, then, are always situated in cultural 
practice, and the moral concepts which will be most immediately useful are 
those which Bernard Williams (1985) describes as 'thick' - i.e. virtues such as 
courage, loyalty and compassion - rather than the 'thinner' concepts of rationalist 
ethics, such as Kant's categorical imperative. Pragmatism in ethics accepts 
relativism as a product of the individual and cultural difference which is a 
condition of life, but it eschews nihilism in its commitment to renegotiating the 
compromises which are necessary to survival and human flourishing. Cultural 
differences, viewed in the light of this commitment, are both a limit on what we 
can achieve together and an opportunity for change and growth. 
There is nothing in this approach to ethics which is incapable of a deeper 
evolutionary explanation. The generation of biological and cultural diversity is 
necessary to the process of evolution, driven as it is at a still deeper level by 
genetic mutation. Changes in the structure and behaviour of species are the 
result of natural selection of those mutations best suited to changes in the 
environment, which are in the final analysis explained by the second law of 
thermodynamics. Progress from simple to more complex biological structures 
seems to be the product of a combination of natural selection and the 'order for 
free' which Kauffman shows is inherent in the slowly changing complexity 
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arising from the decay of thermodynamic systems poised on the relatively stable 
cusp between completely static order and totally dynamic chaos. Such natural 
progress appears to explain the emergence of consciousness, reason, language, 
society and culture, and the necessity of both stability and change in our social 
structures. The theory of evolution suggests that while certain natural laws 
determine the fundamental conditions of life there may be only so much that is 
'given' about the local biological, social, cultural and hence moral adaptations of 
human communities: rather these are strategies for survival patched together 
according to largely pragmatic 'considerations' - hence the similarity and 
diversity of individuals, societies, cultures, and moral codes. But exactly how 
much is given, and by what forces at work in our lives, remains a moot question. 
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5. Postmodern ethics: the limits of theory 
Natural selection theorists see care for others, and the reasonableness of 
extending that care beyond our immediate family, ethnic group and species, as 
founded in human and ultimately animal nature through the evolution of both 
instinct and reason as adaptive mechanisms. In their belief that humans possess 
an innate moral sense they are similar to the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman 
(1993) who asserts in his book Postmodern Ethics that humans possess a 
fundamental impulse 'to be for the Other' which leads them to form social 
relationships. However, Bauman, like Harpham and Parker, does not offer any 
evolutionary explanations for this phenomenon. Instead, following the 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas and supported by rational and empirical 
arguments, he claims that 'being for the Other' precedes and gives rise to that 
'being with the Other' which is society. And (since we are social animals, the 
sociobiologist would add) it is being for and with the Other which constitutes 
our sense of the self as a separate identity, albeit a complex one which is 
intertwined with other identities. In more traditional terms, then, Bauman sees 
morality as founded on the fragile basis of individual conscience. 
However, he also recognises the reality that humans are morally 
ambivalent: not fundamentally evil as some versions of Christian doctrine 
maintain, and not fundamentally good as some versions of humanism would 
have it, but a mixture of good and bad. Evolutionary theory takes this view too, 
and offers a scientific explanation for the phenomenon's genesis. As social 
animals, humans are the product of what Richard Dawkins (1976) calls 'the 
selfish gene', the drive to individual reproduction which is the engine of 
evolution and which has been working out its survival through the adaptive 
strategy of forming communal structures. Thus humans exhibit both rivalry and 
co-operation in their relationships with each other. Bauman argues that this 
moral ambivalence in human beings extends to the very nature of what we 
conceive to be good and bad. We can see this in evolutionary theory as well: 
thus rivalry can be good in producing more adaptive characteristics within 
species, and bad in the harm it can do to individuals; and cooperation can be bad 
in that it may lead ultimately to the death of the individual through an act of 
self-sacrifice, and good in that it may lead to the survival of the group. 
However, Bauman's notion of moral ambivalence extends more deeply than 
that. He describes morality as 'incurably aporetic', (11) defining 'aporia' as 'a 
contradiction that cannot be overcome, one that results in a conflict that cannot 
be resolved'. (8) 
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Few choices (and only those which are relatively trivial and of minor 
importance) are unambiguously good. The majority of moral choices are made 
between contradictory impulses. Most importantly, however, virtually every 
moral impulse, if acted upon in full, leads to immoral consequences (most 
characteristically, the impulse to care for the Other, when taken to its extreme, 
leads to the annihilation of the autonomy of the Other, to domination and 
oppression); yet no moral impulse can implement itself unless the moral actor 
earnestly strives to stretch the effort to the limit. The moral self moves, feels 
and acts in the context of ambivalence and is shot through with uncertainty. 
Hence the ambiguity-free moral situation has solely an utopian existence of the 
perhaps indispensable horizon and stimulus for a moral self, but not a realistic 
target of ethical practice. Seldom may moral acts bring complete satisfaction; 
responsibility that guides the moral person is always ahead of what has been 
and what can be done. All the efforts to the contrary notwithstanding, 
uncertainty is bound to accompany the condition of the moral self forever. 
Indeed, one can recognise the moral self by its uncertainty whether all that 
should have been done, has been. (11, 12) 
In developing this notion of moral ambivalence which constitutes his 
postmodern ethics and sociology, Bauman's discussion also takes into account 
the implications of the post-structuralist-pragmatist insights which I have been 
discussing - i.e. the inherent instabilities and hence limitations of language and 
culture (and, as we have seen, to a lesser extent of science) which undermine the 
formation of totally compelling ethical theories. Thus ethics, when it has 
attempted to construct a completely rational foundationalist and universalist 
system of principles and precepts which would oblige people to behave morally, 
has succeeded only in generating conflicting systems each of which calls into 
question the foundations and universality of the others. And so long as ethics 
persists in this futile search for the fulfilment of its totalising ambitions it will be 
on the side of the controllers of society who want to manage every aspect of our 
lives and who are constantly tempted to resort to legislation in order to enforce 
their control. Thus Bauman argues that ethics is in danger of substituting moral 
heteronomy for moral autonomy, and of stifling our fundamental, non-rational 
moral sense in the process. Abandoning the illusions of the grand project of 
modern ethics for a more realistic, postmodern conception of morality holds out 
the paradoxical prospect of allowing us to do more rather than less good. 
Bauman offers a detailed analysis of the difficulty of our predicament in 
a world of bewildering diversity and dramatic change which is largely - and 
ironically - beyond the control of the individuals whom modernity has been so 
successful first in creating and empowering, and then in fragmenting and 
disillusioning. The picture of postmodemity which Bauman paints is more than 
a little gloomy. Nor does he see, at this end of the modern experiment, any hope 
for the success of governments to legislate for morality, or of philosophers and 
educators to persuade us by rational means to be 'good'. Nevertheless, as 
Bauman points out, it was ever thus, and so our only hope, slim though it may 
be, must lie in individual conscience, that innate moral sense which he thinks is 
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perhaps uniquely human. (Darwin, however, did not think that altruism was 
confined to humans: even ants seem to behave unselfishly within their complex 
social structures, as A.S. Byatt, 1992, demonstrates in 'Morpho Eugenia'.) This 
does not mean that all laws are unnecessary, nor that philosophical analysis is 
denied its usefulness, but simply that we cannot rely on them alone to make 
people morally better. It also means that at times, as in Nazi Germany, both the 
philosophy and the laws of society can be evil, yet it is still incumbent upon 
citizens to follow their consciences, their innate sense of caring for others, and 
to resist inflicting socially sanctioned harm on their neighbours. 
For Bauman, then, postmodemity is 'modernity without illusions...' 
The 'illusions' in question boil down to the belief that the 'messiness' of the 
human world is but a temporary and repairable state, sooner or later to be 
replaced by the orderly and systematic rule of reason. The truth in question is 
that the 'messiness' will stay whatever we do or know, that the little orders and 
'systems' we carve out in the world are brittle, until-further-notice, and as 
arbitrary and in the end contingent as their alternatives. (32, 33) 
Evolutionary epistemology would agree with this statement, but only up to a 
point. One must remain sceptical about such absolute claims, including claims 
to a radical agnosticism. I object particularly to Bauman's use of the term 
'arbitrary' in this context since I am not so sure that science cannot make 
progress towards more accurate representations of external reality through its 
methodical procedures for checking the validity of its hypotheses. However, I 
agree that the 'messiness' of human life is likely to resist forever all our 
technologies of control, though perhaps not our ability to understand it. 
Kauffman's (1995) account of complexity theory explains why. In 
thermodynamic systems poised between stasis and chaos tiny initial inputs can 
have vast and essentially unpredictable consequences. Thus, even if in the far 
distant future we could arrive at a physical theory of everything, we would still 
not be able to control or predict the unfolding of all events beyond a certain 
point. 
Bauman goes on to say that postmodemity not only disillusions but also 
brings 're-enchantment' of the world after the protracted and earnest, though in 
the end inconclusive, modern struggle to dis-enchant it (or, more exactly, the 
resistance to dis-enchantment, hardly ever put to sleep, was all along the 
'postmodern thorn' in the body of modernity). The mistrust of human 
spontaneity, of drives, impulses and inclinations resistant to prediction and 
rational justification, has been all but replaced by the mistrust of unemotional, 
calculating reason. Dignity has been returned to emotions; legitimacy to the 
'inexplicable', nay irrational, sympathies and loyalties which cannot 'explain 
themselves' in terms of their usefulness and purpose... The postmodern world is 
one in which mystery is no more a barely tolerated alien awaiting a deportation 
order... Fear of the void, that... most acute of psychological effects of modern 
Enlightenment, has been blunted and assuaged (though never quelled 
completely). (33) 
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If Bauman's statement about postmodernity's disillusionment was too positive, 
then this statement about its re-enchantment is too negative. The re-enchantment 
of the world in our times may be partly as he describes, residing in what I 
previously called a 'radical agnosticism', through which one learns to live with 
life's insoluble mysteries. But I also think that for many people today re-
enchantment is occasioned by the dramatic turn which modernity's optimistic 
search for truth has taken in recent developments in science. For example there 
are Kauffman's reflections upon the mathematics of complexity theory, its 
startling applicability to both evolutionary biology and economics, and its 
implication that the evolution of human consciousness could be expected in this 
particular universe rather than being the result of some fantastic chance. 22 Also 
there is the advent of the new developments in physics, especially in the fields 
of cosmology and quantum mechanics, with the metaphysical and ontological 
questions which they have raised. The remarkable proliferation of books on 
these subjects is a contemporary publishing phenomenon, attesting to a re-
enchantment with at least some aspects of what science can reveal about the 
circumstances of our existence. I will have more to say on this subject in section 
6 of the present chapter. 
A different approach to postmodern ethics from Bauman's, one that is firmly 
based on new developments in evolutionary theory, has been adopted by Robert 
Wright (1995) in The Moral Animal: Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday 
Life. Wright presents a detailed account of a relatively recent increase in the 
power of evolutionary theory to explain many of the puzzles of human 
behaviour, illustrating them from the life of Charles Darwin and the Victorian 
society in which he lived. These developments have followed from the work in 
sociobiology which E.O. Wilson and Richard Dawkins synthesised and 
popularised in the mid-1970s. The last chapter of Wilson's (1975) book, 
Sociobiology, speculated on the implications of the study of the biological basis 
of animal behaviour for the study of human behaviour and particularly of ethics. 
It created such a storm of outrage that the extensive work on human behaviour 
of subsequent sociobiologists has been quietly carried out under other names, 
such as evolutionary psychology. What emerges from Wright's summary of this 
now substantial body of careful research is a description of human nature which 
challenges the anti-essentialism of so much structuralist, post-structuralist and 
22 Of course, if one entertains the many universes theory of cosmology, then it could still be a 
fantastic chance that one of those universes just happened to be structured in such a way that 
conscious beings would evolve to reflect upon the improbability of their existence. 
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feminist thought, clinging as it does to the dogma that behaviour is largely 
shaped by culture and therefore (it is claimed) almost entirely malleable. Wright 
explains many of the theoretical and experimental findings of evolutionary 
psychology which strongly support the replacement of cultural determinism by 
biological determinism. This is an extremely sobering shift and one that will 
outrage those discourse theorists who subscribe to cultural determinism yet 
tacitly allow sufficient agency to themselves and others to attempt to reshape 
society by rewriting its discourses. Biological determinism seems, at first sight, 
to be less open to manipulation, or at least any attempt to manipulate it seems 
less morally acceptable, since eugenics, when applied to human populations, has 
a justifiably bad reputation. 
But determinism is determinism, whether biological or cultural, and 
manipulation of human populations against their will is ethically questionable 
whether it is attempted through breeding programs or subtle forms of 
propaganda. No matter how one deals with the ethics of these activities it will 
be helpful to know what are the facts of the case: the question of what can be 
done is as relevant as the question of what ought to be done. It is apparent, as I 
have shown, that some post-structuralists in education circles are not addressing 
either question with an open mind. We need to know to what degree we are 
conditioned by nature and by nurture (indeed, we need to know how nurture 
itself is determined by nature), how these complex factors actually produce their 
effects, and to what extent, if any, we are free and able to manipulate them. 
Then the question of what we ought to do with this knowledge will have real 
applications. 
Wright has much to say in his long book about the adaptive function - 
i.e. survival value - of the social behaviours and especially the moral codes 
which humans have evolved. All of it is fascinating and some of it may be 
considered politically incorrect in our prevailing social climate, yet it bears 
serious consideration. Particularly relevant to my immediate concerns, are his 
comments on 'the postmodern mind' (324-326) and 'postmodern morality'. (356- 
358) Wright characterises postmodernism as concerned with power rather than 
responsibility, and as self-referential, ironic, cynical, irreverent and absurdist. 
These attitudes are at least partly a result of evolutionary thinking, he suggests - 
certainly they are in keeping with it. The Darwinian explanation of morality is 
the reverse of what has been traditionally thought: 
We believe the things - about morality, personal worth, even objective truth - 
that lead to behaviors that get our genes into the next generation. (Or at least 
we believe the kinds of things that, in the environment of our evolution, would 
have been likely to get our genes into the next generation.) It is the behavioral 
goals - status, sex, effective coalition, parental investment, and so on - that 
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remain steadfast while our view of reality adjusts to accommodate this 
constancy. What is in our genes' interests is what seems 'right' - morally right, 
objectively right, whatever sort of rightness is in order. (324, 325) 
This explanation of our so-called 'higher' motives is deeply cynical and 
thoroughly disillusioning. It leads Wright to wonder whether the human animal 
can be a moral animal and, indeed, whether the word 'moral' can be anything but 
a joke. It is perhaps not at all surprising, therefore, that some post-structuralists 
have also arrived at the view that moral codes are really a political compromise 
formed by competing interest groups. 
Nevertheless, Wright sees some possibilities for evolutionary ethics to 
create at least the potential for humans to be genuinely moral. The key lies in 
our evolved abilities of self-consciousness and analysis: 
Morality, you could almost say, was designed to be misused by its own 
definition. We've seen what may be the rudiments of self-serving moralizing in 
our close relatives the chimpanzees as they pursue their agendas with righteous 
indignation. Unlike them, we can distance ourselves from the tendency long 
enough to see it - long enough, indeed, to construct a whole moral philosophy 
that consists essentially of attacking it. (344) 
On this basis, Wright says, Darwin himself believed that humans are the only 
moral animals - or, according to my definitions of the terms, the only ethical 
animals. However, Wright warns us that we only have the technical ability to 
lead a truly examined life. 'Chronically subjecting ourselves to a true and 
bracing moral scrutiny, and adjusting our behaviour accordingly, is not 
something we were designed for. We are potentially moral animals - which is 
more than any other animal can say - but we aren't naturally moral animals. To 
be moral animals, we must realise how thoroughly we aren't'. (344) 
Wright also makes an interesting point about free will, an essential 
component in our ability to be ethical. Since we are biologically determined - 
and that includes cultural determination, because culture itself is the product of 
biological evolution - free will is an illusion brought to us by adaptation. It is 
adaptive behaviour which allows us to genuinely believe that our motives are 
altruistic, when they are really at the deepest level selfish, and this belief allows 
us to be more convincing in persuading others to return our 'favours'. However, 
it is clear that Wright, following Darwin, thinks that rational analysis does open 
the way for genuine freedom of choice. 
This view may not hold out great prospects for ethics education, though, 
since it depends on the extent to which the majority of people can be taught to 
analyse their own and others' motives in scientific terms. Wright points out that 
Darwin thought this skill would be confined to a few gentlemen, but of course 
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we now uphold the ideal of education for all. One result of the increased level of 
education in our time is that notions of our biological determinism are seeping 
through to the masses and threatening to undermine our deeply held belief in 
moral responsibility. Yet this belief had presumably evolved in order to make 
society more stable and thus enhance the possibility of the passing on of the 
individual's genes. No wonder then that we see today a law-and-order backlash: 
people are instinctively fearful of the breakdown of society when the courts 
become, as it seems to them, too lenient towards offenders. 
If in this situation ethics education can achieve anything at all, there are 
two things it might usefully do. One would be to teach us that, since our 
behaviour is largely determined by forces beyond our control, we ought to 
suspect our own motives (including our fears) more deeply. The other would be 
to teach us, for exactly the same reason, to be more tolerant of the pretensions 
and failings of our fellows. Thus we might learn to be tougher on ourselves and 
kinder towards offenders. But, paradoxically, an education in evolutionary and 
postmodern theory should also teach us the limits of analysis (or theorising) and 
of education in bringing about individual and social change. Hence, as well as 
educating everyone in ethics, we (I use the first person plural deliberately since I 
believe the program I am advocating must be carried out openly and 
democratically) must also change the social environment in ways which will 
work with our instincts to produce the results we want. Animal and human 
behaviour is a result of what Wright calls 'knobs and tunings': the 'knobs' are 
genetically determined propensities and the 'tunings' are the way these are 
shaped by our environment as we grow up. Thus education is needed to give us 
as clear an understanding as possible of the nature and possibilities of our lives, 
and politics is needed to adjust the conditions of our physical and social 
environment in ways which will best enable us to achieve our realistic goals. 
This is clearly a complex and delicate procedure. Our leaders will need to be 
highly educated in evolutionary psychology as well as economics, politics, law 
and so on. They will also need to be educated in ethics and in a genuine 
understanding of and commitment to the ideals of democracy in order to avoid 
the temptation to become autocratic. 
More could be said about how to make such a program workable, but 
already it is beginning to sound like a charter for Plato's republic - indeed, for all 
its attempt to remain realistic, it is a very idealistic notion. Wright, like Bauman, 
is justifiably phlegmatic about the possibilities for evolutionary ethics, politics 
and education. There are indeed limits to what theorising and its resultant 
technologies can actually achieve since the circumstances of life are so complex 
and perhaps ultimately beyond our control. Perhaps Bauman is right: all we can 
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do in the end is to trust to the moral impulses and reasoning powers which life 
has given us, and use them as best we can to deal with whatever contingencies 
arise. Our species has survived so far, and we may well be endowed with the 
resources to adapt to the threats which face us. Indeed, there does seem to be 
emerging, for obvious selfish motives, a sense that we need to co-operate 
globally in order to survive, and herein lies a ray of hope. 
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6. Quantum ethics: the return of metaphysics 
A radical synthesis of evolutionary, post-structuralist and metaphysical ethics 
has been advanced by Don Cupitt (1987) in The Long-Legged Fly: A Theology 
of Language and Desire. Although his theory is based on the (reductionist?) 
notion that there is nothing beyond the energy-matter-space-time continuum of 
the universe, Cupitt sees ethics as founded in the nature of this fundamental 
reality which he views in an ultimately religious way. If it is still possible to 
speak of God, it is for Cupitt as the ground of our being, or as the quantum void 
from which all possibilities spring. This 'horizontal' theology tries to take into 
account recent developments in linguistics, deconstruction, quantum physics, 
evolution, psychoanalysis and so on, and is perhaps one of the few viable 
directions for metaphysics today - if one can still speak of such a non-
transcendental philosophy as metaphysical. The idea of the Good, if it exists 
independently of our thinking at all, is in Cupitt's view immanent in the 
structure of a universe which has given rise to conscious beings capable of 
reflecting on ethical issues, in spite of the limitations of language. 
A similarly speculative attempt to forge a new, and in its way 
postmodern, world view, founded on quantum physics and integrating a variety 
of other disciplines, including evolutionary theory, is to be found in the work of 
Danah Zohar and Ian Marshall. (1994) Their book, The Quantum Society: Mind, 
Physics and a New Social Vision, explores, through reference to their own work 
and an impressive array of other thinkers and researchers, the notion that the 
strange sub-atomic world of quantum events and relationships determines the 
nature of ourselves and the universe of which we are an integral part. They 
reject the dualistic split between spirit and matter, mind and body, but their 
materialist philosophy is not exactly that of modernism which bases its beliefs 
on Newtonian physics and Darwinian evolution - a tradition within which James 
Rachels' evolutionary ethics sits comfortably enough. In fact Zohar and 
Marshall see the movement from modernity to postmodernity as quintessentially 
the movement from the mechanistic, reductionist view of reality to the quantum 
view - the ideas of the new physics of quantum mechanics and cosmology 
which have been given currency by the writings of Paul Davies, Stephen 
Hawking and others. 23 Newtonian physics presents us with a world which is 
thoroughly logical: for example light is considered as either a series of waves or 
a stream of particles, and movements of projectiles can be predicted with 
pinpoint accuracy. These ideas work quite adequately within the scale of human 
23 Many popularised presentations of quantum mechanics are available apart from Zohar and 
Marshall's. In my opinion Roger Penrose's versions in The Emperor's New Mind and Shadows of 
the Mind are the clearest. I do not intend to attempt an adequate account here. 
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affairs. But when we observe events on the minute scales of particle physics or 
the vast scales of cosmology, the counter-intuitive, seemingly illogical theories 
of relativity and quantum mechanics must be brought to bear. Indeed, scientists 
now recognise that quantum mechanics must be used to explain chemical 
reactions, the behaviour of DNA, laser beams, neutron stars, and the operation 
of neurons in the brain. 
In discussing the implications of quantum mechanics scientists use such 
unsettling terms as 'indeterminacy', 'uncertainty', 'superposition', 'both/and', 
'action at a distance', 'non-locality', 'uncaused events', and 'virtual transitions'. 
These surprising concepts have captured the popular imagination and, to borrow 
Bauman's terms, are partly responsible for the 're-enchantment' of the world 
following our 'dis-illusionment' with the destructive results of the great Marxist 
and capitalist utopian visions of modernity. Science since the Enlightenment has 
promised to dis-enchant the world by delivering us from the fear of the gods and 
placing our destiny in our own hands. However, the massive individual, social, 
political and environmental disasters which characterise this century have 
shattered the faith of many in the ability of science and technology to solve our 
problems. One of the greatest problems facing the world today is that the power 
mongers, the politicians and the directors of multi-national (or as Bauman, 
1993: 232, calls them, 'non-national') corporations, are unlikely to relinquish the 
power which technology delivers to them, or the belief that the disasters caused 
by the side effects of technology can be solved simply by the application of 
more technology. On the other hand the total rejection of science and 
technology by extreme greens and new-agers, or by those post-structuralists 
who see science as simply another discourse with no better claim to reliable 
knowledge than tarot card reading, is not the answer either. 
Zohar and Marshall cautiously steer a passage between these poles of 
total faith in or rejection of science, charting the way forward through a deeper 
scientific understanding of the world, the self, society and technology based on 
the new physics. Central to their restoration of faith, hope and brotherly love to 
society is their proposal that quantum physics may explain the evolution of the 
human brain as the most complex structure in the universe. They also argue, 
together with Roger Penrose, that quantum states and events in the brain are 
responsible for consciousness, free will, and our sense of ourselves both as 
individuals and as integrally connected to everything else in our social and 
natural environments. Thus humans, as emergent self-ordering systems, are the 
highest expression of the fluctuations in the quantum void, the underlying sea of 
potentiality which particle physicists see as the fundamental reality, and which 
Zohar and Marshall, like Cupitt, identify with the traditional idea of a God that 
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literally creates us in its own (quantum) image. From this statement of what is, 
Zohar and Marshall appear to commit the naturalistic fallacy by making the 
logically forbidden leap to what ought to be. But perhaps their argument is valid 
here, for if we are (partially) free individuals who are also integrally connected 
to and shaped by everything else in the universe, then care for ourselves is at the 
same time care for everything else. Thus our moral responsibility as the highest 
expression of the consciousness of the universe emerges in their description of a 
quantum-driven evolutionary process. 
Zohar and Marshall offer this scenario as an immanently metaphysical 
world-view, in which, metaphorically speaking, the horizontal dimension links 
us across space to everything else in the universe and the vertical dimension 
links us to the divine through our role in the evolutionary process across time. 
Hence a sense of wonder and of the sacred is restored to human existence, and 
life regains meaning, purpose, faith, hope, love and joy. 
A further point - a sobering one - needs to be made about this perhaps 
too fervent vision: Zohar and Marshall demonstrate a clear understanding of 
post-structuralist ideas (which they call 'deconstructive post-modernity', 111ff). 
Whilst they vehemently reject the way some deconstructive thought seems to 
undermine all values, they recognise that post-structuralism has raised issues 
which 'are the central philosophical problem of today'. (115) No longer can we 
be confident of grasping absolute truth, since all our attempts are thwarted by 
the unstable nature of discourse. However, this does not mean that we must go 
to the other extreme of valuing all knowledge claims equally and rejecting all 
criteria for judging truth and error. Post-structuralism offers one explanation 
(and evolutionary epistemology another) why knowledge can always only be 
partial, but it does not prevent us from achieving closer approximations to truth 
through the application of criteria such as diligent comparison of all points of 
view, careful observation, the formation of reasonable hypotheses, and 
assessment of the results of predictions. The alternatives to this moderate 
approach to truth claims are, on the one hand, epistemological and ethical 
nihilism and the retreat into the aesthetics and politics of post-structuralist free 
play; and on the other, the deluded certainties of fundamentalism. 
Zohar and Marshall, espousing the so-called 'quantum logic' of both/and 
to supplement the mechanistic logic of either/or, cautiously tread this middle 
path. They advance their knowledge-claims tentatively, subjecting them to the 
criteria listed above, but they also act on the ethical implications of their beliefs 
by sharing them enthusiastically in the hope of pointing a way out of the 
postmodern morass. Thus they have summarised the ethical and political 
implications of their philosophy for the reconstruction of society in a series of 
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imperatives: the 'new social reality,' they declare, '...must be "holistic".., it must 
go beyond the individual/collective dichotomy... it must be plural... it must be 
responsive.., it must be "bottom-up", or emergent... it must be "green"... it must 
be spiritual.., it must be in dialogue with [quantum] science...' (7-10) Their 
explanation of these guidelines, at times directly supported by the new physics 
while at others only modelled upon it, amounts to a synthesis of evolutionary, 
postmodern and metaphysical theory, thereby offering renewed hope for the 
world in an open-minded way which perhaps can avoid the totalitarian 
propensities of previous utopian visions. 
Zohar and Marshall's philosophy is, of course, a version of the evolutionism 
whose roots extend to a time before Darwin gave scientific credibility to the 
theory of the evolution of species by his marshalling of evidence in support of 
the mechanism of natural selection. For example Tennyson's In Memoriam, 
composed between 1832 and 1845, contains in section 118 a reference to the 
evolution of man as 'The herald of a higher race', and to the notion that 
individuals have the power to cooperate with this process in order to 'Move 
upward, working out the beast, / And let the ape and tiger die'. (1954: 363-364) 
However, recent developments in evolutionary theory have dramatically 
increased its power to describe the dynamics of the universe, from the Big Bang 
to the emergence of consciousness, especially through the application of 
mathematics in quantum mechanics and complexity theory. As a result one is 
compelled to wonder whether Platonic idealism - which itself grew out of the 
Greek philosophers' speculations about the nature of mathematics and its 
relationship to the phenomenal world - might be reformulated in contemporary 
terms as the founding concept of philosophy. Certainly, this view has been 
seriously considered by the physicist and natural philosopher, Paul Davies, 
(1992) the mathematician, Roger Penrose (1990, 1995) and the philosopher and 
novelist, Iris Murdoch. (1992) 
For Davies the ultimate reality resides in the laws of physics, which give 
rise to the remarkable dynamic order, poised between stasis and chaos, that we 
see around and within us, and that mathematical analysis so beautifully 
encapsulates. In them he discerns, not the mind of a personal God, but 
nevertheless a purpose for the universe which includes the evolution of 
conscious beings who are able to comprehend such marvels. Penrose is 
convinced that the Platonic world of mathematical forms actually exists prior to 
the mathematicians' discovery (rather than construction) of such entities as the 
natural numbers and the algebra of complex numbers, and that this ideal world 
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influences the physical world in which we live. 24 Furthermore, he speculates 
that 
Perhaps a Platonic reality should also be assigned to other abstract concepts, 
not just mathematical ones. Plato himself would have insisted that the ideal 
concept of 'the good' or 'the beautiful' must also be attributed a reality, just as 
mathematical concepts must. (Penrose, 1995: 416) 
As indicated in Chapter 1, Iris Murdoch concurs with this view that the Platonic 
concept of the Good may be the ultimate reality. She argues that the long 
tradition of metaphysics (including also religious, mystical and intuitive forms 
of knowledge) remains a guide to morals,25 and that there is still a place for 
common sense, empiricism, rationalism, pragmatism and structuralism (in 
which she also includes post-structuralism) in formulating an ethics. 
The ideas of Cupitt, Zohar and Marshall, Davies, Penrose and Murdoch 
are ultimately speculative but by no means without foundation, as the carefully 
argued work of each of these scholars attests. The fact that they have seriously 
proposed a return to such well-worn philosophical concepts is an 
encouragement to reconsider the possibility of a place for metaphysics in our 
construction of a more realistic ethics for our times. After all, it is the tacit 
belief, or at least the hope, that there is an ultimate truth, or truths, somewhere 
beyond the range of language and mathematics, which sustains a continued faith 
in the value of the conversation of mankind on whatever level it is conducted, 
from the most perfunctory request to the most profound philosophical 
discussion. It is the existence of that final point of reference, the logos of 
Platonic idealism, which Derrida is sometimes supposed to have disproved. But 
this is a distortion of his philosophy. What he has posited is not the 
impossibility of the existence of the transcendent logos, but the impossibility of 
ever being able to pin it down, to refer to it directly in language. The same thing 
may be true of attempts in mathematical physics to create a theory of 
everything, in spite of Stephen Hawking's (1988) claim to be on the verge of 
uncovering the mind of God. Yet scientists continue to be motivated by the 
search for meaning and a first cause. 
In a sense, all language (including, perhaps, mathematics) is poetry - 
even the most careful philosophical discussions can be shown to be webs of 
metaphor and metonymy. And poetry can only hint at both its subjects and 
objects, to approach them via circumlocutions, which in the end define an area 
24 A fascinating novelistic treatment of this and other ideas about the nature and significance of 
mathematics can be found in Sue Woolfe's (1996) Leaning towards Infinity. 
25 Perhaps when Murdoch entitled her book Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals she was 
deliberately being less ambitious than Kant set out to be in his great work, The Foundations of 
the Metaphysics of Morals. 
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of silence where the rational mind must be still, and what can be known must be 
apprehended by some kind of (mystical?) intuition. Perhaps with the advent of 
post-structuralism and the deconstruction of all dualities, the day has arrived 
when the Western tradition of reason (the 'Church of Reason' Robert M. Pirsig, 
1974, called it in that extraordinary cult book of the seventies, Zen and the Art 
of Motorcycle Maintenance) having admitted its inherent limitations in the 
pursuit of truth, might also recognise that its own mystical tradition, the via 
negativa of the Christian mystics,26 and the mysticism of the East, such as Zen 
Buddhism, 27 offer an essential complement. This may be a difficult pill to 
swallow for recalcitrant humanists who still put their faith in the sufficiency of 
reason. 
Yet to deny, as some have accused post-structuralists of doing, the 
existence of an ultimate truth (call it God, the Buddha, the Tao, the One, or even 
the object of the totalising structure, if you like) or at least to deny the 
possibility of human language being able to even approach the truth, or truths, 
may leave the struggle to gain and communicate knowledge open to a final, 
terrible temptation. That is the temptation to abandon responsibility to any value 
beyond that of self-interest, and to give in to a desire for personal and self-
serving power at the expense of the rights of others. Language (and the practice 
science) is something we 'do' in the first instance because it gets things done. 
But what we want to do is an indication of what we value. Having evolved the 
ability to reflect upon our values, do we now want to enjoy, in the company of 
all sentient beings and sharing our many different perspectives, what seems 
good and true and beautiful? Or do we want to bend all that to selfish, partisan 
ends? The shape of this temptation, and the consequences of sometimes giving 
in to it, can be clearly seen in the history of science from Francis Bacon to the 
present day. In part, the choice is made in how we view language and use it. On 
the one hand, we can describe ourselves as part of a greater whole, recognise 
our limitations of knowledge and power, stand in awe of the immanent and/or 
transcendent 'One', try by listening as much as by talking to live in harmony 
with it, and survive to tell the tale to our children and our children's children. Or, 
on the other hand, we can use the power of language to define ourselves as 
fundamentally separate from nature and from each other, and attempt to lord it 
over all that we regard as alien to ourselves - and may the best (i.e. the most 
powerful) person win, which might mean to destroy everything in the attempt. If 
this seems to be putting the ethical choices which face us every day in terms 
26 See Kevin Hart (1989) for a discussion of Derrida which argues that his philosophy is in fact 
a development of the tradition of negative theology. 
27 See, for example, Herrigel (1971) who gives an account, from his perspective as a German 
philosopher, of his experience of learning archery from a Japanese Zen master. 
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which are altogether too stark, it is worth considering that Western culture may 
well be faced with such a choice in the looming ecological crisis. As the 
realities of that crisis begin to force their way into our consciousness the choice 
will increasingly look like one between the survival or extinction of our species 
and, more immediately, of ourselves. If we wait long enough, therefore, our 
instinct for survival will make the 'choice' for us, but by then it may be too late. 
In offering the above account of some attempts to use the languages of 
religion, the humanities, science and mathematics to express the inexpressible 
mystery of existence, to shape our future and to articulate the ethical choices 
which we must make in order to achieve our goals, I remind the reader that there 
also remains an important role for narratives. Just what that role entails will be 
illustrated in Chapter 3. 
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7. The ethics of 'disillusionment and re-enchantment': a modest synthesis 
M uch more could be said about other recent developments in ethics: for 
example extensive and significant work is being done in feminist ethics; there 
are also important responses being developed by moral philosophers to issues 
raised by the ecological crisis; and there is the work in applied ethics being 
undertaken by academic philosophers and others in many more areas of 
practical concern, such as biological and business ethics. All of these are topics 
which should be addressed in developing a comprehensive theory of ethics, and 
which could be relevant to discussions in English classrooms. However, there is 
only space to draw attention to them here and to encourage others to explore 
them further. This is one reason why the synthesis I am suggesting - some 
elements of which have been outlined above - must remain tentative and 
modest: it leaves out so much which still needs to be considered. Another reason 
for its incompleteness is that it is centred on the 'attractor' 28 of evolutionary 
theory - a theory which is itself still evolving. Moreover, the theory of evolution 
holds as one of its central tenets that what is selected from among many random 
mutations is what satisfies the pragmatic criteria of workability and survival 
rather than the logical criterion of coherence. Hence the perhaps overly-
optimistic tone of the previous section on the return of metaphysics needs to be 
tempered by the more pragmatic and ambivalent approach of - to take just one 
example - Robert Wright whose work, as we have seen, clearly illustrates the 
difficulty of deriving a coherent ethics from the seemingly contradictory moral 
codes which human societies have evolved in response to the imperatives of 
their individual members' selfish' genes. One difficulty of combining a 
metaphysical basis for ethics with an evolutionary one, particularly if the 
metaphysical view includes the idea of the Good as the ultimate reality, lies in 
resolving the traditional problem which such a metaphysics has in explaining 
the existence of evil, a problem which does not exist in a purely evolutionary 
model (or at least in a fully deterministic one) where 'evil' is the suffering 
caused by the contingencies of existence, including those at work in the human 
psyche. Nevertheless, a startling new attempt to do this has been made by the 
mathematical physicist, Frank Tipler (1996) whose book, The Physics of 
Immortality, I have mentioned previously. 
28 I have borrowed this term from the language of chaos, or complexity, theory where it is 
sometimes used in the phrase 'strange attractor'. An attractor is defined by Peter Coveney and 
Roger Highfield (1995) as: 'A way to describe the long-term behaviour of a system. Equilibrium 
and steady states correspond to fixed point attractors, periodic states to limit-cycle attractors and 
chaotic states to strange attractors'. (424) A simple example of an attractor is the point of stasis 
towards which a pendulum seems to be drawn as the energy of its swing dissipates. 
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The final reason why any proposal for a new theory of ethics must be 
greeted with a degree of scepticism is that it is only a theory, a model, a 
construction, which must face Popperian tests of its falsifiability until it 
succumbs and is superseded by a better theory. It is the necessity of this 
procedural scepticism, occasioned as far as we can tell by the very conditions of 
our existence, that gives rise to the disillusionment which is one of the two key 
terms in my proposal for an evolutionary-postmodern-metaphysical ethics of 
disillusionment and re-enchantment. Disillusionment here is a crucial stage of 
the on-going process of creating models of perceived reality, testing them by 
means of both reason and experience, discovering in what ways they are merely 
illusions, and replacing them with new and hopefully more accurate models. 
Thus disillusionment becomes a positive value - rather like Derrida's view of 
deconstruction as an 'affirmation [which] goes through some radical 
questioning, but is not questioning in the final analysis' (quoted in Chapter 1: 5 
above) - and it carries with it the obligation of a moral imperative if we wish to 
grow in our understanding of truth and in acting consistently with it. In its 
negative aspect of shattering treasured illusions, disillusionment may be 
experienced as creating a wasteland, a void, a sense of tragic loss or of an 
encounter with the absurd - depending upon how grand our illusions were and 
how firmly we believed in them in the first place. This experience, which has 
been evoked most poignantly in modernist texts like Beckett's Waiting for 
Godot, may be accompanied by such emotions as sorrow, the feeling of having 
been betrayed, and despair. However, viewed in its positive aspect, 
disillusionment may also be experienced as clearing the ground in order to 
rebuild, an empty space pregnant with possibilities, a sense of comic relief, and 
it may be accompanied by such emotions as joy, renewed desire, and hope. 
Disillusionment, then, may be embraced as the pain and pleasure of growing 
towards whatever maturity is available to us. It can be, paradoxically, an 
affirmation of attachment to life. Re-enchantment, correspondingly, will then be 
what happens to our perspective of the universe as we embark upon this age-old, 
cyclical journey - of creation, destruction and re-creation; discovery, loss and 
rediscovery; enchantment, disenchantment and re-enchantment - fortified by the 
modest hopes which are appropriate to ignorant yet talented creatures facing the 
mystery of existence in a vast and complex universe. 
Indeed, it may be that ethics can begin only where there is some hope 
and a sense of shared purpose - in the nexus between the moral sense of being 
for the Other and the instinct to survive in being for Oneself, the nexus out of 
which hope and shared purpose spring. These impulses, according to the 
sociobiologists, are the gift of life to its creatures, evolving from the first 
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unthinkable surge of the Big Bang and through the aeons of its long unwinding. 
Without such impulses the making of so many theories could scarcely have 
occurred - including post-structuralist philosophies, quantum mechanics, and 
Frank Tipler's (1996) ambitious or foolhardy attempt to be for postmodernity 
what Thomas Aquinas was for the middle ages. (328-329) Nor would there be 
any point to ethics' fundamental question: how should we live if we want to live 
together as best we can? In the next chapter I pursue some answers to that 
question through readings of some of the texts which constitute the wealth of 
literature that Martha Nussbaum (1990) sees as a form of moral philosophy. My 
deeper purpose there - as it has been here - is to restore hope in a larger sense of 
meaning and purpose than post-structuralist ideas alone can afford, and in the 
value of ethics itself, especially as it takes the form of literature and ethical 
literary criticism, in the pursuit of that hope. I also demonstrate in the next two 
chapters that, although morality and ethical reasoning have instinctual, genetic, 
deterministic origins, and although schooling has developed as a social 
mechanism for inculcating often unexamined moral values, it is still possible to 
some extent to transmit ethics as a mode of critical and creative 're-valuation' 
via carefully managed discussions in literacy and literature classes. 
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Part Two: Poiesia 
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Chapter 3 
Literature and criticism as ethical reflection 
1. Contemporary models of ethical criticism: introduction 
An evolutionary epistemology would suggest that languages have developed 
because they have conferred adaptive advantages on those organisms which 
possess them. These advantages are hard to explain without postulating that 
languages are fairly successful in communicating intended meanings from one 
individual to another, and in referring with some accuracy to the textual, 
psychological, social and physical conditions within which those individuals 
live. Hence it should be possible to devise a hermeneutic method which takes 
into account the epistemological considerations of the previous chapters - 
including the various problems of textuality raised by post-structuralism - and 
which can offer greater accuracy in discerning intentions, influences and 
references. Whilst the detailed treatment of such a method is beyond the scope 
of this study, enough has been said to justify embarking on an experiment with 
ethical criticism which takes these considerations into account. One purpose of 
this kind of criticism, especially with students in schools, is to teach and practise 
the skills of ethical reasoning, since these skills are useful in negotiating 
everyday life with all its textual and other complexities. Students can apply 
ethical criticism skills in the interpretation and discussion of the more, or less, 
complex and accurate models of life which authors construct through the stories 
that they tell and that are told by their culture through them. To what extent, and 
why, these fictional models distort experience are questions which will form 
part of the discussions. 
Before offering my own examples of ethical criticism, let me draw 
attention to three recent prototypes which have inspired me, but which also offer 
the reader alternative approaches, since they derive from somewhat different 
ethical theories than my fundamentally evolutionary one. Martha Nussbaum 
(1989) exemplifies theoretically informed ethical criticism of the highest order 
in discussing Henry James' exquisitely subtle expositions of interpersonal 
morality in his extraordinary late novels, The Ambassadors, The Wings of a 
Dove, and The Golden Bowl. Her example might be too difficult for senior 
secondary students to follow, but it is a very appropriate one for teachers, who 
may learn from it what ethical criticism can accomplish when practised by a 
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classicist and philosopher who is a leading exponent of Aristotelian, or virtues, 
ethics. 
Another interesting example of contemporary ethical criticism has been 
provided by Jennifer Livett (1995) in an essay on the novels and stories of 
Elizabeth Jolley. Livett writes deftly from the perspective of the frequently 
uneasy conjunction of feminist and post-structuralist ethical positions. A 
quotation will serve to illustrate the tenor of her discussion. In writing about the 
literary critic hero of Jolley's (1988) novel, The Sugar Mother, Livett says: 
Edwin at last begins to acknowledge that it is 'not possible to be 
simply like an animal, a bull servicing a cow' (146) and that he, who believed 
he was in control of this (patriarchal) story, has probably been all along 
entrapped in Mrs. Bott's (?also patriarchal) fiction. His situation is not only a 
result of interpretative incompetence, it also includes a willed misreading, 
another variant of reader-writer negotiations. But Leila, who speaks very little 
in the novel, and the baby, outside language altogether, though they appear to 
be enclosed in other people's stories, eventually have a power and immediacy 
which may control all the stories. (17) 
Here Livett comments upon the complex way biological and discursive 
determinations impinge upon the life of a fictional character in the context of a 
narrative which appears to have been constructed with a feminist slant. Earlier 
Livett suggests that 'Jolley is demonstrating in all [her] fictions that experience 
of the world comes through a network of complete and incomplete stories. Since 
we live by analysing stories, life makes us all into critics of narrative, and moral 
judgements may in some sense be judgements like those in literary criticism'. 
(15) Taken out of context, this observation seems to make too simple a 
connection between reading and living: making moral judgements in reading is 
apparently a rehearsal for making them in life. This statement is probably true, 
but the earlier quotation from Livett's essay gives some indication of how aware 
she is that the connection between literary and life experiences is indeed 
extremely complex. She concludes her essay with some brief quotations from 
Jolley's (1979) story, 'The Performance', which illustrate the often perplexing 
and painful nature of making moral judgements: 'You seem to have two answers 
to every question... I have no answers' (3) 'Yes, it's terrible when there's two 
answers... I haven't any answers at all really, only questions. Only questions'. 
(28) 
Of particular interest in the light of my discussion of the ethics of lying 
in Heart of Darkness, is Livett's as yet unpublished suggestion that in The 
Newspaper of Claremont Street Jolley (1981) reworks Immanuel Kant's famous 
example of the application of his categorical imperative against lying. 29 The 
29 I am grateful to Jennifer Livett for permission to use this idea and develop it in my own way 
here. 
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categorical imperative states: 'act only according to that maxim by which you 
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law'. (Trans. Beck, 
1949: 80) Kant's practical and theoretical application of this maxim to lying 
appears in the following passage, which employs a rudimentary story in order to 
defend the duty to tell the truth as an absolute principle: 
For instance, if by telling a lie you have prevented a murder, you have made 
yourself legally responsible for all the consequences; but if you have held 
rigorously to the truth, public justice can lay no hand on you, whatever the 
unforeseen consequences may be. After you have honestly answered the 
murderer's question as to whether his intended victim is at home, it may be that 
he has slipped out so that he does not come in the way of the murderer, and 
thus that the murder may not be committed. But if you had lied and said he was 
not at home when he had really gone out without your knowing it, and if the 
murderer had then met him as he went away and murdered him, you might 
justly be accused as the cause of his death. For if you had told the truth as far as 
you knew it, perhaps the murderer might have been apprehended by the 
neighbors while he searched the house and thus the deed might have been 
prevented. Therefore, whoever tells a lie, however well intentioned he might 
be, must answer for the consequences, however unforeseeable they were, and 
pay the penalty for them even in a civil tribunal. This is because truthfulness is 
a duty which must be regarded as the ground of all duties based on contract, 
and the laws of these duties would be rendered uncertain and useless if even the 
least exception to them were admitted. 
To be truthful (honest) in all declarations, therefore, is a sacred and 
absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited by no expediency. (Trans. 
Beck, 1949: 349) 
Part of Kant's point in this story is precisely that this is an unusual and extreme 
situation. Faced with the murderer's questions, 'you' are obliged to answer, or 
else place your own life in jeopardy. Furthermore, even if you had time to think 
through the possible consequences of your options - which under the 
circumstances you probably would not - you cannot be certain of the actual 
outcomes, because you do not know what contingencies may intervene in 
determining the results. For all these reasons it is best to act on an absolute 
principle - and even more so because the rightness of that principle (in this case 
that one must never lie) is the one thing you can be certain of, and because that 
rightness is guaranteed, Kant argues, by its rational derivation from the 
categorical imperative. However, if we can thus overrule the objection that the 
action which Kant advocates here is too calculating in its apparently self-serving 
prudential concerns, it still strikes us today as too cold in its principled 
rationality. What seems to be lacking is adherence to the humane virtues of 
friendship, love, loyalty and courage. We are inclined to see these as principles 
which sometimes conflict with, and usually override, the general virtue of telling 
the truth. Thus ethics seems to us to be shot through with irreconcilable 
dilemmas, the ultimate dilemma being that of finding oneself obliged to choose 
a course of action which apparently sacrifices one principle in order to satisfy 
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another equally commanding one. What counts as the highest moral conduct in 
this situation is the sort of politically expedient action which is strategically 
conceived to satisfy the most immediately demanding principle, whilst initiating 
further actions which may enable us to satisfy other principles in the long run. 
Such conduct is characterised in the sayings: 'The end justifies the means', and 
'Politics is the art of the possible'. What this view has in common with Kant's is 
the role of principle in morality, but it does not pretend that moral principles can 
be derived from reason alone. In fact, just what such principles can be derived 
from remains a vexed question amongst contemporary moral philosophers, as 
Peter Singer (1994) makes clear in his extensive reader on ethics. One thing that 
is clear, though - particularly from the above quotation from Kant - is that 
stories and their interpretation have an important role to play in ethical 
deliberations. 
In Jolley's story the character called 'the Newspaper', an elderly cleaning 
lady, has a younger brother whom she dotes upon, but who exploits her 
unconscionably. The last time she is summoned to him she finds him fallen on 
hard times and recovering from illness. He begs her to steal a hundred pounds so 
that he can leave Australia and go to South Africa. On her way home she is 
accosted by a well-dressed young man who claims to be a friend of her brother. 
He has lost track of her brother and says, with much charm, that he needs to find 
him in order to offer him a deal which will be greatly to his benefit. Newspaper 
is taken in, gives away her brother's whereabouts, and then realises, too late, that 
she has betrayed her brother to someone who wishes to take revenge upon him. 
Newspaper has in all innocence told the same kind of potentially damaging truth 
as that which in Kant's scenario can only be told knowingly. Yet for the rest of 
her life Newspaper feels guilty about it. Later in the story she abandons to death 
by exposure a lonely and demanding old woman - Nastasya or, as Newspaper 
calls her, 'Narsty' - whom she has been caring for, but finds extremely 
burdensome. Newspaper would like to be rid of Narsty, but does not plan to kill 
her. However, when the opportunity to abandon her to the elements suddenly 
presents itself, she does so, and apparently feels no guilt afterwards. 
What morals, or ethical principles, if any, can be drawn from this tale? It 
is, of course, much more rich and complex in Jolley's telling than I have been 
able to indicate here, and it deserves more detailed discussion. However, in the 
context of this study a few observations immediately come to mind. Newspaper 
has no reason to love her brother apart from the fact that he is her younger 
sibling whom she has known since he was a sweet little baby. One suspects that 
she would have as readily lied to protect him, as she would have stolen for him. 
Sociobiology offers a simple explanation for this kind of familial love. 
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Newspaper has no other reason to care for the old woman except that, as Jolley 
has her suggest, she has been brought up to be helpful, and the old woman is an 
'Other' human being who has laid claim to her help. Sociobiology explains - 
better than Bauman and Levinas do - this kind of attachment too. It also explains 
why familial attachments are stronger than merely human ones. Hence in the 
story a parallel is drawn between Newspaper's drowning of unwanted kittens 
and her abandoning of Nastasya, although she perseveres with the latter much 
longer than she does with the former. Where is Kant's categorical imperative in 
all this? Certainly many readers will be left feeling uneasy at the end of Jolley's 
somewhat eccentric and macabre novel. Is this because rationality compels 
belief in an absolute principle which condemns murder? Or is it simply that we 
recognise our common humanity in each of Newspaper's actions: we too would 
steal and lie, and even die for a brother, but we might be more tempted to put the 
fulfilment of our own dearest dream before the life of a particularly burdensome 
and elderly acquaintance, and most of us certainly would not sacrifice more than 
a little for a cat. The sociobiological explanation for these common human 
reactions describes them as strategies shaped by evolutionary forces in response 
to the principle of the survival of the fittest, or what Dawkins, (1976, 1986) with 
the insights of modern genetics, variously calls the principle of 'the selfish gene' 
and 'the blind watchmaker'. This principle has also been derived by rational 
processes, but on the basis of empirical observation and not by rationality alone. 
Yet Kant's purely rationalist approach to ethics is not entirely overruled by 
evolutionary theory, as we shall see. 
In his brilliant example of theoretically aware ethical criticism, entitled 
Morals and Stories, Tobin Siebers (1992) flies in the face of many post-
structuralists by defending Kant's adherence to absolute principle. This is an 
adherence which is not motivated by feelings, consequences of actions, or 
ulterior motives of any kind, except a special sort of respect for law itself which 
is dictated by reason alone. He does this by discussing in detail the context - 
Kant's debate with one of his critics - in which the above story of the murderer 
first appeared, and by showing what this story looks like when translated into 
the more modern context of Fascism. Siebers accomplishes the latter by 
analysing Jean-Paul Sartre's reworking of Kant's story in his tale of the Spanish 
civil war, 'The Wall', and then by discussing Hannah Arendt's use of Kant in her 
work on the experiences of Nazi war criminals, Jewish collaborators, and 
Germans who refused to co-operate with the Nazis. In his detailed and richly 
illuminating discussion, Siebers demonstrates that Kant's ethics is well able to 
cope with the challenges of modern totalitarianism, and that principles should 
not be accommodated to political (or strategic) expediency. He also shows that 
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principles - or 'morals' - are meaningless without stories which situate them in 
the world of human experience, and that the imagination, by means of which we 
construct stories, is essential to moral judgement and decision making. 
Imagination allows us to understand the moral dilemmas of others, to predict the 
consequences of our own moral choices and to consider how we might live with 
ourselves, as well as with our neighbours, if we do, or do not, adhere to 
commanding principles of conduct. Thus Siebers concludes: 
The categorical imperative recommends that we ask whether our maxim may 
be treated as a universal law. It asks us to tell ourselves a story to determine 
whether an action is acceptable. To describe its structure in a modern light, as 
Arendt does, it asks finally whether I can live with myself, if I act in a certain 
way. 3° Despite his association with duty, Kant holds up individuality as the 
guide to moral conduct, and it is this emphasis that makes his ideas so valuable 
to Arendt's attempts to combat those regimes that exist to extinguish 
individuals and their moral faculties. 
I am not arguing that Kant's ethics is flawless. Nor that he provides the 
final answer to living a moral life in the modern world. I am arguing that he 
exposes the limits of an ethics based wholly on experience, imitation, and 
political norms. In Nazi Germany, one could not depend on either political 
convention or the conduct of others to guide oneself in matters ethical. To be 
moral was a crime from the point of view of one's neighbours. (152. My 
emphasis.) 
In the following discussion of Heart of Darkness I will return to Siebers' 
provocative view of Kant's categorical imperative, with its implications for the 
ethics of lying, and for the role of stories in moral and ethical development. In 
concluding this section, however, we may observe that Siebers has effectively 
revived the meta-ethical dilemma of whether conduct can and should be guided 
by principle alone, or by principle modified by practice. The reader may recall 
(p. 88 above) that Geoffrey Harpham (1992) resolved this dilemma by 
articulating his version of a categorical principle as, 'Act on principle', and 
'laminating' this with the practice of acting on the contingent moral codes of 
one's culture. This is certainly neat, but, as he recognised, it offers little help 
when codes and cultures collide. All it can do is alert us to the human wisdom 
enshrined in morality and ethics, which at least might be greater than our own. 
And, as Harpham also demonstrates, one of the best places to find that wisdom 
applied in practice is in the models which literature provides. 
30 In this light it is interesting to note that Newspaper in Jolley's novel is unable to forgive 
herself for unwittingly betraying her brother, but seems able to live with the fact that she 
abandoned Nastasya to die. However, at the end of the story she does seem a little reluctant to 
draw close to another human being, suggesting that she feels a twinge of something like remorse 
- perhaps a revival of that sometimes painful feeling that all other humans have a moral claim 
upon us which intrudes upon our self-centredness. 
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2. Heart of Darkness and the ethics of lying: disillusionment 
Joseph Conrad's novella, Heart of Darkness, has been discussed by literary 
critics from a multitude of different perspectives, including those which explore 
its moral assumptions and its ethical questioning. One strand of these 
discussions, which is most relevant to my concerns, pursues Ian Watt's (1979) 
observation that Conrad belonged to 'the first generation that had not felt 
supported by the traditional view of man's flattering eminence in the history as 
well as the design, of the cosmos'. (154) In his book, Joseph Conrad's 
Darwinian Ethics, Allan Hunter (1983) has examined in detail the effects on 
Conrad's philosophy of life of the revolution in scientific and religious thought 
occasioned by Charles Darwin. Hunter argues that, whereas Darwin's great 
defender, Thomas Huxley, saw the implications of evolutionary theory for ethics 
in rather optimistic terms, Conrad took a more pessimistic line. Richard Yatzeck 
(1996) concurs in depicting Conrad as adopting a gloomy view of the destiny of 
man and his pretensions to moral reform. He argues that Darwin's On the Origin 
of Species and Kelvin's second law of thermodynamics suggested to Conrad that 
man is just another of the animals in a world devoid of 'special creation', itself 
doomed to ultimate destruction by entropy. In support of this view Yatzeck 
quotes Conrad's comments in an 1897 letter to R.B. Cunninghame Graham: 
The fate of a humanity condemned ultimately to perish from cold is not worth 
troubling about. If you take it to heart it becomes an unendurable tragedy. If 
you believe in improvement you must weep, for the attained perfection must 
end in cold, darkness and silence. In a dispassionate view the ardour for reform, 
improvement for virtue, for knowledge, and even for beauty is only a vague 
sticking up for appearances... There is a - let us say - a machine. It evolved 
itself (I am severely scientific) out of a chaos of scraps of iron and behold! - it 
knits. I am horrified at the horrible work and stand appalled. I feel it ought to 
embroider - but it goes on knitting. You come and say: 'this is all right; it's only 
a question of the right kind of oil. Let us use this - for instance - celestial oil 
and the machine shall embroider a most beautiful design in purple and gold.' 
Will it? Alas no. You cannot by any special lubrication make embroidery with 
a knitting machine. And the most withering thought is that the infamous thing 
has made itself; made itself without thought, without conscience, without 
foresight, without eyes, without heart. It is a tragic accident - and it has 
happened... In virtue of that truth one and immortal which lurks in the force 
that made it spring into existence it is what it is - and it is indestructible. It knits 
us in and it knits us out. It has knitted time, space, pain, death, corruption, 
despair and all the illusions - and nothing matters. I'll admit however that to 
look at the remorseless process is sometimes amusing. (Conrad 1969: 65) 
The image of the cosmic knitting machine foreshadows Conrad's 
depiction of the two women knitting relentlessly in the foyer of the colonial 
office in Heart of Darkness, (Conrad, 1990: 145, 147) 31 It supports the view 
31 All references to the text are taken from the 1990 Oxford University Press World's Classics 
edition. 
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that this novella, which was published just two years after the letter to 
Cunninghame Graham and which contains a scathing indictment of the 
hypocrisy of European colonialism, 32 is indeed a deeply pessimistic portrayal of 
the whole human condition. In fact it can be seen as a paradigm record of a 
personal episode of 'disillusionment' coinciding with a historical moment of 
cultural disillusionment with profound effect. In this case we see Conrad's early 
modernist disillusionment, but a similar moment can be found in Woolf, Forster, 
Eliot and Pound, and in America in F. Scott Fitzgerald and Hemingway. 
The flashes of light among Heart of Darkness's prevailing images of 
deepening gloom are associated with a mere handful of items, which are 
typically humanist in their reduction to a reliance on a much attenuated version 
of the hero tradition: the character of the central narrator of the story, Captain 
Marlow; his vision of the brief span of our individual human lives; his belief in 
the (comparative) virtues of the British Empire, which nevertheless is doomed, 
like everything else in the universe, to ultimate decay; the moral values of 
honest labour and the restraint of human lusts; and a beautiful, grief-stricken 
woman who is idealistic and faithful, but also tragically deluded. Beyond these 
things Marlow sees only our obliteration at the hands of an ultimately hostile 
universe (see, for example, 166, 183, 184): there is for him no after-life, no 
meting-out of divine justice, no heavenly bliss - all that is good, true and 
beautiful must be grasped in this life or not at all. Marlow's is a thoroughly 
materialist view of reality and at the same time a deeply moral one. Indeed, here 
we see Conrad as an early modernist still struggling to make this difficult 
conjunction, whereas by late modernism morality has vanished into aesthetics. 
However, Marlow's belief in the possibilities for human goodness seems to be 
far outweighed in his tale by examples of corruption. It is for these reasons that I 
consider Heart of Darkness to be a profoundly pessimistic tale, and that I want 
to ask: is this a suitable fiction with which to engage in the moral and ethical 
development of adolescent readers? Would it give them hope and sufficient 
reason to want to be moral, or would it merely inform them of some difficult 
ethical issues and leave them pessimistic about the possibility of their 
resolution? Would it therefore disillusion without re-enchanting them - and if 
so, would that still justify its inclusion in English courses as part of a cross-
curricular program of ethics education in schools and universities? In addressing 
these questions I hope to illustrate how an ethical criticism founded on the ideas 
outlined in the previous chapter can provide some adequate answers. 
32 Conrad's criticism of colonialism in this novella is remarkable for its time, in spite of the fact 
that, as Chinua Achebe (1989) has famously shown, it also partakes of many of the racist 
assumptions of its day. 
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Conrad has Marlow convey his vision of life not to women or children, 
but rather (in the manner of the ancient Greek philosophers perhaps) to a small 
group of mature, responsible, worldly-wise male friends. It is interesting that 
they are identified in the novella not by their names but by their professions, 
reminding the reader of their standing in civilised society and their role in 
upholding its values. Marlow relates to these men his grim and often sardonic 
tale of an encounter with Mr Kurtz, who in his view was the most brilliant and 
potentially good, but finally the most corrupted, of human beings. 33 If in fact 
Conrad gives this narrator any moral motive at all in telling his story, 
presumably Marlow feels that these men will not be unduly harmed by it, and 
indeed will benefit from the experience. It seems, therefore, that Conrad's 
implied reader is a late 19th century middle class gentleman just like the men on 
the boat. A consequence of this is that a great deal of background material will 
need to be supplied by the late 20th century teacher, if her students are to 
understand, and enter into dialogue with, the community of shared belief which 
the men represent. However, Conrad has his unnamed narrator record some 
disagreements between Marlow and his listeners which might have the effect of 
encouraging the reader to adopt a more critical stance. 
As the novella progresses Marlow tells his companions that in the end he 
was unable to reveal to Kurtz's bereaved fiancée the full horror of this 
encounter. Confronted by her complete faith in the exceptional goodness of the 
man whom she idolises as the paragon of civilisation, and in response to her 
desperate request, Marlow tells her that the last word Kurtz pronounced was her 
name. But, of course, he is acutely aware that Kurtz's last words had really been 
an anguished, perhaps despairing, whisper: 'The horror! The horror!' (239) Thus 
Marlow is guilty of telling an outright lie, even though he has previously 
informed his friends that he hates lies: 
I would not have gone so far as to fight for Kurtz, but I went for him near 
enough to a lie. You know I hate, detest, and can't bear a lie, not because I am 
straighter than the rest of us, but simply because it appals me. There is a taint 
of death, a flavour of mortality in lies - which is what I hate and detest in the 
world - what I want to forget. It makes me miserable and sick, like biting 
something rotten would do. Temperament, I suppose. (172) 
Marlow here reflects on his own horror at the notion that the world may be 
rotten at the core and therefore itself a kind of lie. He attributes his hatred of lies 
to their 'flavour of mortality', declaring that he feels this way not because he is a 
33 Conrad's treatment of the character of Kurtz is a case of the most-developed individual of the 
highest species having the greatest potential for both good and evil. Mediocre minds do not have 
the imaginative power to be fully evil. This is a version of Christian humanist modernity which 
begins with Renaissance science, politics and aesthetics as can be seen for example in Marlowe's 
Doctor Faustus, Machiavelli's The Prince and the character of Edmund in King Lear. 
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man of exceptionally strong principle, a kind of moral saint, but because of his 
temperament, perhaps a certain squeamishness. This may strike the reader as a 
modest self-assessment, but it also means that Marlow cannot be seen as a 
Kantian when it comes to lying. He then recalls an occasion when he had told 
an indirect lie for Kurtz's sake: 
Well, I went near enough to it by letting the young fool there believe anything 
he liked to imagine as to my influence in Europe. I became in an instant as 
much of a pretence as the rest of the bewitched pilgrims. (172) 
He excuses himself by claiming that he 'had a notion it somehow would be of 
help to that Kurtz whom at the time I did not see'. (172) Thus he reveals himself 
to be an ethical consequentialist. Later he lies directly, if unpremeditatedly, for 
the sake of Kurtz's fiancée. To his great discomfort, he finds that he cannot bear 
to disillusion a woman who is sustained by such a radiant, if deluded, faith. 
I heard a light sigh and then my heart stood still, stopped dead short by 
an exulting and terrible cry, by the cry of inconceivable triumph and of 
unspeakable pain. 'I knew it - I was sure!' ... She knew. She was sure. I heard 
her weeping; she had hidden her face in her hands. It seemed that the heavens 
would fall upon my head. But nothing happened. The heavens do not fall for 
such a trifle. Would they have fallen I wonder, if I had rendered Kurtz that 
justice which was his due? Hadn't he said he wanted only justice? But I 
couldn't. I could not tell her. It would have been too dark - too dark altogether... 
(252) 
Kurtz's desire for justice mentioned here is perhaps another example of the use 
of one of Bernard Williams"thin', more principled ethical concepts, as opposed 
to the 'thick', practical version of ethics which Marlow seems to offer. In these 
extreme circumstances such a lie is certainly understandable. Marlow himself 
describes it as a 'trifle'. Indeed, who would not be moved to prevaricate in order 
to spare the feelings of anyone so profoundly stricken with grief? But is such a 
lie justifiable? Marlow is portrayed as being very uneasy about it. He hates lies 
and, furthermore, he feels that he has been untrue to Kurtz in order to care for 
Kurtz's Intended. At least these feelings make him seem more human in his 
uncertainty. 
Immanuel Kant, as we have seen, argued that one should never under 
any circumstances tell a lie, even if it seemed that by lying one could save the 
life of a friend. However, Rae Langton (1994) tells a true story about a poignant 
correspondence which took place from 1791 to 1794 between Kant and Maria 
von Herbert, in which Kant's categorical imperative - or at least his failure to 
persevere compassionately in trying to advise her - proved to be of no comfort 
at all to the lady, who was so distressed that she was contemplating suicide. 
Herbert's moral anguish and emotional depression were the direct result of 
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having told a painful truth about herself to a man with whom she shared both 
friendship and love. The truth was that she had had a previous relationship with 
a man who had abused her. By reluctantly revealing this to her new beloved she 
had both lost his love and diminished their profound friendship - a result which 
is a sad reflection on the sexual values of their society. Langton shows that Kant 
failed by his own principles to help Herbert, and argues - also, up to a point, by 
Kant's own principles - that Herbert may have had a duty to lie. Under the 
circumstances of the time, when a woman's worth was measured in large part by 
her virginity, such a lie could be regarded as a strategic act which might secure 
as its ends the great goods of both friendship and self-respect, whilst denying 
the great good of truthfulness. Langton comments: 
Kant would not allow it. He thinks we should act as if the Kingdom of Ends is 
with us now. He thinks we should rely on God to make it all right in the end. 
But God will not make it all right in the end. And the Kingdom of Ends is not 
with us now. Perhaps we should do what we can to bring it about. (294) 
The conclusion of Langton's story is that in 1803 Maria von Herbert committed 
suicide. Langton points out that this was an act of which Kant's philosophy did 
not approve, although he recognised that it required a courage which deserves 
our respect as having moral worth in itself. Is this, then, a case in which it is 
right to lie as a strategic or political means to securing a personal, and perhaps 
ultimately social, good? Does this story undo Kant's argument, and Siebers' 
defence of it, that absolute ethical principles are essential to the maintenance of 
a moral life? Marlow's somewhat similar situation may constitute another case, 
and so I will defer any attempt to answer these questions until we have 
considered it further. 
For Marlow, too, the world is without God. The heavens 34 do not fall for 
such a trifle as he regards his lie to have been. Furthermore, Marlow's apparent 
concern for the Intended's feelings could perhaps be read as showing that he 
treats her as an end in herself and not as a means to some other end, such as that 
of maintaining his own integrity. However, it could also be read as treating her 
as a means by which Marlow can uphold, against the evidence of Kurtz to the 
contrary, his belief that at least some people can maintain civilised values in a 
dark and savage world. And he could be doing this in a way which is 
patronising to all women, by treating them as 'things' necessary to the 
maintenance of a civilised world, particularly one in which men can sit 
comfortably smoking on the deck of a ship whilst contemplating the vicissitudes 
of existence. Thus Marlow's lie raises further questions, which relate directly to 
34 I take 'heavens' here to mean merely the imaginative and material fabric of human ideals, 
since Marlow does not seem to believe in the existence of God even outside the world. 
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the inherently patronising business of the moral and ethical education of our 
children through literary studies. Are there at least some people who in some 
circumstances should be protected from stories which convey a deeply 
pessimistic view of life? Would 'the heavens fall' if they were told a lie, or 
indeed the truth? And if so, why?35 That Conrad's novella directly addresses 
these questions becomes apparent when we examine the story more closely. 
Marlow is not presented as a misogynist, but as still having a somewhat 
patronising view of women: on the one hand he admires them for the strength of 
their devotion, while on the other he laughs at them for the impracticality of 
their ideals. We are given the impression of a man who has spent his life 
working in the exclusively male world of shipping, and who considers it ironic 
that he, of all people, should have had to appeal to a woman for assistance in 
securing a job. (143) Speaking of the Aunt who had helped him to obtain a 
position as a steamboat captain with the Belgian Congo Company, Marlow says, 
She talked about 'weaning those ignorant millions from their horrid ways,' till, 
upon my word, she made me quite uncomfortable. I ventured to hint that the 
Company was run for a profit. 
'You forget, dear Charlie, that the labourer is worthy of his hire,' she 
said, brightly. It's queer how out of touch with truth women are. They live in a 
world of their own, and there had [sic] never been anything like it, and never 
can be. It is too beautiful altogether, and if they were to set it up it would go to 
pieces before the first sunset. Some confounded fact we men have been living 
contentedly with ever since the day of creation would start up and knock the 
whole thing over. (149) 
The feminine here is clearly associated with beautiful illusions and impractical 
ideas, whilst the masculine is associated with the practical acceptance of harsh 
reality. The Aunt's use of the words 'horrid ways', 'profit' and the biblical 
reference to the labourer introduce the whole late-Victorian linking of 
capitalism, colonial patronage, and Christian manners and morals. 
Later we are told that Marlow, in commenting on his memory of the 
whole episode concerning Kurtz and his fiancée, remarked: 
'I laid the ghost of his gifts at last with a lie,' he began, suddenly. 'Girl! 
What? Did I mention a girl? Oh, she is out of it - completely. They - the 
women I mean - are out of it - and should be out of it. We must help them to 
stay in that beautiful world of their own, lest ours gets worse.' (205) 
It seems that Marlow would be inclined to lie to all women about the harsh 
realities of life, in order to protect not only their deluded sensibilities but also 
35 Another important question which arises here is whether or not fiction is a kind of lie and, if it 
is, can it be of any use in teaching morals and ethics? My view, which I expound further in 
discussing Breaktime and 'Morpho Eugenia', is that fiction is often used as a deliberate attempt 
not to deceive, but on the contrary to tell the truth about the world as the author understands it by 
means of a prototype or analogy or model. 
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the very fabric of his civilised society, which depends on the maintenance of 
such binary oppositions as male-female, public-private, work-prayer, 
civilisation-nature, reason-emotion and practicality-idealism. To him a lie of 
this kind might be justified as a means to a greater end. The very fact that 
Marlow's action is discussed so extensively in the text as a lie which is both 
justified and unjustified suggests that Conrad was aware of such ambiguity. 
Marlow is shown as telling the lie to the Intended, but in such a narrative form 
that doing so becomes problematical. Thus the text seems to give one 
impression with the content and another with the form. Can we, therefore, 
conclude that Conrad himself thought women should be protected in this way to 
preserve the fragile achievements of human - especially male - progress? 36 
Perhaps he did, since he lived in a very sexist era. But then again perhaps not, 
since he chose to publish Marlow's lie, and his depressing vision of life, in a 
magazine which educated women were at liberty to read. 37 Of course, in our 
society which has experienced the enfranchisement of women and other 
achievements of the feminist movement, Marlow's attitude to women would not 
be countenanced. However, the Australian government still believes in 
protecting the young from reading and viewing material which might be too 
emotionally and morally disturbing - in fact it goes so far as to censor some 
material which it thinks might offend or corrupt adults as well as children. 
Moreover, it is hard to imagine a society which would not want to censor 
something in the name of its own preservation and the welfare of certain of its 
members. 
Heart of Darkness offers its readers strong grounds for supposing that 
Marlow's attitude to Kurtz's fiancée as a woman should not be adopted as the 
norm, and indeed should not in the final analysis be taken literally. The 
presentation of the men and women in the novel, while somewhat melodramatic 
for the sake of hyperbole, may be taken as an attempt to be socially and 
psychologically realistic in the context of the time; but it also seems to be 
deliberately symbolic. For example Marlow is represented as, among other 
things, a version of the Buddha. (136, 140, 252) The two women who act as 
receptionists in the foyer of the colonial company's head office in Brussels are 
represented as the Fates of Greek legend, who spin the threads of each man's life 
ready to be cut off by the shears of Atropos. (145, 147) And Kurtz's magnificent 
36 I am conscious that I may appear oblivious here to the intentional fallacy and to Barthes' 
notion of the death of the author. I agree that, since authors cannot be fully in control of their 
texts and since language is itself a somewhat blurry medium, it is impossible for readers ever to 
know fully what an author intended or to agree on one completely determinate reading of a text. 
However, I have argued that a radically sceptical view of the communicative capacity of 
language is unjustified. 
37 The first appearance of Heart of Darkness occurred in the issues of Blackwood's Edinburgh 
Magazine for February, March and April 1899. 
125 
black mistress, gorgeously decorated with glinting yellow brass wire and other 
trinkets, is represented as 'the image of [the] tenebrous and passionate soul' of 
'the immense wilderness' of Africa, 'the colossal body of the fecund and 
mysterious life'. (225, 226, 236) Conrad draws a striking comparison and 
contrast between this radiantly dark woman, in whom he symbolises the 
primitive life force, and Kurtz's glimmering gold 'Intended', who symbolises for 
him the still potent, but desperately vulnerable, aspirations of civilisation - 
aspirations which are the product of that same primitive life force. (246-252) 
Today post-colonial feminists would, of course, object to the way this use of 
symbolism appropriates the complex reality of the black woman as a simplified 
metaphor for Western notions of the exotic other. This is a clear example of 
what Edward Said (1978) has called 'Orientalism', and of turning the subject (in 
grammatical terms) into an object. In the context of the values of the novella, 
however, the ultimate effect of this symbolism is to propose something even 
more pessimistic about the nature of civilisation in its foundation, construction 
and preservation, yet at the same time to offer a tiny ray of hope to the reader. 
This ironic impression is given particular force in Marlow's description of 
Kurtz's painting of a very different kind of woman, this time representing the 
principle of (Western) justice, but in deeply ambiguous terms: 'draped and 
blindfolded, carrying a lighted torch. The background was sombre - almost 
black. The movement of the woman was stately, and the effect of the torch-light 
on the face was sinister'. (169) 
A large and ironic part of the 'truth' (i.e. Conrad's model of the way of 
the world) which is presented in Heart of Darkness is that civilisation is simply 
not possible without a strong commitment to the kind of blindly impractical 
idealism which is represented by Kurtz's 'Intended' - the woman who shares and 
has come to symbolise his noblest intentions. However, this idealism is also 
vulnerable to the corruption that overtakes even such a high-minded individual 
as Marlow believed Kurtz to have been. It is the possibility of this corruption 
and its consequent disillusionment to the point of despair from which Marlow 
wants to protect both Kurtz's fiancée and the civilised values which she 
represents. However, Conrad does not portray civilisation as an unequivocal 
good absolutely opposed to the evil savagery of tribal peoples. Rather 
civilisation is made out to be simply the product of human progress from tribal 
beginnings, a process which is attended by good and evil at every stage. For 
Conrad, civilisation represents real progress, at least in material terms, but there 
can nevertheless be more or less savage civilisations: for example British 
imperialism is portrayed in the novella as relatively good, (137, 140, 145) and 
Belgian imperialism as almost entirely vicious. Thus he thinks civilisation's 
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ideals of material and moral progress are always vulnerable to corruption - and 
the higher it rises, as the example of Mr Kurtz reveals, the greater will be its fall. 
Conrad's tale suggests that this is so for the simple reason that civilisation is 
constructed over an abyss, by beings who are commonly thought to be the 
product of the random processes of Darwinian evolution at work in a universe 
without purpose. Moreover, in this view there is nothing, apart from the 
ultimately impermanent and hostile material of the universe, from which to 
construct it. There is certainly no eternal deity who lays down a moral law upon 
which to found society: after all, Conrad was writing for a society which was 
still struggling with the loss of the sense of the Kantian sublime, and with its 
replacement by intimations of a fearful hollowness. 
Whatever moral foundation exists to raise us above savagery is presented 
by Conrad as merely an inexplicable human capacity for restraint of our 
otherwise untrammelled lusts - inexplicable, that is, except that Marlow also 
associates it with fear and faith. (206, 235) Perhaps this capacity is a 
rudimentary and negative form of that altruism which, as we have seen, has now 
been satisfactorily explained by sociobiology as an unconscious, evolved 
strategy for achieving the survival of one's genes, but which Zygmunt Baumann, 
ignoring scientific in favour of philosophical explanations, calls the unfounded 
foundation of morality. In any case, this moral restraint is represented most 
strongly, if inaccurately, in the novella by the so-called 'cannibals' who man 
Marlow's boat but do not rebel and eat him to satisfy their obvious hunger. 38 It 
seems to be almost entirely absent from the so-called 'civilised' colonials who 
are his passengers, (194, 195, 206) and certainly all restraint has been 
abandoned by Kurtz (209) who, Conrad is careful to point out, symbolises the 
whole of European (including English) civilisation and not just the infamous 
excesses of Belgian colonialism. (207) Commenting upon the shrunken heads 
arrayed on stakes around Kurtz's house, Marlow says, 
They only showed that Mr. Kurtz lacked restraint in the gratification of his 
various lusts, that there was something wanting in him - some small matter 
which, when the pressing need arose, could not be found under his magnificent 
38 Marlow, and probably Conrad, would have been ignorant of what anthropoloy now tells us 
about cannibalism. It seems that the regular practice of anthropophagy among tribal people is not 
motivated by hunger, but has complex religious and moral determinants: some members of 
cannibal tribes will eat certain enemies to ingest their strength, or dead relatives as a sign of 
spiritual continuance. So what Marlow interprets as restraint of a basic biological urge (i.e. 
hunger) is in fact based on an acculturated ethics. An interesting fictional/documentary treatment 
of cannibalism appears in Gary Crew's (1990) adolescent novel, Strange Objects, which deals 
with the infamous massacre of the survivors of the wreck of the Batavia. A purely documentary 
treatment of the resort to anthropophagy to avoid starvation by so-called civilsed people occurs 
in Piers Paul Read's (1975) Alive, which tells the story of the Andes plane crash survivors and of 
their horror of eating the flesh of friends and relatives. Both of these books are frequently 
studied in schools. 
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eloquence. Whether he knew of this deficiency himself I can't say. I think the 
knowledge came to him at last - only at the very last. (221) 
Kurtz, isolated in the heart of Africa, is deluded by his own rhetoric. 
Here, perhaps, we can see a prefiguring of what I would call the postructuralist 
caricature of language as a 'prison house' because of its alleged inability to refer 
to the real world or to provide determinate moral directions. However, Marlow's 
point seems to be that Kurtz finds his rhetoric deluding not simply because it is 
rhetorical, but because he is alone, cut off from dialogue with other members of 
his own culture who can 'correct' his culturally transgressive ideas. While 
Marlow shows an awareness of the (less than completely crippling) 
inadequacies of language, he is more concerned here with Kurtz's lack of the 
moral support which his own society would normally supply (partly through 
language as a social activity), and which Marlow describes to his listeners thus: 
You can't understand. How could you? - with solid pavement under your feet, 
surrounded by kind neighbours ready to cheer you or to fall on you, stepping 
delicately between the butcher and the policeman, in the holy terror of scandal 
and gallows and lunatic asylums - how can you imagine what particular region 
of the first ages a man's untrammelled feet may take him into by the way of 
solitude - utter solitude without a policeman - by the way of silence - utter 
silence, where no warning voice of a kind neighbour can be heard whispering 
of public opinion? These little things make all the great difference. When they 
are gone you must fall back upon your own innate strength, upon your own 
capacity for faithfulness. (206) 
No warning voice... These little things make all the great difference. One could 
add to Marlow's list of 'little things', which are set up by society to prevent 
Foucauldian-style transgression, the kind of Arnoldian public education which 
his gentlemanly listeners would have received in order to train them for the 
administration and service of the Empire. It is not surprising that, according to 
Marlow, these commonplace social sanctions, founded on an innate but fragile 
capacity for moral restraint and expressed in the discourses of the moral 
community, should require the support of some illusory ideals. For often it is 
faith, an irrational religious belief in a great and glorious destiny for mankind 
and in absolute principles of morality, which inspires the citizens to devote 
themselves to the small and large works by which civilisations are constructed 
and preserved. (207) Nor is it surprising that Marlow considers it necessary to 
hide this depressing state of affairs from all but the strongest minds. Thus Heart 
of Darkness seems to suggest that civilisation must be built upon a lie. 39 
39 Clearly I am not convinced that civilization, with its languages and other social practices, is 
ultimately founded upon a lie. For example sociobiology suggests that moral values are an 
evolutionary response to the very real circumstances of life. I am tempted to read Kurtz's 
delusion by his own 'magnificent eloquence', cut off from dialogue with anyone who might 
disagree with him, as a warning to poststructuralist (and other) fundamentalists who speak the 
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Why then would Conrad want to draw attention to this fact, whose 
revelation is potentially ruinous, by raising the 'ghost' of Kurtz to public view 
through the publication of his novella? Surely, if growing numbers of people 
were to fall prey to Kurtz's horrified disillusionment, then society would 
crumble, and the Hobbesian vision of the state of nature would reassert itself. Is 
it not therefore the writer's civic duty - or, to put it brutally, a political means to 
a pragmatic end - to uphold the lie? However, Conrad was merely presenting, in 
its most uncompromising terms, the picture of an absurd and hostile universe 
which many of his readers would have already sensed, especially since Darwin 
had hesitantly lent it greater credibility through the publication of his 
painstaking works on the evolution of species and the descent of man. It is true 
that many people since Darwin's day (including Darwin himself, and Darwin's 
defender, Thomas Huxley, as Robert Wright, 1995, has shown) have striven to 
avoid this pessimistic implication of his theories. Christian fundamentalists, 
exponents of so-called 'creation science', recognise in the theory of evolution a 
direct threat to morality founded on belief in God, and so flatly reject evolution 
as biblical and scientific heresy. The Roman Catholic church, however, has 
sought a compromise by teaching a doctrine of divinely guided evolution. Some 
atheists console themselves with various forms of belief in the evolution of man 
towards the emergence of a super-consciousness, a process in which they 
believe they can actively participate, and so find meaning and purpose in their 
lives. Francis Heylighen's vision of a post-biological future for mankind 
(mentioned in Chapter 2) seems to be of this kind. Certainly Frank Tipler and 
Zohar and Marshall find cause for extreme optimism in their more 'spiritual' 
versions of evolutionism. But what if the less optimistic model of the universe, 
depicted in Heart of Darkness, as I have so far represented it, and elaborated in 
later modernist literature, proves more accurate? How then could one find the 
moral restraint, the sense of purpose, the hope on which to found a civil society? 
That Conrad's vision is both totally pessimistic and thoroughly accurate 
might seem to be supported by his apparent prescience, for he could be seen as 
foreshadowing the unravelling of the social fabric of some Western cities and 
nation states in recent times. Furthermore, he could be seen as pre-empting the 
more extreme and nihilistic elements of post-structuralist literary theory through 
Marlow's occasional recognition of the inability of language to refer 
determinately to individual experience, let alone to the world outside. (138, 163, 
172)40 However, these are unjustified conclusions: Conrad's vision is not 
jargon of their coterie and isolate themselves from dialogue with other discourses - for example 
those of sociobiology and evolutionary ethics. 
40 Evidence that Conrad himself held this view of the inadequacy of language can be found in 
the above quoted (1897) letter to R.B. Cunninghame-Graham on entropy: 'Half the words we use 
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unremittingly pessimistic; civil societies are not so vulnerable to collapse under 
normal circumstances; and language is not completely powerless to refer to 
realities beyond itself, as the critical history of Heart of Darkness itself 
indicates. This slightly more optimistic view of the world of the novella turns 
upon a close reading of the character of Marlow, who shows by his own words 
and example how it is possible for human beings to survive in a generally 
absurd and hostile universe and, indeed, to build flourishing civilisations, at 
least for a time. For although Marlow is acutely aware that he is surrounded by a 
void, he demonstrates that at least he is not 'hollow at the core'. 
Marlow does not believe that a mere mortal can be expected to live alone 
with the knowledge that civilisation is constructed over an abyss. Certainly, in 
spite of his grandiose idealism, Kurtz proves that he cannot. Indeed, it seems 
that it is precisely because of the instability of his combination of Enlightenment 
and Romantic utopianism when confronted by what appears to him savage and 
alien that Kurtz's humanist subjectivity is so dramatically fragmented and his 
high-minded principles are replaced by the practices of terrorism and thoughts 
of genocide. Marlow, who is much less idealistic and therefore less vulnerable 
to disillusionment, despair and corruption, is depicted as sharing his knowledge 
with four experienced and reliable male friends - at times, however, almost 
compulsively, as if his tale were more the troubled confessions of a doubter and 
sinner than the parable of a moral teacher. For the most part, though, Marlow is 
portrayed by the unnamed narrator of the novella as an extremely self-possessed 
man who is at once humble and didactic, and ever ready to enter into dialogue 
about ethics with his companions. Indeed, as mentioned above, Marlow is 
presented as 'a Buddha preaching in European clothes' to his disciples. (140) 
What he preaches is perhaps a very Westernised version of Buddhism, an 
atheistic and ascetic devotion to salvation by practical works, which might 
appear to have more in common with the Protestant work ethic: 
What saves us [i.e. British merchant seamen] is efficiency - the devotion to 
efficiency. (140; c.f. also 175, 183-184, 186-187) 
It could be argued that what Conrad offers his readers is a smug celebration of 
Arnoldian middle-class values such as courage, hard work, efficiency, 
excellence and self-actualisation, and an invitation to feel morally superior to 
the exploitative colonial administration of the Belgians. But middle-class values 
represent a Christian ethic based on the notion of the dignity of man as the 
pinnacle of God's creation. Conrad is more radical than that: he depicts a 
have no meaning whatever and of the other half each man understands each word after the 
fashion of his own folly and conceit. Faith is a myth and beliefs shift like mists on the shore...' 
(Conrad 1969: 65) 
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morality founded on fragile human qualities in spite of his atheistic materialism 
which sees the universe as fundamentally hostile. 
In Marlow Conrad exemplifies the ethic of an emotional and rational 
human animal - it is modest, pragmatic, deliberate, determined and self-
satisfying. It is also the ethic of a social animal, since sheer survival requires 
Marlow to work with others, such as the native fireman whom he relies on, 
respects and cares for, (187, 188) and then to communicate his ethical successes 
and failures to his peers. Furthermore, it inspires Marlow to judge the deluded 
Kurtz with a compassionate heart, for he wants to believe that Kurtz's last 
anguished words reveal that he still possesses an acute moral sense: 
It was an affirmation, a moral victory paid for by innumerable defeats, by 
abominable terrors, by abominable satisfactions. But it was a victory! That is 
why I have remained loyal to Kurtz to the last, and even beyond, when a long 
time after I heard once more, not his own voice, but the echo of his magnificent 
eloquence thrown to me from a soul as translucently pure as a cliff of crystal. 
(241, 242) 
And so Marlow also deals compassionately with Kurtz's grieving fiancée by 
telling her a lie which may be construed as a strategically consoling fiction - 
revealing that he can exercise a fine sense of restraint in this extremity too. The 
ethic which Marlow has developed through long experience and reflection on 
the basis of his innate moral sense is, of course, the ethic which Conrad admired 
in the common seamen among whom he had chosen to work for nearly twenty 
years.'" Finally, it is an ethic of healthy disillusionment, since the novella warns 
its readers of the ironic and tragic dangers of becoming carried away with the 
unrealistic ideals which Marlow says are still necessary to some, if not most, 
people in sustaining a civil society. Thus Conrad seems determined to avoid 
patronising his readers, since he does not offer them a lie as a consoling fiction 
in Marlow's tale. Rather, he vigorously disabuses them of any arrogant colonial 
pretensions, any moral superiority, any grandiose schemes to transform the 
world, which they might share with Mr Kurtz. 
It would seem, therefore, according to Heart of Darkness, that an innate 
sense of restraint must be a sufficient moral foundation upon which to build an 
individual life and a civil society, in the face of the ever-looming darkness. It is 
this moral sense which must sustain Marlow and his companions, at the end of 
the novella, if they choose to continue their voyage in spite of the fact that 
The offing was barred by a black bank of clouds, and the tranquil waterway 
leading to the uttermost ends of the earth flowed sombre under an overcast sky 
- seemed to lead into the heart of an immense darkness. (252) 
41 See Cedric Watts' introduction to the World's Classics edition of Heart of Darkness: xxviii. 
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Yet at the same time Conrad seems to be suggesting, pragmatically, that if 
civilisations are to be built and sustained, then illusory ideals, high-minded but 
ultimately unfounded principles, are both necessary and extremely risky means 
to that end. Here, then, we see a picture of an uneasy coalition of principle and 
practice, in which practice must be the final arbiter since principle is in fact a 
sham. 
Heart of Darkness presents a tough, possibly realistic and 'thick' view of 
life - that is if one accepts its element of melodrama as, in the Aristotelian sense, 
merely a rhetorical device. It is deeply pessimistic, yet I contend that in its 
characterisation of Marlow it can be seen as offering a complex prototype of a 
way of living with dignity and compassion in a hostile universe. Certainly his is 
a prototype more attractive on the whole to modern sentiment than the figure 
which Langton portrays of Kant. For these reasons I would be inclined to 
recommend it for study with older, more capable and experienced students in an 
ethical literacy program. By inviting them to listen as privileged adults to 
Marlow's tale and to discuss it rigorously, they will be given an opportunity to 
forge in the classroom a community of shared belief which will help to sustain 
and develop whatever innate moral sense they possess. However, I have more 
than a little hesitation in embarking on such a project, since the level of 
understanding required to enter into such a rigorous discussion of the book 
might well prove beyond even the better students. A class would need to begin 
by examining Heart of Darkness as a modernist text from an earlier period 
illustrating a moment of ethical questioning and dialogue. They would then need 
to problematise this approach by treating it in post-structuralist terms as an 
example of the impossibility of the author completely controlling the signifying 
systems he brings into play. This might be demonstrated by studying Achebe's 
post-colonial reading of the novella alongside a Leavisite one, and by examining 
Conrad's gaps and silences in order to illustrate that the text sometimes 'says 
what it does not say'. 
Not only would this be a difficult task for senior secondary students, it 
might also be judged by their teachers, who have their welfare as whole persons 
at heart, as potentially too dark. Indeed, this might be a book which should be 
left until students are older and more secure in their place in the world. As has 
been suggested in my discussion of the ethics of lying in this chapter, perhaps 
there is a case for sometimes remaining strategically silent about the whole truth 
as we perceive it, when those to whom we speak are particularly vulnerable, 
perhaps because of their youth, as in the case of some high school students, or 
because of their emotional state, as in the case of Kurtz's Intended and Kant's 
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correspondent, Maria von Herbert. In my experience of teaching such texts as 
Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot and Sylvia Plath's The Bell Jar it is often 
the most intelligent and sensitive students who find themselves deeply 
depressed by certain elements of these works, in spite of my attempts to present 
them within a more positive context. On the other hand, we cannot go on 
protecting 17 and 18 year-olds from the vicissitudes of life and literature. 
Indeed, many may have already sought, outside school, far grimmer real and 
virtual experiences against which to measure their strength of body and mind. 
However, we can at least discuss such experiences in the classroom and, 
especially through literature, situate them in a wider cultural context where they 
may be seen as both biologically and culturally determined. Perhaps, for 
example, it might be possible to trace the idea of the rites of passage from 
immaturity to maturity from the mediaeval quest narrative, through Robinson 
Crusoe, to Sons and Lovers, The Catcher in the Rye and Breaktime. Indeed, 
elements of Heart of Darkness might be interpreted in this light. Such study can 
serve to make some of the unconscious forces at work in the lives of students 
conscious, and so open up these impulses for ethical scrutiny, judgement and 
choice. 
As I have argued in the previous chapter, and as I will illustrate in 
discussing the remaining two texts in this chapter, I am not, however, convinced 
that the pessimistic view of life which Conrad and some other modernist writers 
seem to present, and which some post-structuralist ideas have been seen to 
suggest, is justified by the most recent scientific developments. If life is as 
Heart of Darkness suggests, then perhaps Kant's attempt to found ethics on 
rational and universal principles is indeed irrelevant and we must rely on (the 
occasional?) strategic lies in order to build and sustain a stable society. Yet, like 
Marlow, I remain uneasy about lies under any circumstances, as I do about 
censorship, even in schools. Why is that? Temperament? Upbringing? Or does 
the answer lie deeper? Perhaps Kant, Siebers and - to hark further back in this 
study - contemporary metaphysicians like Norris and Murdoch deserve further 
consideration. It may still prove possible to privilege principle over practice in 
our ethical deliberations. 
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3. Breaktime and the ethics of fiction: re-enchantment 
The author, publisher and educator, Aidan Chambers, has written four of a 
projected series of six novels for teenagers and young adults, exploring various 
aspects of adolescence. Each of the novels focuses on a different youth who has 
reached a critical moment in his transition from childhood to manhood. 
Together, Chambers has said, they cover themes of 'physical experience' 
(Breaktime), 'kinds of love and our personal possessions' (Dance on my Grave), 
'the clash of rational thought and irrational belief (Now I Know) and 'friendship 
and the cost of becoming an adult' (The Toll Bridge). In the novels Chambers 
combines the conviction of an earlier critical tradition that he can examine and 
communicate certain 'themes' by means of literature, with a post-structuralist 
interest in how both literature and life are problematised by language. Hence he 
says that the novels 'share a pair of common themes: language and how we are 
all composed of the language we speak and think; and story as the form in 
which we use language to create and recreate ourselves - our ideas about who 
we are, where we have come from, what we might be'. (cited on the flyleaf of 
Chambers, 1987) 
In these comments Chambers apparently claims that the self is 
constructed entirely by discourse, although not just the discourses which 
impinge upon us from our environment, for he also allows us a degree of 
personal agency in creating and recreating ourselves through language. But how 
does such agency work? Can it be explained entirely in terms of the complex, 
interactive nature of language and discourse? Or is there a self whose agency 
springs ultimately from pre-linguistic operations in the biological structures of 
the brain? Chambers' remark that the first of the novels, Breaktime (first 
published in 1978), is about physical experience suggests that he is interested in 
the relationship between bodily senses and the way we interpret them through 
language. 
Certainly Breaktime deals directly with the way in which its hero, 
seventeen year-old Ditto, takes an important step towards independence through 
writing a story. The novel signals the complex interdependence of language and 
the world, revealing the problems as well as the possibilities of referentiality. It 
highlights the limitations of language and the role of physical experience in 
providing a knowledge of self and others which can only be hinted at in words. 
It shows that ethical choice depends on the ability to represent to ourselves past 
experiences through our memory of sense impressions as well as through our 
reflections upon them in language, and to project possibilities for future actions 
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and their consequences. But it also shows that many choices are made 
subconsciously - pre-linguistically - and are no less reliable because of that. 
Breaktime opens with Ditto talking to his friend, Morgan, during 
'morning break' (one of many references in the novel which give multiple 
significance to the title). They are discussing Morgan's desire for sexual 
experience with the latest girl of his dreams, Maureen Pinfold. Maureen's 
surname, combining pin-up and centre-fold, is the first indication that Chambers 
is writing in an overtly symbolic style. Here too he introduces one of the themes 
of the novel: the influence which textually induced stereotypes have over the 
way adolescent boys fantasise about girls. From this opening scene the narrative 
is dominated by a self-conscious cleverness which is particularly appropriate to 
the bright, somewhat pompously punning sixth-formers who are its central 
characters. Such cleverness is also appropriate to the self-reflexiveness of the 
novel's themes, for this is a story about the value of telling stories. The verbal 
playfulness (reminiscent of Derrida's puns and neologisms) is especially evident 
in the dialogue and in the various parts of the story which purport to have been 
written by Ditto himself, and it extends to the use of a wide variety of genres, 
styles and word plays - even to various graphic devices such as comic book 
illustrations. Indeed, at first sight, Breaktime appears to be an example of 
writing in which the postmodernist manner of the medium is at least partly the 
message. 
Ditto's name (actually a nickname) suggests that, taken as a real person, 
he is simply a repetition of the multiplicity of texts which have intersected in his 
life, and, taken as a fictional character, he belongs to a type familiar to readers 
of that genre of novels about artistic youths struggling to establish their identity, 
which includes D. H. Lawrence's Sons and Lovers, James Joyce's A Portrait of 
the Artist as a Young Man, and J. D. Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye. He 
suspects that both his father and his friend, Morgan, look down on him because 
he has had so little physical experience and has derived most of his knowledge 
of life from books. He is particularly distressed by his disastrous relationship 
with his chronically ill father and by the fact that at seventeen he has not yet had 
sexual intercourse. Ditto is indeed a literary-minded youth and defends book 
learning by quoting his English teacher's dictum that 'literature offers us images 
to think with. That its unreality has nothing to do with untruth'. (Chambers, 
1995: 8) But Morgan, who is of a more scientific and practical bent, reinforces 
his scorn for the value of literary fiction by presenting Ditto with a list of 
charges against it, claiming that as entertainment it has been superseded by film 
and television; that fact is truth and fiction is a lie; that novels make life look 
more tidy and logical than it really is; that reading fiction is merely playing at 
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life; and that, in short, literature is 'CRAP' (a complaint familiar to many 
secondary school English teachers!) 
At this point in the novel Ditto's uneasiness and desire for change might 
be explained simply in terms of a conflict between discourses - in this case 
between the arts and sciences, or C.P. Snow's 'two cultures'.42 Elsewhere the 
conflict is between the discourses of his own education and that of his parents; 
or of his masculine and Helen's feminine attitudes (Helen is an old schoolmate 
who has moved to another town); or of his own heterosexuality and the 
homosexuality of his new acquaintances, Jack and Robby; or of his political 
scepticism and Robby's leftist fanaticism. However, Chambers' characterisation 
is more complex, for Ditto, together with almost all the adolescents in the book, 
is also shown to be motivated by more primitive imperatives which are 
fundamentally biological although culturally modified: namely sex and the urge 
to break free from parental restraints and expectations. Thus Chambers depicts 
adolescence as a time of dramatic change, a 'breaktime', when the self can be 
reformed for better or for worse, and he seems especially keen to show that the 
conscious self is capable of exercising a high degree of control over this 
process. First he has Ditto become conscious of the derivative nature of his 
personality and of a desire for new and life-changing experiences - particularly a 
sexual encounter. Then he has Ditto make plans both to seek out such 
experiences and to reflect upon them in a variegated style of narrative which 
will allow him to shape, according to his own wishes, the new self which 
emerges. In so doing, Ditto also sees his chance to show Morgan that a 
fictionalised account of real-life events can give a meaning to them which 
Morgan will acknowledge as true-to-life. 
At the end of the novel Chambers humorously depicts Morgan as being 
convinced that Ditto's narrative is factual reportage, but then has Ditto quickly 
unsettle this illusion, leaving Morgan wondering how much of it is actually 
fiction: 
Morgan made for the door. 
'I'm in the thing,' he said as he went. 'Are you saying I'm just a 
character in a story?' 
Aren't we all?' said Ditto and laughed. (139) 
Of course the reader knows that Morgan, Ditto and the rest are indeed just 
characters in Chambers' story. But how fictitious a tale is that? After all, Ditto 
has told Morgan that 'All fiction starts from something'. (138) As I will show, 
42 A conflict which I consider still cripples the humanities and the sciences today, and which I 
hope this study might play some small part in breaking down. A more detailed contribution to 
bridging this gap between the latest scientific theories and post-structuralist philosophies and 
literary studies may be found in Damien Broderick. (1994) 
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Chambers' novel not only imitates a familiar genre, but is also partly based on 
his own youth and is constrained by his notion of what is true-to-life, thus 
raising interesting questions for the criticism of autobiographical and historical 
fiction which could be taken up in the classroom. Yet Ditto, in asking his 
question, seems to be speaking as Chambers' representative of the human race. 
If we are all, including Chambers, characters in a story, who or what is the 
author? Is it God, as the eighteenth century philosopher George Berkeley (1710) 
maintained and as, following him, Jostein Gaarder (1995) has playfully (or 
seriously?) suggested in his philosophical fiction for adolescents, Sophie's 
World? Or is it discourse? Or evolution? Or our conscious or unconscious 
selves? I hope to show that Chambers thinks we are constructed by some 
mixture of all these. But if so, what exactly is the formula and how might it vary 
for each individual? These are questions which will undoubtedly engage 
scientists and philosophers for a very long time to come, and which can be 
introduced to secondary students in critical discussions of Breaktime.43 
Meanwhile it is clear that Chambers gives great credence to Ditto's power to 
recreate his personality by opening himself to new experiences and by 
consciously shaping their effect on his mind by means of narrative. Hence Ditto 
is presented as self-'authoring' (and therefore in a very real sense a character in 
his own story) and self authorising. Thus in order to grow up he and Helen must 
become their own authorities, morally autonomous adults, who have adopted, 
among other values, a different sexual morality from that of their parents. 
However, at many points in the story Ditto appears to be motivated by 
powers which are outside his control but to which he sometimes willingly, 
sometimes unwillingly, submits. Some of these are external, as has already been 
noted, including: a tantalising note and photograph from Helen; 44 the 
manipulative machinations of Robby, who uses Ditto in carrying on a feud with 
his father; and the influence of drinking too much alcohol. But some of Ditto's 
motives stem from his own subconscious, and it is these which particularly 
interest me here. One of the clearest examples occurs when Ditto unwittingly 
offends Helen at their first meeting: 
43 One small step towards determining this formula has been suggested by Paul Churchland 
(1995) when he points out that 'a mature human brain has at least 10 14 independent synaptic 
connections, whereas the human genome contains only 2 x 10 9 base pairs of 'letters'. Plainly, the 
bulk of human synaptic configuration must be shaped by postnatal experience of the real world. 
Moreover, of the portion that is genetically specified, one would expect it to be concerned with 
very basic biological functions, such as suckling, rather than with sophisticated frameworks for 
apprehending the intricacies of high-level cognition. After all, the infant human doesn't have any 
high level cognition at birth, and won't develop any for many months to come'. (321) 
44 An opportunity could arise here to discuss with students the semiotics of visual texts, 
including photographs. 
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He felt an impulsive desire to probe her presence with him now, to hear her 
reason it. He knew before he spoke that his question was a mistimed curiosity. 
But he could not help himself. (62) 
Helen is offended and runs off to catch her bus. Ditto castigates himself for his 
folly while trying to make sense of it: 
Stupy. Why. To stop anything coming too close. Is that it. Afraid to be 
known. To be vulnerable. It's so. Admit. Foolarse. Afraid what you'll learn 
about yourself. True. It is. Pity 'tis. Twit. 
Unthought conclusions sent him sprinting from the castle, belongings left 
abandoned by the wall. (63) 
He sees Helen through the window of the bus where she sits crying and refusing 
to look at him. As the bus leaves he has just time enough to scribble 'HELP' (the 
primal human message?) on the back of a docket, lick the paper and slap it on 
the window. Impulsive action has got Ditto into trouble and he hopes that 
impulsive action will get him out of it. He instinctively appeals to Helen's good 
nature and later is rewarded. Ditto contacts her by phone, they meet, share a 
picnic lunch, talk and finally, after Helen has shut him up by saying, 'Don't talk 
any more, word child', (122) 45 they make love. 
Chambers has found a clever and humorous way of conveying their 
sexual encounter in words, by juxtaposing three texts, each of which 
progressively distances the reader from the eroticism of the scene. A first 
person, past tense narrative of their actions is interlined in italics with a stream 
of consciousness account of Ditto's simultaneous thoughts, and parallelled in the 
right hand column of the page by Dr Spock's more clinical description of 
lovemaking. By this means Chambers offers a conjunction of accounts drawn 
from the discourses of 'realist' and modernist fiction, and from 
medical/educational texts. So even their sexual encounter is graphically 
portrayed as conditioned by textual conventions. However, at the moment of 
sexual climax Ditto's inner monologue is finally stilled and the other two 
descriptions also give way to blank space. Then Chambers has Ditto write: 
Thought returns 
A sense of place 
Of being 
exhausted flat-out quenched desireless body able still to pleasure in the 
aftertaste of body on body made poignant by a reasonless sense of loss sweet 
with gratitude but still no words to speak no wish to say (126) 
45 The use of the phrase 'word child' is perhaps an intertextual reference to Iris Murdoch's 
(1975) novel, A Word Child, which is also concerned with the difficult relations between 
language and experience. 
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Lovemaking stands in Breaktime as the ultimate symbol of a powerfully 
life-changing physical experience. It is one which is motivated by instinct and 
significantly shaped by discourse, or culture - as Dr Spock points out in the 
passage mentioned above. (123) Yet it is finally inexpressible in words. Even 
after Helen has gone, leaving only a letter - another text - in place of her 
presence, Ditto does not immediately reflect on the meaning of the event; 
instead he acts intuitively: 
When I woke, the sun was setting. Egg yolk in deepening blue. 
My sleeping bag covered me. Helen's doing, I supposed. 
I looked for her. Found not her, but her note lying by my side 
weighted by a dalestone. 
I read it. 
Then lay back. Wordless thought. 
Then, impulse: I had to go back home. Whatever I had come for, I 
now had. But had yet to sort out. 
I felt good as soon as I moved, being busy again with purpose. 
Whatever I am to be, I am not a drifter, a taker-or-leaver of life. I know that 
now, if no more. (128) 
Following this impulse - an admirably moral one as it becomes apparent - Ditto 
returns home to set things right with his father, only to find that his father has 
experienced a 'breaktime' too. 46 Languishing in hospital after a heart attack 
brought on by Ditto's last row with him, and with Ditto away, he has written a 
very touching letter of rapprochement to his son. This is yet another example of 
the role of text in shaping lives. Ditto learns something of his father's own life-
changing experiences and frustrated ambitions as a young man, and so is able to 
relate to him better. The final symbol of the emergence of Ditto's confident adult 
self appears when he clears his room of all his boyish possessions as if he were 
breaking free of a chrysalis. And with this minor renaissance, the prosaic 
culmination of all the exciting adventures in his story, especially of his 
delighted first sexual experience, the world has taken on a new enchantment. 
Adolescents reading Ditto's story may certainly learn from it and be 
encouraged by it. For some it might even significantly shape their lives, but it 
will be no substitute for both physical experiences and reflections of their own. 
In 1985, under the title 'Ways of Telling - from writer to reader: an author reads 
himself, Chambers published a compilation of lectures he had given on what he 
had set out to do in writing Breaktime and its sequel, Dance on my Grave. 
(Chambers, 1985b: 92-115) His detailed analysis of the genesis of Breaktime 
and of its highly complex structure reveals that he had been drawing 
46 In psychoanalytic and feminist terms, of course, Ditto's impulse could also be seen as a 
troublingly, if unrecognisedly, Oedipal one, in which the 'silent' female mother/lover is 
subordinated to the vital male father/son relationship. 
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consciously upon structuralist and post-structuralist ideas when he began to 
conceive and formulate his themes. As he writes this analysis he is also aware 
that he is revisiting his novels as a reader: he quotes Roland Barthes that 'the 
birth of the reader is at the cost of the death of the author' and reassures his 
audience that his reading of his work is only one valid 'translation' among many. 
(92) Yet it is clear that Chambers is a particularly privileged reader, having 
inside knowledge of the 'intentions' of the author, albeit as a memory subject to 
all manner of distorting influences. 
Chambers' reading of Breaktime draws overtly upon the theorists Wayne 
Booth, Roland Barthes, Gerard Genette, and Hans-Georg Gadamer, showing 
how the novel makes a story out of some of their ideas about the relationships 
between experience, memory, language, story and narration. Furthermore he 
attests to modelling his novel on aspects of the work of Shakespeare, D.H. 
Lawrence, Proust and Lewis Carroll, and on four folk-tales associated with the 
Richmond area of Yorkshire where Breaktime is set. Indeed, Chambers sees his 
work as even more complicated than this, since he presents Breaktime as a 
narrative 'network' founded upon seven underpinning layers of influence or, to 
use his geological metaphor, 1 strata',47 which give form to seven key themes or 
features in the landscape of the story, as depicted in the following diagram: 
BREAKTIME: 
The Network of the Narrative 
Boy on a 	'rite of passage' adventure 
Cliché: the clichés of teenage fiction 
The structure of Shakespeare's comedies 
Underpinning folk tales and 	'place': location 
Linguistic performance as a fictive act 
The question of the narrator 
Reshaping the author's own youth 
(Chambers 1985b: 95) 
47 Does Chambers use this scientific metaphor to give authority to 'artistic' creation? Whatever 
his motive it is a happy use of language from my point of view, since I am arguing for a 
recognition of the similarities between scientific and artistic forms of knowledge, as will become 
clearer in my discussion of 'Morpho Eugenia'. 
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Chambers goes on to explain in some detail how his work was shaped by the 
items listed in the vertical column of his grid, though occasionally he cuts his 
discussion frustratingly short, as in the following passage: 
Language must be uttered before it can be heard. Naturally, therefore, a whole 
stratum of the narrative's geology, the next level down, is composed of the 
hard-rock question: Who is telling the story? Whose voice do we hear? Who is 
the narrator? 
I wish we had time to dig into these puzzles, for they are the ones that 
presently fascinate me about the writing of fiction. For the moment I'll only 
note that the use of first- and third-person voices in Breaktime was not 
arbitrary, and that the choice of voice for each passage was considered from a 
number of points of view, mostly to do with the problem of the narrator rather 
than the technical reason that the first-person creates an effect of immediacy 
and closeness to the protagonist while the third-person creates a sense of 
distance, of being an observer rather than a participant. The juxtaposing of the 
voices is meant to help compose a polyphony, and a duality of personality, so 
that the reader stands now within, now without, the story, and 'hears' the 
linguistic shifts more keenly than would be the case without the use of this 
device. (Specialist critics will know that Gerard Genette's chapter on 'Voice' in 
Narrative Discourse lays out the principal ideas that group around this element 
in fiction, where he searches from Proust the authorial impulse behind 
extradiegetic and heterodiegetic usage.) (103, 104) 
Chambers also ignores Barthes' and Kristeva's ideas of unwilled 'intertextuality', 
or the idea that every text is a mosaic of quotations from the culture'. This 
includes Derrida's 'already said', or the notion that the values of the culture are 
transmitted through its verbal artworks. These are important considerations in 
the interpretation of authorial functions. Nevertheless, if we return to Chambers' 
novel with his few comments in mind, perhaps it will reveal enough of what he 
has made of Genette's treatment of such matters. 
Chambers' account of his novel is admirably clear about the role of 
language in the creation and recreation of the self. However, his treatment of the 
theme of physical experience (which figures in less general and explicit terms in 
the horizontal axis of his grid) tends to underplay the way such experience 
subconsciously enables and directs value judgements, including ethical 
decisions. (I should stress here that I am not using the term 'subconsciously' in 
its Freudian sense, but rather in Paul Churchland's sense of the way the brain 
processes experience by operations which are non-linguistic and unconscious.) 
It remains much clearer in Chamber's novel that there is a realm of knowledge 
which is acquired through our senses and which can at best be only hinted at in 
language. Yet, as I have shown, that is about as far as Chambers goes in 
Breaktime since he is keen to suggest that the whole of our self-knowledge (or 
at least the only useful part of it) must be constructed in language through the 
stories we tell about ourselves after the events. However, this is to limit the 
images of sight, sound, touch, taste and smell, and whatever strange intimations 
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we have of our mental states, which we are able to recall from our store of 
experience without describing them in words. It is also to ignore the albeit 
limited powers of artists, such as painters and musicians, to represent 
experiences which cannot be conveyed in speech or writing. Indeed, there 
remains a self-knowledge which is ultimately private but nonetheless real and 
influential for all that it defies representation in any public medium. And it is 
important that writers, critics and teachers should acknowledge this fact in the 
stories they tell about human experience. 
Chambers comes close to fulfilling this imperative in his 1985 lecture 
when he discusses the personal experiences which have informed his novel. His 
first mention of them is in the lowest stratum on the vertical axis of his grid, 
titled, 'Reshaping the author's own youth', its lowly position suggesting that this 
is in other respects deeply buried material. Later he comments on this stratum as 
follows: 
Move down another layer and we reach the most difficult topic of all 
for me to say anything about, not least because I'm still unclear about it myself. 
At this level is confronted the relationship that inevitably exists between the 
three elements: the fictive act as a linguistic performance; the person of the 
narrator; and the author himself in his first-person existence. Again we might 
pose the problem in questions: What has the author given the book? What has 
the book given the author? Or: Where am I in this book and what am I doing in 
it? 
Judging from the inordinate interest there is in the biography of 
writers, which often exceeds interest in their books, I suspect a lot of people 
find this the subject that engages their curiosity most of all. But, as I say, it isn't 
part of our discussion today so I'll leave it alone, with this one hint. I 
sometimes think that what I was doing in Breaktime was shaping - or rather re-
shaping - my own youth, re-examining it in the light of the years since then. 
But this is tentative and inadequate, and is offered only as a talking point for 
those determined to pursue biographical lines of inquiry. (105) 
'Biographical lines of inquiry' are considered almost indefensibly outmoded by 
post-structuralists, yet it is salutary to be reminded that many readers are deeply 
interested in whatever an author's work might reveal about his or her personal 
life. Authors are constantly confronted with this fact in the crowds who turn up 
to literary lunches and writers' festivals, but, like Chambers, they are often wary 
of the conclusions readers might draw from their books about their private lives 
- and indeed from anything they might 'reveal' in their public persona as 
promoter of their books. In fact, as Chambers is at pains to explain about his 
own work, authors are often careful to distance their fictional narrative from any 
autobiographical sources. (98) The popularity of literary biographies also attests 
to the fascination readers have with the relationship between the life and the 
work, while the variant readings offered by subsequent biographers show just 
how elusive is the discovery of any ultimate truth in this quest. But perhaps it is 
this very elusiveness, the inexpressibility in language of the deepest springs of 
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personality, which drives the reader's curiosity about the author. The reader 
lives in hope that maybe this artist, who is so linguistically gifted in telling 
stories about human experience, will be able to disclose the innermost secrets of 
herself, secrets which the reader can never articulate about himself - and which 
perhaps he would be reluctant to expose to himself, let alone to others, even if 
he could name them. 
The notion that there exists truths about ourselves which lie beyond our 
grasp both stimulates us to try to approach them as nearly as we can, and allays 
our fears that we might actually find them and then perhaps stand exposed as 
unacceptable. Most importantly, though, the existence of such truths places 
upon the author an ethical imperative to make her fiction as truthful as possible, 
not necessarily in revealing intimate secrets about her personal life, but in being 
true to some part of human experience. Chambers indirectly acknowledges this 
duty when he describes how he came to set Breaktime in the landscape in which 
he had grown up: 
The invaluable authorial experience this setting gave me.. .was discovering how 
to find in myself and in my own life reference points for truth by which to test 
the veracity of a character's experience during the writing of a novel. It taught 
me how to use autobiography in the creation of a fiction without turning the 
fiction into autobiography. In other words, it taught me how to use myself to 
write truth in fiction while also keeping my distance. I don't say I can always 
do it, only that taking the risk showed me what fictional truth really means. 
(99) 
Like Emmanuel Levinas' imperative to 'be for the Other', which he 
considers to be the foundation of the moral self, and which finds expression 
when the self merely apprehends 'the Face of the Other' before any appeal is 
made, (Baumann, 1993: 72,73) the imperative to write has pre-linguistic 
motives. For Chambers, writing gives expression to an imperative to be true to 
the tale which, whatever conscious forces may have shaped it, in the final 
analysis has come to him from he knows not where inside his head. But what 
Chambers does not acknowledge sufficiently in this lecture is that the author 
also has a definitively moral responsibility to tell the truth as best he can for his 
readers, in whom, since he can only imagine them, he apprehends the Face of 
the Other before a word is exchanged. Ironically, the author does this most 
effectively by struggling to tell the truth to and for himself. And it is a struggle, 
first because our unconscious self remains largely a mystery, an Other, to our 
consciousness (for reasons explained by Churchland's account of the non-
linguistic processes which constitute most of our mental activity, and by 
Wright's evolutionary account of the way our social success is often facilitated 
by not recognising our deeply selfish motives), and second because there are 
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things about ourselves which we do not want to face, just as there were for 
Ditto. 
To realise that one has lied to oneself can be at least as abhorrent as lying 
to another: witness Marlow's scruples in Heart of Darkness, even though he felt 
that under the circumstances it was right to tell a lie. It seems that no fruitful 
relationships, whether between one's various selves or between different people, 
can flourish where there can be no trust. The fundamental enterprise of 
communication through language depends upon the general assumption that 
one's interlocutors are attempting to speak the truth as they perceive it. 
Furthermore, those who lose sight of the truth about themselves - such as by not 
acknowledging and trusting to their instincts as at least a partial guide - or who 
have developed completely distinct multiple personalities, can ultimately 
become subject to the most debilitating and painful delusions. Of course there 
are disorders of the mind which do not necessarily have their roots in moral 
choices, as the chemical aetiology of schizophrenia demonstrates. Yet self-
deception may be as common among reasonably sane people as is lying - or at 
least telling lazy half-truths - to others among reasonably honest people, and 
such lying is no less a temptation to authors of fiction. 48 Paradoxically, one of 
the truths about ourselves - one which Chambers seems to have overlooked in 
this lecture, in spite of his dedication to telling the truth in literature - is that, 
even if we want to, we cannot tell the whole truth about both our conscious and 
unconscious experiences, and yet those experiences profoundly shape our lives. 
In his discussion of the themes of his novel, Dance on my Grave, 
Chambers says, 
My personal conviction is that we are not changed by our experiences, as 
common wisdom has it. What changes us are the stories we tell about our 
experiences. Until we have re-formed our lives into story-structured words we 
cannot find and contemplate the meaning of our lived experiences. Till then 
they remain in the realm of beastly knowledge. Only by turning the raw 
material of life into story - by putting it into a pattern of words which we call 
narrative - can beastly knowledge be creatively transformed and given 
meaning. (112) 
As Nussbaum (1990) and Siebers (1992) attest, the universal practice of giving 
symbolic meaning to our lives by reflecting on them in the stories we tell is 
48 A recent example of an author who may have lied to herself in lying about the historical 
foundations of her fiction and about her own identity as author in promoting her book is Helen 
Darville/Demidenko. (1995) Many critics have stridently defended her right to use fiction to 
distort history, declaring for example that a genuinely postmodern novel deliberately distorts the 
past in the attempt to show that historical discourse is subject to both deliberate and inadvertent 
error. Here, perhaps, is an example of telling a deliberate lie as a means to securing what is 
regarded as a greater good. But would it not be possible to make this point about the problems of 
historical discourse without adding to the deliberate errors? Just because truth-seeking in history 
is problematic, should we risk abandoning the attempt altogether? 
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evidence of a deep, even obsessive, need. And our ability as a species to change 
our lives through language and other discursive practices is testimony to the 
plasticity of the human mind, as evidenced by the extraordinary variety of 
cultures humans have produced. Yet I think Chambers overstates his case as far 
as individual agency is concerned. Experiences, prior to their representation in 
language, do change us, as he demonstrates in Breaktime. Also he speaks too 
slightingly of 'beastly knowledge'. Modern evolutionary biology has shown 
more and more convincingly that we are different in degree rather than kind 
from the beasts, and that beasts are capable of some learning and reasoning even 
though they possess signifying systems far less highly elaborated than those 
which constitute human language. (Diamond 1991; Churchland 1995) 
Furthermore, advances in brain science have shown that the extreme complexity 
of human language may well be a product of the sheer computing power of our 
larger neural networks rather than of a special feature of the brain which has 
evolved uniquely in humans. Contrary to the more widely accepted view of 
Noam Chomsky,49 Paul Churchland has offered persuasive evidence in support 
of this hypothesis, arguing that the operation of the human brain is essentially 
the same as that of all sentient species. He also demonstrates that much of the 
brain's processing of information takes place in its own 'machine language' (to 
borrow a phrase from computer science) in realms completely inaccessible to 
reflection undertaken either with or without language. Thus 'beastly [i.e. 
subconscious, pre-linguistic] knowledge' is indeed human knowledge which 
grounds, and to a significant degree determines, the self. As I have argued in 
Chapter 2, a part of that self is genetically constructed, after which it is further 
elaborated upon as the brain subconsciously processes the intersecting physical 
and discursive experiences to which it is subjected from birth. Only in a limited 
way is it possible for us to consciously 'rewrite' ourselves during this learning 
process. 
Theories of the construction of the self which ignore its grounding in the 
evolution of human physiology and in the brain's powers of subconscious 
learning are almost certainly mistaken and give rise to significant problems in 
the realm of ethics, such as an undue belief in the power of moral rules to 
change behaviour, or in the adequacy of rationalist systems of ethics. Hence, in 
my exploration of the possibilities for ethical criticism after post-structuralism, I 
have turned to recent developments in evolutionary biology, brain science and 
quantum mechanics and their implications for moral philosophy, as well as to 
49 Chomsky's view that the language facility is partly innate, as opposed to Churchland's view 
that it is fully learned, possibly gives greater support to my final point here, which is to maintain 
that there is a biologically determined - i.e. essential - human nature which is pre-linguistic and 
which sets significant limits to the plasticity of the mind under the influence of cultural 
discourses. However, on the former point I find Churchland's arguments more convincing. 
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the postmodern ethics of Zygmunt Baumann, based on the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas. I repeat that I do not pretend to have constructed more than a 
precursory synthesis of these ideas (Baumann and other exponents of 
postmodernism claim that such totalised theories are a dangerous illusion 
anyway), but I hope at least to demonstrate that literary critics and teachers of 
English should not ignore them. 
Nature and nurture (or biology and discourse) both play a part in 
constructing the self, leaving it some scope - though not as much as Chambers 
would like - to consciously reconstruct itself through the invention of stories, 
both histories and possible futures. It is likely that if we really want to change 
ourselves (and our children) we will be best served by subjecting ourselves 
repeatedly to appropriate physical and social, as well as aesthetic, experiences 
from which our brains will learn unconsciously through the 'vector processing 
mechanisms' which Churchland describes. In this learning, conscious reflection 
through language may well play only a facilitating role. Teachers, writers, 
inventors - indeed all serious learners - know from experience how significant 
strides in understanding are often made during a time when our attention is 
focussed on repetitive drills, on something else entirely, or on nothing at all. 
Even reading, which might seem to be an almost purely conscious linguistic 
experience, works upon the mind in subliminal ways, creating salutary effects of 
learning which defy articulation by the most gifted of literary critics. It is a 
common experience for readers to feel that their minds have been briefly but 
satisfyingly re-ordered during the reading of a 'good' book, and to sense - not 
dimly but radiantly - that they grasp things which neither they nor the critics can 
adequately communicate to others after the event, except by recommending that 
they experience for themselves the reading of that 'marvellous' book. Such 
aesthetic and ethical literary experiences do, of course, change lives but not, 
perhaps, as much as teachers of English would like to think. And maybe this is 
not such a bad thing, since people expose themselves to what some consider to 
be morally damaging material as well as to that which is potentially uplifting. 
Significantly, Chambers' use of the word 'contemplation' in the passage 
quoted above seems to support my view rather than his, since contemplation is 
often associated with an opening of oneself - beginning sometimes with words 
but extending through silence - to insights into the meaning of our lives which 
precede and transcend language. Indeed Chambers approaches this idea when he 
says at the end of his lecture: 
I know I've mentioned contemplation a number of times. That's 
because, for me, all reading is an act of contemplation... Contemplation is 
important to me because only in contemplation do I realise myself. Some will 
say that this invests the reading of literature with religious significance. I 
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wouldn't argue with that. For me it has. Perhaps one day I'll write an 
explanation of its significance. But not yet. For where Breaktime and Dance on 
my Grave have led me is to a story about this very idea. I didn't realise they 
were, of course, while writing them. But I'm amused now to find [in Dance on 
my Grave] Hal's teacher, Jim Osborn, telling him, 'If you go on like this you'll 
turn religious, you know that, don't you?' Sometimes your books know where 
you're going, or where they're taking you, a long time before you know 
yourself. (115) 
Here again Chambers acknowledges that his stories are shaped by hidden, pre-
linguistic forces, leading to the discovery of truths which his conscious mind 
had not imagined. But he does not take the next step of admitting that his 
contemplation after the event might pass over into 'post-linguistic' realms of 
understanding, even though he is willing to call this contemplation religious. 
The story which he says Breaktime and Dance on my Grave have led 
him to is probably his next novel in the sequence, (1987) Now I Know, which 
Chambers has said (see p. 134 above) is about 'the clash of rational thought and 
irrational belief. In this story his youthful hero, Nik, examines the claims of 
Christian faith and arrives at a re-interpretation of religious belief consonant 
with his modern materialist culture. It is a belief in the immanence rather than 
the transcendence of God. In this respect Chambers espouses the kind of 
contemporary Platonism which I have outlined in Chapter 2.6. Chambers has 
Nik and his friend, Julie, express their belief brilliantly in words, but Nik had 
first to discover it through physically re-enacting Christ's crucifixion, since the 
only kind of knowledge which could ultimately convince Nik of the truth of 
belief in God was the bodily-beastly-empirical knowledge which comes through 
physical experience. The fear and pain of his crucifixion is, of course, reflected 
upon afterwards in language, but here Chambers has Nik also write, 'Another 
conclusion from the experiment: people do things more for hidden reasons than 
for stated ones. Each of us is a galaxy of secret lives'. (Chambers 1987: 213) In 
the end Julie, who is further down the path of Christian commitment than Nik, 
determines to live her faith 'hidden among ordinary people in an ordinary 
everyday place while I do ordinary everyday work.' (230) According to 
Chambers, the ultimate expression of religious belief is therefore to be found in 
bodily actions performed for and with others - of which the reductive 
incarnation of thoughts in speech and writing is perhaps only one example. 
Here at last Chambers arrives at an ethics truly grounded in the body and 
reaching out to the whole physical universe. Interestingly, in its emphasis on 
ordinary work and compassion, it is similar to the ethics of Captain Marlow in 
Heart of Darkness, although Conrad elaborated his somewhat disillusioned 
version from an atheistic perspective. Chambers has enunciated an ethics of re-
enchantment, lived out in deeds as well as words which spring ultimately from 
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deep, pre-linguistic motives. 50  But can we afford to trust the future of human 
society to these hidden motives, as Conrad and Baumann claim we must? We 
have, Baumann says, no option, for we ought to have learnt by now that 
attempts to formulate in language a systematic universalist ethics at best fall 
short of the whole truth and at worst pervert it into some monstrous philosophy 
such as the Nazis, following perhaps in the footsteps of Conrad's Mr Kurtz, used 
to justify the Holocaust. Moreover, Baumann argues that ethics enunciates a 
rational system of duties, a law which obligates all people, forestalling any free, 
and therefore (in Levinas' sense) moral, acts motivated by an impulse to be for 
the Other whether or not the Other feels any obligation to reciprocate. Thus he 
maintains that in the end the 'unfounded' moral impulses of conscience, in spite 
of all the influences of culture, must be our guide. It should be noted that when 
Baumann says this, he has in mind exactly those extreme circumstances which 
prevailed in Nazi Germany when the national culture provided a seemingly 
'rational' justification for the elimination of the Jews. To acquiesce to one's 'civic 
duty' in these circumstances by betraying one's neighbour might be 
understandable but could never be excusable. Here conscience alone dictates our 
duty to be for the Other before all our apparently reasonable duties to the state. 
(Baumann 1993: 249) This situation compares and contrasts nicely with that of 
Kurtz who, cut off from the moral constraints of his own culture and isolated 
among tribes whom he wrongly regarded as morally inferior, abandoned the 
dictates of conscience and resorted to abominable measures which he thought 
were justified by the standards of the savages. 
I believe Baumann is right in his assessment of the collaborators in the 
Holocaust, but in more normal circumstances I would still want to balance his 
faith in our intuitive motives to be for the Other (which evolutionary psychology 
argues are in fact founded upon the social needs of basically selfish individuals) 
with Chambers' emphasis on the role of literary contemplation, conducted in 
dialogue with others, in shaping our lives aright. Chambers is not a Kantian: for 
him morals are not grounded in a metaphysics which is transparent to reason 
alone. Rather in Chambers' ethics, the private and less rational processes of 
belief need to alternate with the public and more reasonable processes of 
language, the former setting our fundamental directions (in principles such as 
friendship, love and sacrifice) and the latter shaping our actions in meaningful 
structures responsive to, though not necessarily in conformity with, our context. 
50 A feminist reading of Conrad and Chambers would justifiably claim that for both these 
writers ethics is an activity of male intellects in a male inner society (e.g. Marlow's group of 
friends/peers), while women act as inspiration, muse, enigma, mystery - representative of all 
that is 'other' to the rational, choice-making controller of the narrative. Thus in their novels 
males tell the 'true' story of civilised ethics! 
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And in this process stories do not so much serve to illustrate and contextualise 
moral principles, absolute or otherwise, as they are necessary to experimenting 
with how best to live, and to forging a more conscious and considered form of 
agency which can better translate the findings of these experiments into 
practice. Thus (to change the metaphors again) stories, if not the ultimate 
progenitors of moral autonomy, are certainly its nursemaids. 
Chambers began his lecture by joking that he is not God and by 
declaring that his reading of his books is only one of many possible 
interpretations. At the end of the lecture he says, 
None of my writing, whether fictional or critical, is either an end in 
itself or ever comes to an end. None of it is self-contained. None of it is 
finished. All of it belongs, I hope and believe, to a continuum that cannot end. 
Which is as good a note as any on which to end this episode. (115) 
Here Chambers also recognises the intertextuality of writing. The margins of a 
book are not determinate; each fiction is a node within a network, thus opening 
up the possibility of an ethical dialogue between fictions which will stimulate 
readers to enter into ethical questioning. Chambers' continued readiness to open 
his deeply held ideas to such public discussion and to the necessity of revision 
makes him an admirably reasonable author, educator and critic. Together with a 
profound optimism, founded ultimately in an intuitively religious view of life, 
he exemplifies the kind of modest, open-ended rationality which is the hallmark 
of ethical education and which offers some further insurance against the return 
of a fascist state. With this in mind, then, I must now take issue with a minor 
aspect of Chambers' novel, Breaktime, which I believe renders it a little less 
than satisfactory as an ethical fiction for young adults. 
I have often thought that Breaktime would be an excellent book to set in pre-
tertiary or first year university literature courses, since it introduces so many 
structuralist and post-structuralist issues of textuality and provides great scope 
for the discussion of psychological and ethical questions which are particularly 
relevant and interesting to young adults. However, I know of no secondary 
school teacher who has been willing to recommend it as anything more than a 
wider reading text. A powerful reason for their hesitation is that the book 
appeals only to very clever and literary-minded students. Other teachers might 
have been reluctant to set it as a core text in even their top classes for fear of the 
backlash which would almost certainly come from some parents objecting to 
Chambers' treatment of adolescent sexuality. The same would be true for Dance 
on my Grave which focuses on a homosexual relationship without passing any 
judgement on its morality, even though in this book the sexual acts are only 
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implied. Regrettably, teachers are not always brave campaigners for a liberal 
education, since their jobs can be stressful enough without the strife which 
justifying the selection of controversial texts can cause. 
In Breaktime Chambers raises the issue of parental disapproval of pre-
marital sex through the following dialogue between Helen and Ditto: 
'...You see, if I got preggers that would confirm their beliefs about life. 
Another of the traps. And if I liked the bloke and married him that would make 
it all right. I'd be properly trapped, paying for my mistakes, taking the 
consequences of my actions - all that guff. And I'd be there, lumbered, for them 
to cluck over still, giving advice, and, what's best, with a baby for them to feel 
sentimental about.' 
'And all forgiven.' 
'Of course.' 
'But if you had fun, played hanky-panky and didn't get with child?' 
'I'd be a loose woman. I'd be promiscuous and, worst of all, I'd be 
enjoying it. I'd be an unpaid whore, a happy hooker, a woman of easy virtue. 
Etcetera. That's what bothers them most.' 
'Ugly words.' 
'Ugly sentiments.' 
'But never said straight out?' 
'0, no. That's what makes it so horrible. I don't think I'd mind if they 
came straight out and said what they think. Trouble is, I suspect they don't even 
know that they think it. So it all comes out in innuendo, by implication. And 
somehow, that makes everything worse. Dirties everything.' (62, 63) 
Clearly Helen does not share her parents' attitudes to sex - at least as Chambers 
has her present them - and is happily indulging in sexual liaisons. However, she 
is depicted as having some scruples, although they are still rather confused. She 
tells Ditto that the aunt with whom she is going to stay is 'a child-weary mother 
of eight, one more being imminent,' and adds, 'a prolific breeding record I 
regard as more suitable to rabbits than human beings'. (58) Later Helen reveals 
to Ditto that she is on the pill, but then says she started taking it just to shock her 
parents. (121) She also says, 'I know I have a reputation as an easy lay and I 
play up to it. But boys are shocking boasters. As a matter of fact, I've gone all 
the way only four times'. (120) She admits to Ditto, 'It's as though there are two 
people inside me, quite different people who have to take it in turns at being 
me'. (120, 121) One of these people, she says, likes to break the rules and one is 
afraid that things will go wrong. Perhaps such a seemingly confused young 
woman would be well advised not to get involved in sexual relationships with 
all their emotional and physical risks. Indeed, being confused about one's 
identity is typically adolescent, and so parents might be justified in wanting 
their teenagers to postpone sexual relationships. But fragmentation of the self is 
also simply human, since we are all partly constructed by so many conflicting 
biological and cultural influences, among them incompatible moral prototypes. 
Furthermore, at every age there seems to be something powerfully at work in 
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most people which wants to integrate the self - possibly an innate function of 
our brains which has evolved to focus our activities in order to survive in the 
physical and social worlds to which we are adapted. Thus Ditto asks Helen, 
'Which one is you now?' 
Her eyes found mine and held them with a cool firmness a little 
frightening in its strength. 
'Which one would you prefer?' 
I tried to smile, to joke, 'Can't I have both?' 
She did not smile in reply. 'I've never tried being both at once before. 
Is it possible, do you think?' 
How could I answer? (121) 
It is then that Chambers has Helen and Ditto make love, an experience of 
momentary unification within and between selves, if ever there was one. Should 
adolescents be denied this experience at a time when they feel ready for it? 
Some parents take the view that adolescents should enjoy a full sexual life, as 
long as they also conduct it in a responsible manner. Yet that is a requirement 
which eludes many adults too. 
Chambers' construction of Ditto's account of Helen makes it clear that 
she is being depicted through the lens of Ditto's male fantasy, so it must be said 
that all of the above might reveal more about the values of a boy like Ditto and a 
man like Chambers than those of any real-life girl. That notion in itself raises 
many important and interesting issues concerning the genetic and social 
construction of gender which ought to be addressed in class discussions of this 
novel. One very apposite topic might be the feminist concern that the whole era 
of sexual liberation has mostly been a covert privileging of male casual sexual 
contacts. Hence even more sensible and liberal-minded parents than Helen's 
three-times fictive ones51 might be worried about the fact that Ditto is portrayed 
as leaping (or maybe only fantasising about leaping) into the arms of this girl 
without first donning a condom, and as having no regrets afterwards. If students 
did not raise this matter in class discussion first, a responsible teacher might be 
expected to point out that, while the book was written in the pre-AIDS 
seventies, sexually active teenagers still had to worry about the old-fashioned 
venereal diseases and should therefore have protected themselves and each 
other. Unfortunately the joys of sex have never been without real dangers and 
the anxieties which justifiably attend them. Chambers wrote Breaktime 
specifically for a teenage audience, so it might be considered reasonable to 
chide him for neglecting to deal with this issue at least in passing. On the other 
hand, Chambers could object that his fiction is true to life and that still today it 
51 We only know them through (1) Chambers' construction of (2) Ditto's account of (3) Helen's 
description of them. 
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is a regrettable fact that the majority of early sexual experiences are unprotected. 
He might also say that safe sex was not meant to be a theme of this novel - after 
all it is impossible to say everything in one book - and that he has been 
sufficiently responsible in depicting adolescents as enjoying sex, free from the 
destructive feelings of guilt which inappropriate social and religious values 
would lay upon them. Nevertheless, a feminist critic might still claim that 
Chambers' text speaks by its silences an ideology of patriarchal assumptions. 
On balance I do not consider that Chambers' failure to raise the issue of 
safe sex is a sufficient reason for not teaching his book. Such matters can and 
should be dealt with in class discussion - if not in discussing this text, then at 
some other appropriate time. Also we should not forget that Chambers is writing 
for adolescents who are over the age of consent: he does not, on the whole, treat 
them patronisingly and neither should their parents or teachers. They will, after 
all, choose for themselves to read and view less ethically responsible works than 
this one, and will form their values in response to many other influences, not 
least those of their parents. Certainly the attempt by schools to inform and 
influence students' values in the area of sex education should be almost 
complete before the age of sixteen. It is high time after that to begin trusting 
teenagers to find their own way to moral autonomy. Helen and Ditto, Chambers' 
model adolescents, seem to be doing a pretty good job of it. On the other hand, 
the obsessively rebellious behaviour of Robby - Chambers' model of a disturbed 
young man - is certainly more worrying, but then he is disadvantaged by having 
a father who is apparently deeply hypocritical. With or without the example of 
their parents, adolescents will sometimes make serious mistakes. We cannot 
protect them from doing that any more than we can protect adults from their 
follies. Nevertheless, a carefully considered series of discussions of narrative 
ethical models is one form of assistance which society can offer its younger 
members. 
Chambers accords a significant role to whatever power the writing and 
reading of stories has to shape and reshape moral impulses. This view fits nicely 
with Churchland's hypothesis about the nature of moral knowledge and how 
moral learning occurs through encounters with increasingly sophisticated and 
varied moral prototypes which can unconsciously guide behaviour and upon 
which it will be possible to consciously and rationally reflect. An ethics 
education program which relies too heavily upon the conscious reasoning 
component and which downplays the need for acquiring moral prototypes - 
especially through stories - is bound to fail. Yet a moral education program 
which downplays the need for rational deliberation about conflicting prototypes 
will fall short of developing whatever limited scope humans have for making 
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informed choices and thus will be guilty of gross indoctrination. Hence moral 
autonomy is at least in part the product of ethical literary criticism - and, more 
broadly, of ethical critical literacy. 
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4. 'Morpho Eugenia' and the ethics of disillusionment and re-enchantment 
A.s. Byatt's novellas, 'Morpho Eugenia' and 'The Conjugial Angel', were first 
published in 1992 in one volume entitled Angels and Insects. Together they 
represent humans as living on the 'darkling' plain/plane which lies between the 
heavenly and subterranean realms - the homes respectively of angels and ants. 52 
The two central characters of these tales are confined to just one point in their 
'two dimensional' habitat for almost the entire duration of their plots, but their 
consciousness is informed by personal and vicarious knowledge of other lives 
led in very different places on the surface of the planet. At the same time they 
receive intimations of life in different realms of the 'third dimension', as they 
seek a better understanding of their circumstances by inquiring into the 
existences of beings both higher and lower than themselves in the traditional 
order. The higher order is represented in the second story by the souls of the 
departed who (according to the heroine's Swedenborgian beliefs) have become 
angels, and the lower order in the first story by insects: butterflies, moths, bees 
and ants. In their quest for self-fulfilment Byatt's hero and heroine move in time, 
the fourth dimension, from illusion, through disillusionment, to a more realistic 
re-enchantment. Finally both stories celebrate the unique value of their lives, 
lived in full acceptance of their mortality, enlightened by an ethic of open-
minded inquiry and reciprocal love, and inspired by modest hopes for a 
satisfying life in the years that remain to them before they are ultimately 
dissolved in the flux of the universe. 
Both stories are set in Victorian England and written in a pseudo-
nineteenth century realist style, brilliantly evoking key philosophical questions 
of that time and place, and subjecting them to the language play and 
postmodern re-reading of our time. In 'Morpho Eugenia' Byatt has her hero list 
some of these in terms of binary oppositions: 
Instinct or Intelligence 
Design or Hasard [sic] 
The Individual and the Commonwealth 
What is an Individual? (109) 
Other issues focus on the relationships between religion and science, free will 
and determinism, and appearance and reality. In 'The Conjugial Angel' the most 
obvious issue is the search for metaphysical comfort by conducting seances to 
52 In Hamlet's words, 'crawling between heaven and earth'. Hamlet has a typically modern 
ethical problem: having to decide between an old world order morality - kill your father's 
murderer if a ghost tells you to - and a new world order morality - be very, scientifically, 
sceptical, test the ghost's narrative, proceed by empirical observation. 
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contact the spirits of the dear departed, and so to find experimental evidence 
that humans are more than mere mortals. The reader cannot help but feel the 
relevance of the issues which trouble her characters to our own circumstances 
over a century later. In moving from a modern version of these concerns, as 
represented in their mid-nineteenth century guise in the novellas, to current 
postmodern versions, Byatt indicates that Western culture has still to explore 
their full ramifications, let alone answer satisfactorily the questions they raise. 
Indeed, in certain respects these questions have taken on a new urgency with the 
changing conditions of our lives. In the passage from modern to postmodern 
society some thinkers have adopted a profound pessimism about the possibility 
of answers to these questions, while others retain a modest optimism that some 
progress can be made towards their resolution. 
A compelling reason why the search for such answers must be conducted 
more modestly is also the fundamental issue in both 'Morpho Eugenia' and 'The 
Conjugial Angel' - one which encapsulates all of the concerns listed above: I 
mean the problematic relationship between fiction and the world, or more 
broadly, between linguistic and other human constructs and the reality to which 
they purport to refer. This issue is usually seen as particularly postmodern, but it 
also has a forerunner in the nineteenth century, in concerns raised by the higher 
criticism of the Bible. 53 It is rarely discussed openly in Angels and Insects, yet 
in 'Morpho Eugenia' it is everywhere inherent in her presentation of experience 
and reflection in the pastiche of various kinds of texts which she has introduced 
into her 'self-conscious realism', as she has called it. (Byatt 1993: 4) Through 
several of her characters' use of the discourses of religion, science, and art, and 
of many different texts, Byatt seems to be asking what understandings of 
objective reality can be conveyed by religious and scientific constructions, and 
such linguistic artefacts as journals, letters, sermons, theological and 
philosophical speculations on natural history, the naming of insects, poems, 
myths, metaphors, analogies, allegories, fables, nursery rhymes, accounts of 
dreams, and word games. In 'The Conjugial Angel' the pastiche consists merely 
of letters, biblical quotations, excerpts of poetry, accounts of visions and 
automatic writing. Ultimately the reader is led to ask the same questions about 
53 Byatt (1993) mentions higher criticism at a number of points in Passions of the Mind, but see 
especially pp. 94-95. Iris Murdoch (1992) make an interesting point in this context: 'If one is too 
'faithful' [to the text] one may merely reproduce unassimilated ideas which remain remote and 
dead; if one is too 'inventive' one may lose the original and present one's own thoughts instead of 
the great thoughts to which one should have attended more carefully. This is of course a 
dilemma which belongs to any sort of imterpretation. Structuralism, which tends to emphasise 
inventiveness at the expense of faithfulness, is also interested in this matter. Theorising about 
such difficulties can become an end in itself. Such theorising may be another way of losing the 
original. Methods of interpretation in various fields are all the time under scrutiny by individual 
thinkers, and sometimes, as in biblical criticism, it is worth making a large general issue of the 
matter'. (510) 
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what Byatt herself is able to convey through her own subtly postmodern use of 
realist fiction in these paired novellas. 
In the introduction to Passions of the Mind: Selected Writings (1993) 
Byatt declares that the concerns which I maintain she is exploring in Angels and 
Insects have exercised her mind for a long time: 
I have tried to be scholarly where that was appropriate, and I have used recent 
literary theory where that seemed useful, though my temperament is agnostic, 
and I am a non-believer and a non-belonger to schools of thought. I grew up in 
Dr Leavis's Cambridge, in an atmosphere of moral seriousness which placed 
English Literature at the centre of university studies and also of social morality. 
I felt then that these claims were extravagant and absurdly exclusive - all sorts 
of other things are good and beautiful, paint, philosophy, mathematics, biology 
- there are many ways of coming at inevitably partial visions of truth. I was and 
am excited by T.S. Eliot's observation that our literature is a substitute for 
religion, and so is our religion... 
My interest in the novel as a form came later than my interest in 
poetry, and was partly a purely practical interest in narrative method. Two 
statements about the nature of fiction that influenced me very early were Iris 
Murdoch's 1961 essay 'Against Dryness' and a remark of Graham Greene's, in 
his essay on Mauriac, about the relationship between the religious sense, and 
the experienced reality, or irreality, of fiction. 'Against Dryness' is both a text 
about morality in a post-Christian world, and a text about the appropriate 
fictive form with which to explore that world, in its complexity and depth. It 
rejects what Blake might have called the single vision both of the crystalline 
novel, or jewel-like artefact, and of the journalistic report, and defends, on 
moral grounds, the Tolstoyan 'old-fashioned naturalistic idea of character'. 
Graham Greene argues that 'with the death of James the religious sense was 
lost to the English novel, and with the religious sense went the sense of the 
importance of the human act. It was as if the world of fiction had lost a 
dimension: the characters of such distinguished writers as Mrs Virginia Woolf 
and Mr E.M. Forster wandered like cardboard symbols through a world that 
was paper thin.' 
The problems of the 'real' in fiction, and the adequacy of words to 
describe it, have preoccupied me for the last twenty years. If I have defended 
realism, or what I call 'self-conscious realism', it is not because I believe that it 
has any privileged relationship to truth, social or psychological, but because it 
leaves a place for thinking minds as well as feeling bodies. It is closely related 
to ideas of accuracy... (B yatt 1993: 2-4) 
In the first essay of Passions of the Mind, 'Still Life / Nature morte', Byatt has 
this to say about her work on her novel Still Life: 
I am afraid of, and fascinated by, theories of language as a self-referring 
system of signs, which doesn't touch the world. I am afraid of, and resistant to, 
artistic stances which say we explore our own subjectivity... I wanted at least to 
work on the assumption that order is more interesting than the idea of the 
random (even if our capacity to apprehend it is limited): that accuracy of 
description is possible and valuable. That words denote things. (Byatt 1993: 
11) 
In these passages Byatt steers a careful pathway through highly 
contested territory in order to claim a place for fictions which can fairly attempt 
to represent the moral life of real people in the real world. Her modest, agnostic, 
eclectic approach seems to me to be very appropriate in the current intellectual 
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context of postmodernity - indeed it could be described as politically strategic, 
but it would be presumptuous to accuse her of being more concerned with 
power than with truthfulness. It is, therefore, in this context that Byatt has 
written Angels and Insects, and that I read it. Clearly in these novellas she deals 
with contemporary as well as Victorian issues, in response to which she has 
presented an answer to the perennial questions which trouble reflective 
individuals and communities: How should we understand the world, and how 
therefore should we live in it? I do not think that she attempts to deconstruct the 
binary terms of the issues she raises in order to move beyond them (indeed, it 
remains doubtful that this will ever be possible). Nor does she completely 
resolve the conflicts, even though she seems, tentatively, to favour matter over 
spirit. Rather, she illustrates a way of living with uncertainty. At the end of both 
stories the main characters are able to go forward renewed in faith, hope and 
love in a universe which is ineluctably mysterious, and which inspires in them 
something akin to religious awe when they are able to gaze steadily at its terrors 
and delights without turning away to comforting and out-dated illusions. In this 
way Byatt offers her readers - who might certainly include senior secondary 
students - an analogy or model of how a postmodern ethics of disillusionment 
and re-enchantment might be put into practice. Conveniently for my purposes, it 
happens to be one which also draws on evolutionary and religious ideas. 
A.s. Byatt tells the story of 'Morpho Eugenia' in the third person but restricts 
the narrative almost entirely to the point of view of William Adamson, an 
earnest young naturalist recently returned to England from field studies in the 
Amazon basin and left almost destitute by a shipwreck on the journey home. 
William sees fascinating opportunities in science for humans to achieve a better 
understanding of themselves, the world and their place in it. However, the 
Reverend Harald Alabaster, Baronet of Bredely Hall and William's benefactor, 
is not so enchanted. Harald is a collector of the curiosities sent home by 
naturalists, one of whom has been William. Early in the novella he invites 
William to stay and put his chaotic collection into some kind of scientific order, 
promising to reward him later by assisting him to return to his expeditions. The 
sorting proves to be an impossible task, for Harald has had no clear purpose in 
his collecting and so his random oddities seem, paradoxically, both capable of 
and resistant to any arbitrary arrangement. William, who is in the habit of 
drawing analogies, is quick to see this impossible task as like that 'of the prince 
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or princesses in the tales', (44) 54 but, of course, it is also like the task of the 
moral self in the postmodern condition, as students can be made aware. 
On his first evening at Bredely Hall, William had danced with Eugenia, 
Harald's eldest daughter, and had fallen immediately in love with her. He sees 
himself now as the 'prince' who hopes to win the hand of the 'princess' Eugenia 
by fulfilling the task of restoring order which had been dictated by her father, 
who could be seen as representing the traditional Western patriarch. But 
William's futile sorting is also representative of a more important, and equally 
impossible task which Harald sets him. Harald is an aged, kindly, Anglican 
priest who is obsessed with writing a book - an 'impossible book' he calls it - 
'which shall demonstrate - with some kind of intellectual respectability - that it 
is not impossible that the world is the work of a Creator, a Designer.' (33) He 
wants William, as a naturalist and rational thinker, to help him to clarify his 
thoughts as he attempts to rescue religion from the threat of science. 
Byatt makes it clear that William arrived at Bredely Hall early in 1860, 
the year after Charles Darwin published On the Origin of Species by Natural 
Selection. Darwin's even more disturbing work, The Descent of Man, and 
Selection in Relation to Sex, was not published until 1871, but well before then 
many of the damaging implications of the earlier work for the traditional 
Christian view of the creation and nature of man had already been recognised. 
Byatt has both Harald and William refer to Darwin a number of times, and they 
accept his account of the origin of species as scientific truth. They could also 
have read Darwin's Journal of Researches into the Natural History and Geology 
of Various Countries Visited by HMS 'Beagle', the first edition of which 
appeared in 1839, the second in 1845 - when William would have been 20 years 
old (see p. 10) - and the final, revised edition in 1860. Darwin had not been the 
first to propose the idea that the species were the result of a long process of 
evolution; rather his great contribution to science was to present a convincing 
case for the hypothesis that evolution occurred through the mechanism of 
natural selection, a mechanism which proceeds by accidental mutations within 
organisms. He also argued, less convincingly, that evolution has no teleological 
purpose, and therefore requires no direction and interference by a Creator or 
Designer. 55 Harald has grasped the full force of these ideas but wants to 
preserve his belief in a beneficent God by arguing that the intelligence of 
54 All page references, unless otherwise specified, are to the 1993 Vintage edition of Angels and 
Insects. 
55 One of the difficulties with Darwin's theory has been that it did not explain why more and 
more complex organisms should emerge. Complexity theory has recently suggested a solution to 
this problem through the mathematics of self-organising systems. 
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creatures - seen, for example, in the way beavers and bees design such intricate 
lodgings - reflects the intelligence of the Divine First Cause: 
'Now, Darwin, in his passage on the eye, does seem, does he not, to 
allow the possibility of a Creator? He compares the perfecting of the eye to the 
perfecting of a telescope, and talks about the changes over the millennia to a 
thick layer of transparent tissue, with a nerve sensitive to light beneath, and 
goes on to remark that if we compare the forces that form the eye to the human 
intellect "we must suppose that there is a power always intently watching each 
slight accidental alteration in the transparent layers." Mr Darwin invites us to 
suppose that this intently watching power is inconceivable - that the force 
employed is blind necessity, the law of matter. But I say that in matter itself is 
contained a great mystery - how did it come to be at all - how does organisation 
take place - may we not after all come face to face in considering these things 
with the Ancient of Days..?' (35, 36) 
William Paley's famous argument for the existence of God, based on the 
analogy between the way such things as the hand and the eye are fitted to their 
purposes and the way we know that watches and telescopes have been designed, 
had been well known in England since his book, Evidence for the Existence and 
Attributes of the Deity, had been published in 1802. Harald says that it was all 
very well for Paley to have used that argument then, but 
'now we have an almost entirely satisfactory explanation - in the gradual action 
of Natural Selection, of slow change, over unimaginable millennia. And any 
argument that would truly seek to find an intelligent Creator in His works must 
take account of the beauty and force of these explanations, must not sneer at 
them, nor try to refute them for the sake of defending Him who cannot be 
defended by weak and partial reasonings...' (33) 
William responds to this by declaring that he has been led by his observations 
'to believe that we are all the products of the inexorable laws of the behaviour of 
matter.' (34) But then he adds: 
'Whether I really believe this in my heart of hearts I do not know. I do not think 
that such a belief comes naturally to mankind. Indeed I would agree that the 
religious sense - in some form or another - is as much a part of the history of 
the development of mankind as the knowledge of cooking food, or the tabu 
against incest. And in this sense what my reason leads me to believe is 
constantly modified by my instincts.' (34) 
Since its beginnings, science has apparently set reason against common beliefs 
(although, as Churchland shows, scientific methods actually extend 
commonsense thought processes). It is, for example, partly contrary to 
commonsense perceptions to maintain that the earth revolves around the sun. 
And so William, as a scientist, is not going to be much help to Harald who 
wants to argue that we instinctively believe in God because he exists. 56 Harald 
56 Harald later (87, 88) appeals to Tennyson's In Memoriam to support this view. 
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cannot accept the contrary view that we 'make God in our image, because we 
cannot do otherwise,' for, he says, 'It opens the path to a dark pit of horrors'. (34) 
But William's lack of faith comes partly from the fact that he thinks humans 
have made the God of hell-fire and damnation in their worst image. And in this, 
of course, William the scientist is influenced by his emotions. 
Four of the central issues of the novella, and of Victorian thought, have 
emerged here. First, there is the difficulty of distinguishing between appearance 
and reality, for in science we learn that things are not always what they seem. 
Second - and related to the first issue - there is the problem of 
anthropomorphism: has Christianity, like paganism, constructed a god in man's 
own image? Later in the story we see that the problem of anthropomorphising 
the behaviour of insects comes to the fore as well. Third, there are the 
conflicting claims of materialism and religion. And fourth, there is the problem 
of reconciling reason with instinct: Harald is concerned to do this to save his 
faith, but for William the problem, as we shall see, has other ramifications, for 
he is caught between his desire to marry Eugenia and his desire to return to his 
studies in the Amazon, while his reason tells him that he does not need to marry. 
A fifth issue has arisen here as well, a central issue of modern and postmodern 
thought: can the discourses of art or science adequately express what we think 
we know? 
Early in the story Byatt recapitulates William's development up to the 
point of his arrival at Bredely Hall and his first sight of the lovely Eugenia. She 
does this largely by giving an account of his journal writing, a habit which he 
adopted in his youth and which has perhaps made him a more acute observer of 
himself than of other people. (8, 9) The journals could be seen as introducing 
the post-structuralist idea of autobiography's pretence to discursive authority, or 
the allegedly spurious conviction of 'I say what I see', by which realism evades 
all the problems of the translating medium of language. Byatt, as we have seen, 
is aware of these problems, but does not take such a radical view. Thus it is 
partly through these journals that she has William find the means to embark 
upon his journey towards greatness as a naturalist, and to develop a more 
scientific view of life. He has been given a good schooling by his father who 
was a successful butcher and a devout Methodist. However, while he has gained 
much of value to his career as a natural historian from an education in Greek, 
Latin and elementary Mathematics, and from emulating his father's butchering 
skills, he has progressively rejected the fundamentalist and judgmental religion 
which was also part of his heritage, finding himself drawn along a pathway 
towards agnosticism similar to that of Charles Darwin. While he is still in 
England William's journals record that 
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...he had at first walked in a state of religious anxiety, combined with a 
reverence for Wordsworth's poetry, looking for signs of Divine Love and order 
in the meanest flowers that blew, in bubbling brooks and changing cloud 
formations... He wrote for a time in his journal of the wonders of divine 
Design, and his self-examination gave way insensibly to the recording of petals 
observed, leaf forms noted, marshes, hedges and tangled banks. His journal 
was for the first time alive with a purposeful happiness... 
And then he discovered his ruling passion, the social insects... Here 
was the clue to the world. (10) 
He writes a letter to the famous zoologist Henry Walter Bates and is encouraged 
to follow him out to Brazil. Later, during his travels in the Amazon, William 
...scribbled descriptions of everything: the devouring hordes of army ants, the 
cries of frogs and alligators, the murderous designs of his crew.. .the 
unbalancing of his own soul in this green world of vast waste, murderous 
growth, and lazily aimless mere existence. He had peered into these pages by 
the light of burning turtle oil, and had recorded his solitude, his smallness in 
the face of the river and the forest, his determination to survive, whilst 
comparing himself to a dancing midge in a collecting bottle. (12) 
Thus through his journals and letters home William comes 'to be addicted to the 
written form of his own language' (12) and uses it to help construct his 
understanding of life. His records show that (like Marlow in Heart of Darkness) 
he has lost his sense of divine design and providence in the jungle, but has 
gained the habit of comparing himself to the insects. This technique of trying to 
understand human life by drawing analogies with the lives of insects and other 
creatures is a central concern of the novella, and we can begin to see here how 
problematic it is. 
Analogy is not a wholly linguistic device, since we can, for example, 
picture some analogies in paint and hear others in music, but it does require an 
elaborate signifying (or semiotic) system in which perceived similarities 
between things can be expressed. Recognising such similarities depends upon 
making generalisations, and hence analogy works by ignoring differences as 
well as finding likenesses. For this reason it offers a gain in meaning at the risk 
of a loss of knowledge. William, by comparing himself to a midge in the 
passage quoted above, realises his smallness in the face of the Amazon but 
ignores his superior intelligence and especially his unique ability to reflect upon 
his life by means of human language, a highly articulated symbolic system of 
representation which, in its written form, is particularly adapted to reflection. 
But why does William see himself as if caught in a collecting bottle? Is it just 
the vast, dense jungle which makes him feel trapped and observed? But hasn't 
he put himself in this situation? Or does he feel that his whole life is like this? Is 
he still subject to his old fears of an interfering and judgmental God? We are not 
told. Analogy, even if handled more circumspectly than this, is a slippery mode 
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of making meaning. Indeed, later Byatt depicts William as fully aware that 
analogies may be specious - he says as much to the Reverend Harald Alabaster, 
when they are discussing Harald's arguments for the existence of the Christian 
God: 
'We have made our god by a specious analogy, Sir - I do not mean to 
give offence, but I have been thinking about this for some years - we make 
perfect images of ourselves, of our lives and fates, as the painters do of the 
Man of Sorrows, or the scene in the Stable, or as you once said, of a grave-
faced winged Creature speaking to a young girl. And we worship these, as 
primitive peoples worship masks of terror, the alligator, the eagle, the 
anaconda. You may argue anything at all by analogy, Sir, and so consequently 
nothing. This is my view. Feuerbach understood something fundamental about 
our minds. We need loving kindness in reality; and often we do not find it - so 
we invent a divine Parent for the infant crying in the night, and convince 
ourselves all is well. In reality, many cries remain unheard in perpetuity.' 
'That is not a refutation.' 
'In the nature of the case, it cannot be. It leaves the matter exactly 
where it first stood. We desire things to be so, and so we create a tale, or a 
picture, that says, we are so and so. You might as well say, we are like ants, as 
that ants may develop to be like us.' 
'Indeed I might. We are all one life, I believe, shot through with His 
love. I believe. I hope.' 
He took his papers with careful hands in which the papers 
shivered...William watched the hands fold the wavering papers and was filled 
with pity for them, as for sick and dying creatures... 
'It may be an emotional deficiency in myself, Sir, that I cannot feel the 
strength of the argument. I have been much changed by the pattern of my life, 
of my work. My own father was very much in the image of a terrible Judge, 
who preached rivers of blood and destruction, and whose own profession was 
bloody too. And then the vast disorder - the indifference to human scale and 
preoccupations - in the Amazon - I have not been left with a propensity to find 
kindness in the face of things.' (89, 90) 
Perhaps Harald believes and hopes in the love of God partly because he is near 
death, and partly because he has been well provided for in life and is a kindly 
man who in turn wants to provide for William's welfare. On the other hand, 
William disbelieves because he is young and seeks freedom and happiness in 
rejecting his father's judgmental God and in pursuing his scientific passion. He 
has been disinherited by his father and he confronts the frightening face of life 
again in the mindless cruelty of the jungle. Thus for both men analogy becomes 
the tool of desire. 
However, it may also be that Harald's analogies simply do not fit the 
observed facts of a wider experience of the world as well as William's do.57 In 
this case analogy may become the tool of reason and offer a more accurate 
generalisation about the nature of reality. Whatever his motives - and in spite of 
57 Analogy is a variety of metaphor. The post-structuralist theorists Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 
argue that traditional metaphors inhibit exploratory thought. Their particular example is that the 
old arboreal metaphor for human development encodes a propensity to certain kinds of errors. 
They prefer the metaphor of the rhizome with its interconnected bulbous root system which 
throws up random shoots at what appear from the surface to be large distances from each other. 
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his warning to Harald about the dangers of analogy - exploring the notion that 
'we are like ants' is just what Byatt has William do at length throughout her 
story. But with what success? Can analogy - and, by extension, all the linguistic 
artefacts in the novella: naming, word games, metaphors, parables, fables, 
allegories and sermons; and journals, letters and scientific observations recorded 
in natural histories (i.e. fiction and non-fiction) - avoid speciousness and 
advance our knowledge of the truth? Or do we, as William says, 'desire things 
to be so, and so.. .create a tale, or a picture, that says, we are so and so'? Post-
structuralism, of course, answers this last question (hypocritically perhaps) by 
saying, yes, that is all we can ever do. Byatt, however, suggests, that maybe 
things are not quite as problematic as that. 
Observations of insect and human behaviour are set side by side 
throughout the novella. Constantly both William and Harald draw implications 
for humanity from the behaviour of ants, bees and butterflies. 58 And William 
continues to reflect on both the necessity and danger of studying humans by 
drawing analogies between their behaviour and that of the insects. In his 
Natural History, which he is encouraged to write later in the story, he says: 
We might also remark that the attitude of the human student is often coloured 
by what he would wish to believe, by his attitude to the Creation in general, 
that is, by a very general tendency to see every other thing, living and 
inanimate, in anthropomorphic terms. We wonder about the utility to men of 
living things, and one of the uses we make of them is to try to use them as 
magical mirrors to reflect back to us our own faces with a difference. We look 
in their societies for analogies to our own, for structures of command, and a 
language of communication. (109, 110) 
Not only is our knowledge about insects limited, but also the understanding we 
gain from it about humans, on the basis of analogy, is tentative. Nevertheless, 
Byatt - like Churchland (1995) - seems to suggest in this novella that analogy 
makes possible a workable approach to truth by proposing plausible hypotheses 
which can be tested against future observations. At the very least analogies can 
make some of our earlier conceptions of human nature seem less tenable, just as 
Darwin's reflections on the origins of human behaviour, based on observation 
and analogies with animal behaviour, challenged the biblical account. In this 
58 On one occasion an unnatural, perhaps cruel, experiment is performed on the ants. This raises 
the moral difficulty of scientific investigation of animals and human beings by certain kinds of 
experimentation. 
In the Summer, with scientific precision, William checked and elaborated his 
observations of the ant colonies, managing to observe the mating of the 
sanguinea this year, as well as that of the Wood Ants, which provided his coup 
de theatre. He introduced into the glass nest of Wood Ants in the schoolroom 
two or three sanguinea Queens, presumably newly fertilised, which he had 
collected after their nuptial flight. (142) 
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way science advances by telling a kind of story which is drawn from 
experience, shaped by pre-conceived notions, and which proposes a model of 
life to be tested by further experience and by how well it fits in with other 
stories, both scientific and non-scientific. The project of science, therefore, is 
similar to those of art and religion: 59 each seeks to represent experience with 
some kind of accuracy. However, each at best falls short of the whole truth and 
at worst may be dangerously misleading. Certainly William thinks that Darwin 
gives a more truthful account of creation than does the book of 'Genesis'. Harald 
regretfully concedes that he may be right but is unwilling to relinquish the 
notion of Divine Providence. Must we therefore abandon all hope when we 
enter the Jungle of Natural Selection? Is there no beneficent Power in which we 
can place our trust? Byatt, I think, answers this question at the end of the story 
when William realises the full implications of the title of Matty Crompton's, 
fairy tale, 'Things Are Not What They Seem.' There is hope, and, as we shall 
see, it lies precisely in the paradox that neither scientific materialism, nor 
religion, nor art can tell us with absolute certainty how things really are, even as 
we use them to do so. 
William's scientific cast of mind, and experience of environments and societies 
very different from those of England, give him a 'double vision' (7) of the 
almost feudal community of the country manor in which he has been offered 
refuge. He has both an 'inside' (subjective) and an 'outside' (objective) view of 
the workings of Bredely Hall. Furthermore his outsider's view is compounded 
by his middle class background and agnostic opinions. Nevertheless, as we have 
seen, he tries to integrate this unsettling double vision through his habit of 
drawing analogies and reflecting on them in his writings. Thus William 
Adamson is portrayed as the modern observer of a society which, from the 
reader's perspective in the late 20th century, could be seen as an outpost of the 
medieval world. In contrast to the inhabitants of this society, William represents 
a new kind of man - Scientific Man - and hence his name, Adamson: son of 
Adam, seems significant. 
Indeed his name takes on a complex irony since he has just returned 
from the Amazon, which, from the point of view of England, seems analogous 
to the Garden of Eden with its endless tropical summer, profligate fruitfulness 
and naked inhabitants. Yet William knows the Amazon is in other respects a 
land of rampant violence, decay and death, and thus he can see it from both 
59 Art and religion, however, may have more in common with each other than they do with 
science, since scientists have developed communal self-correcting procedures which allow them 
to test the truth claims of their hypotheses experimentally. 
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points of view. To William, it is returning to England which more strongly 
represents Paradise Regained: 
Since his ten years in the Amazon, and even more since his delirious days 
afloat in a lifeboat in the Atlantic, William had come to see clean, soft English 
beds as the heart of some earthly Bower of Bliss. (8) 
While he was isolated in the jungles and writing his letters and journals, 
William kept himself in tune with his own language by reading and rereading, 
among other things, Milton's Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained (a work 
which Byatt, 1993: 3, says was 'the last believed - or believed without a large 
dose of riddling and qualifying fictionalising scepticism - Christian narrative in 
the language'). Not surprisingly, therefore, it is in England, and more 
particularly in the beautifully tended garden which is Bredely Hall, that William 
Adamson falls in love with and ultimately marries his supposed Eve, Eugenia 
Alabaster. 
Early in the novella, while they are walking beside a stream and his love 
is as yet unspoken, William has the following conversation with Eugenia: 
'How beautiful all this is,' she said. 'How lucky I always feel to live 
just here, of all spots on earth. To see the same flowers come out every spring 
in the meadows, and the same stream always running. I suppose it must seem a 
very bounded existence to you, with your experience of the world. But my 
roots go deep...' 
'When I was in the Amazons,' he answered simply and truthfully, 'I 
was haunted by an image of an English meadow in spring - just as it is today, 
with the flowers, and the new grass, and the early blossom, and the little breeze 
lifting everything, and the earth smelling fresh after the rain. It seemed to me 
that such scenes were truly Paradise - that there was not anything on earth 
more beautiful than an English bank in flower, than an English mixed hedge, 
with roses and hawthorn, honeysuckle and bryony... Out there, no woman may 
touch a snake. They run to ask you to kill one for them. I have killed many 
snakes for frightened women. I have been fetched considerable distances to do 
so. The connection of the woman and the snake in the garden is made even out 
there, as though it is indeed part of some universal pattern of symbols, even 
where Genesis has never been heard of - I talk too much, I bore you, I am 
afraid.' 
'Oh no. I am quite fascinated. I am glad to hear that our spring world 
in some sense remains your ideal. I want you to be happy here, Mr Adamson.' 
(29 - 31) 
It is one of the greatest ironies of the story that William Adamson, in spite of his 
loss of sexual innocence with the women of Brazil, turns out to be the morally 
innocent but gullible Adam in the English Garden of Eden; and that Eugenia, to 
whose blandishments he readily succumbs - though not without some 
misgivings - has already fallen to the temptations of its serpent, her half-brother 
Edgar, whom William finally has the power to scotch, but chooses not to. The 
climax of the novella occurs when William is mysteriously summoned back to 
the house from a ride and discovers Eugenia and Edgar committing incest. His 
165 
saviour, from what had already become a stultifying marriage and which is now 
a complete sham, is another outsider in the household, Matilda (Matty) 
Crompton. She has been engineering an escape for William and herself to the 
verdant but cruel realities of the Amazon, thus becoming both his 'good Fairy' 
(156) and his true Eve. 
Hence William's analogising double vision, which controls the whole 
novella through the narrative point of view adopted by Byatt, and of which his 
Garden of Eden analogy is one example, is fully engaged, emotionally as well 
as intellectually, in the world of Bredely Hall, as it had also been in Brazil. He 
is both observer and participant - a position which Einstein's theory of relativity 
and quantum mechanics have now shown frustrates scientists' attempts to 
achieve completely objective knowledge - as Byatt makes clear in the following 
passages: 
He guided [Eugenia] around the floor, and felt, to his amazement, 
unmistakable stirrings and quickenings of bodily excitement in himself. He 
shifted himself inside Lionel's dress suit, and reflected - he was after all a 
scientist and an observer - that these dances were designed to arouse his desire 
in exactly this way, however demure the gloves, however sweetly innocent the 
daily life of the young woman in his arms. He remembered the palm-wine 
dance, a swaying circle which at a change in rhythm broke up into hugging 
couples who then set upon and danced round the one partnerless scapegoat 
dancer. He remembered being grabbed and nuzzled and rubbed and cuddled 
with great vigour by women with brown breasts glistening with sweat and oil, 
and with shameless fingers. 
Nothing he did now seemed to happen without this double vision of 
things seen and done otherwise, in another world. (6, 7) 
Understanding daily life at Bredely Hall was not easy. William found himself 
at once detached anthropologist and fairytale prince trapped by invisible gates 
and silken bonds in an enchanted castle. (21) 
William is presented as being aware of the problem yet at the same time 
helpless to extricate himself from the webs in which his sexual and social 
instincts are enmeshing him. Unless his capacity for reason triumphs over his 
emotions he is trapped: 
He bowed politely to her, and thought at once of his drunken, clear-eyed 
journal entry, ' "I shall die if I cannot have her" ', and of a ship in flight, with 
the green water churning away from the bows, and the spray racing. He was 
not afraid of danger, but he was shrewd, and took no relish in the thought of 
shrivelling in a fruitless fire. (20) 
The image of the ship in flight is one of the many dramatic ironies in this 
novella since it nicely foreshadows William's situation and mood in the final 
scene when he and Matty flee across the Atlantic. He does escape 'shrivelling in 
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a fruitless fire'60 but not because he has succeeded by himself in maintaining his 
scientific, rational objectivity. Byatt's story would not be such a human and 
ethically interesting one if he had been so successful, for then the moral of that 
different story would have been humanly impossible to follow. As it is, the 
chief moral of the novella is encapsulated in Matty Crompton's fairy-tale-
within-the-tale, which I will examine in detail later. 
William Adamson's subjective/objective vision is not quite capable of 
saving him from his instincts, but at least his scientific detachment makes his 
salvation both necessary and possible. William has a passion for science and the 
clear-minded habit of revising his judgments following more accurate scientific 
observations. In the Natural History which Matty encouraged William to write, 
he says: 
I retorted at the time that Reaumur claimed to have observed ants at 
play like ancient Greeks, indulging in wrestling bouts without harm, on sunny 
days. I have since, I must confess, several times observed what I believed to be 
this playful phenomenon, only to conclude on closer inspection, that what I 
was watching was not play, but war in earnest, fought, as ant wars usually are, 
for limited objectives and without wholesale berserker bloodlust. (115) 
This modest approach, which tests hypotheses against further observations, 
allows William to produce a successful natural history for young readers, thus 
providing some of the independent finance needed for his escape. It also helps 
him to maintain sufficient detachment not to do something desperate when he 
discovers how he has been cheated by Eugenia and Edgar. 
However, as we see in William's story, it is difficult - perhaps impossible 
- to gain sufficient knowledge from science to answer all our questions about 
the conditions of human life and how we should respond to them. Advances in 
scientific knowledge are hard-won and slow, and they require many researchers 
to work together in a communal inquiry. Also that inquiry should be well 
prepared to meet the problem of verifying genuine advances in what is, as 
Thomas Kuhn (1962) has argued, a form of knowledge which is partly socially 
constructed. Hence, just as Harald desperately needs William to help him write 
his 'impossible book' rescuing religion from science, so too does William need 
Matty to help him write his book of speculations on human nature based upon 
analogies drawn from their observations of ants. And Matty needs William to 
inspire her to write her fairy tale of renewed hope in the nature of things. The 
individual can achieve the good life, it seems, only by balancing instinct and 
reason with the help of a supportive and inquiring community. Thus Byatt 
60 On p. 87 Byatt has Harald quote a passage from Tennyson's In Memoriam which contains a 
similar phrase concerning the fate of a moth. Tennyson and Harald, unlike William, hoped that 
Divine Providence was at work even in such a fate. 
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implies that we need to acquire William's 'double vision', by adding to our 
subjective view of life the degree of objectivity gained through wider personal 
and vicarious experience - through travel, conversation and reading, and 
through the essentially communal disciplines of science and art, with their 
public discourses which open them up to reflection, critique and revision. There 
is even, as we shall see later, a place in this process for the perspectives of a 
form of religion which is also open to review. 
So far I have been discussing Byatt's presentation of one of the key issues of 
my study: the problematic but still productive ways in which language refers to 
natural and social realities through the construction of analogies or models, and 
how these constructions can move from subjective towards more objective 
forms of knowledge - and towards closer approximations to (ultimately 
unattainable?) universal truths - as we begin to understand how other people 
construct and revise their models in response to their experiences. Now I turn to 
Byatt's treatment of the nature of the self which creates these constructions, 
particularly in the realm of social and moral knowledge. This is another of my 
central concerns, and one which could form a vital part of critical discussions of 
Byatt's novel in the classroom, since without a self which is capable of some 
degree of agency, and which can reflect on the conditions of its life in languages 
that refer reasonably accurately to those conditions, there can be no useful 
discussion of ethical issues. 
Byatt portrays William as writing a book of natural history in which he 
explores the nature of, and relationships between, instinct and intelligence, 
design and chance, and the individual and society. (109) He pursues these 
musings through observing the behaviour of ants and hypothesising tentative 
explanations for their behaviour by drawing analogies with human societies. 
Here William shows that he is aware that these analogies are strongly 
influenced by current social conditions: 
In the past both ants and bees have been thought to have kings, generals and 
armies. Now we know better, 61 and describe the female worker-ants as slaves, 
nurses, nuns or factory operatives, as we choose. Those of us who conclude 
that the insects have no language, no capacity to think, no 'intelligence', but 
only 'instinct' tend to describe their actions as those of automata, which we 
picture as little mechanical inventions whirring about like clockwork set in 
motion. (110) 
61 Byatt's use of the word 'better' here as part of William's scientific/philosophical discourse is 
perhaps indicative of his patriarchal assumptions and ironic in the light of his later rescue by 
Matty, a female 'slave' in the household, from a form of slavery which his new role as a literal 
patriarch has imposed on him. 
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Yet William tries to find plausible answers to his questions, and, although he 
feels that he has argued around and around in his book, he clearly favours the 
Darwinian view that the chance processes of mutation and natural selection 
have endowed insects and other creatures with inherited aptitudes which 
amount to intelligence - in other words, problem solving abilities which modify 
behaviours that are otherwise instinctive or unconscious. William also wonders 
whether this intelligence, in the case of the social insects, resides more in the 
individual or the group. He observes that the ants' nest seems to display a fine 
ability to adapt its workings to changing circumstances: 
The intelligence that directs the activities of the founding Queen, or those of 
the mature worker, is the intelligence of the City itself, of the conglomerate 
which cares for the wellbeing of the whole, and continues its life, in time and 
space, so that the community is infinite and eternal, even if both Queens and 
workers are mortal. (112) 
Elsewhere William describes this controlling intelligence as 'the Spirit of the 
Nest'. (40) However, he notes that there are some ants who are more active and 
adventurous than others and he wants to see them as individuals motivated by 
personal desires. Yet he has observed that their whole natures can be changed 
by altering their circumstances: 
Shake up a dozen ants, in a test tube, and they will fall on each other and fight 
furiously. Separate a worker from the community, and she will turn in aimless 
circles, or crouch morosely in a coma and wait to die... (113) 
Applying these reflections to human life, William concludes: 
The terrible idea - terrible to some, terrible, perhaps, to all, at some time or in 
some form - that we are biologically predestined like other creatures, that we 
differ from them only in inventiveness and the capacity for reflection on our 
fate - treads softly behind the arrogant judgement that makes of the ant a 
twitching automaton. (113) 
William wants to see both ants and humans as biologically and socially 
constructed, and at the same time as intelligent individuals who are able to 
exercise some degree of choice. He also rejects the notion that the social instinct 
in humans tends to be elaborated into more and more repressive political 
systems. He cites the benevolent social experiments of Robert Owen, in which 
individuals were to some extent reconstructed or 'improved' by placing them in 
a good environment, giving them some individual responsibility and offering 
them an individual education. Byatt has the famous natural historian, Alfred 
Wallace, comment thus on these experiments in a letter to William: 
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'Heredity, through which it is now known that ancestral characteristics are 
continually reappearing, gives that infinite diversity of character which is the 
very salt of social life; by environment, including education, we can so modify 
and improve the character as to bring it into harmony with the possessor's 
actual surroundings, and thus fit him for performing some useful and enjoyable 
function in the great social organisation.' (115) 
All these arguments are, of course, familiar to modern readers - and could 
certainly be introduced to students - in terms such as 'nature versus nurture', and 
'free-will versus determinism'. Usually they are resolved by acknowledging that 
both concepts in each pair apply. However, William remains uncertain that he 
has any freedom of choice at all. Indeed, as we shall see, he feels trapped by his 
social circumstances and driven by his instincts, until late in the novella when 
he finally breaks free to resume his scientific studies in the Amazon. 
Thus, in constructing her characters and plot, Byatt clearly comes down 
in favour of a degree of individual human agency - influenced, of course, by 
texts and communication as much as by other experiences and proclivities. And 
with good reason since, as I have indicated, the recent work of evolutionary 
epistemologists, sociobiologists and neuro-scientists, building on Darwin's far-
reaching application of the theory of natural selection, supports the notions that 
language does refer to the world through the construction and modification of 
models or prototypes in response to experience, and that the biologically and 
discursively constructed self does have the capacity to exercise a degree of 
agency. Natural selection has produced in ants and humans an instinctive 
capacity to respond to many different circumstances, perhaps through a variety 
of parallel processes and sub-routines within the overall program of the brain. 
These are sufficiently complex to give even ants with their tiny brains the 
ability to respond in a way which we recognise as intelligent, even creative. 
This capacity for problem-solving works at all levels in their society, from the 
individual to the group, since ants communicate, according to the biologist E.O. 
Wilson's (1976) research, by an elaborate chemical code. 
Part of their 'hard-wiring', through natural selection, has programmed 
ants and other social animals to behave in an altruistic manner, since such 
behaviour is selected by its survival value to the genes of the individuals within 
the group. The mechanism of this selection has been plausibly hypothesised by 
sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists. Thus we can speak accurately 
of ants behaving in a moral (i.e. altruistic) way and even of solving problems by 
using creative intelligence (the neural processing mechanism of which has been 
hypothesised by Churchland, 1995). However, it would be going too far to say 
that individuals or groups of ants exercise ethical judgement, that is if morality 
is defined as the codes of conduct specific to a particular social group, and 
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ethics as the practice of reasoning in more general (i.e. philosophical) terms 
about the foundation, construction and application of moral principles and 
prototypes. It is unlikely that creatures which do not possess such highly 
developed languages as humans do would have the ability to reflect consciously 
on their moral decisions. In all probability they respond to challenges to 
themselves and their society by processing them in individual neural networks 
which operate in the same unconscious ways which characterise many of the 
processes of the human brain. Some of the prototypical behaviour patterns 
which lower creatures apply to these problems would have been genetically 
determined, others would have been learned as the creature was socialised 
within the group, and still others would be formed as the individual 
unconsciously processed new data from its experience and communicated this 
learning to the group by demonstrating a modified behaviour pattern. Humans, 
of course, have the capacity, conferred by the concepts and relationships 
enshrined in their highly complex languages, to signify to themselves and to 
each other their understanding of their natural and social worlds and of passing 
on this knowledge to their descendants, who must in turn modify it in response 
to new circumstances. Thus we have the ability to be self-conscious, to reflect 
on our feelings, thoughts and actions, to project possible ways of acting in the 
future and to choose between them. We are able, therefore, to exercise varying 
degrees of free will, ethical judgement and agency. 
Matty Crompton, as we shall see, exercises a greater degree of agency 
than does William. When they are discussing William's book she asks him if 
there will one day be people who will be happy to live and die for the group 
without expecting a reward in an after-life. William says that such people 
already exist, although he also supposes that there are many important facts of 
which he is ignorant in his picture of the world. (117) Indeed, it is true that 
many people have felt the need to be motivated by a belief in something greater 
than themselves to which their mortal lives can contribute. Some, like Zohar 
and Marshall, have found in the evolutionary process, working in part through 
the social animals, this sense of a transcendent meaning to their individual 
existences. As self-conscious beings (or becomings) they therefore choose on 
rational grounds to add to their limited altruistic instincts a further altruistic 
purpose, partly by cooperating with, and partly by working against the 
processes which seem to govern the universe, and so contribute to the evolution 
of more complex states of consciousness and the creation of more benevolent 
societies. For on the one hand, although nature is not necessarily teleological, it 
does seem to be finely tuned to bring about the emergence of more and more 
complex life forms, as Wilson (1994) and Kauffman (1995) have claimed. On 
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the other hand, the process of evolution is not in itself benevolent - far from it, 
in fact - even though it has produced social animals which possess some 
altruistic motives. Nevertheless, reflective people can choose to make life better 
for their fellows, even the weak and lowly, and so reshape the conditions of life 
which evolution and social history have produced. William and even more so 
Matty certainly have a greater degree of awareness of themselves and their 
natural and social circumstances than do any of the Alabasters, including 
Harald. They are enabled by this awareness to break out of the medieval, 
perhaps more instinctive, patterns of life at Bredely Hall, and to embark on a 
very modern - indeed, as I shall show, postmodern - journey of discovery, a 
journey which is scientific, literary, religious and ethical. 
Eugenia Alabaster provides an interesting case of someone who possesses a 
kind of double vision together with a tragically limited degree of agency. If 
these capacities are not exactly the same as William's, at least they almost get 
her what both conventional morality and her particular instincts dictate: a 
socially acceptable marriage and an incestuous relationship. Also Edgar, her 
half brother by Harald Alabaster's first wife, certainly knows something which 
William does not, but he is presented as driven by instincts which he satisfies 
through animal cunning. Eugenia and Edgar live together with their father and 
her mother; with Edgar's full brother, Lionel, and Eugenia's numerous younger 
full siblings; and with a nanny, tutors (one of whom is Matty) and myriads of 
servants in the household of Bredely Hall, which is likened in many and various 
ways to a colony of insects. For example Eugenia is compared by William, and 
by her 'fortuitous' name, to a female specimen of a butterfly known 
scientifically as Morpho Eugenia. William promises at Eugenia's request to 
procure a cloud of butterflies for her, in which, he says, 
'You would be Morpho Eugenia. It means beautiful, you know. Shapely.' 
'Ah,' said Eugenia. 'The opposite of amorphous.' 
'Exactly. The primeval forest out there - the endless sameness of the 
greenery - the clouds of midges and mosquitoes - the struggling mass of 
creepers and undergrowth - often seemed to me the epitome of the amorphous. 
And then something perfect and beautifully formed would come into view and 
take the breath away. Morpho Eugenia did that, Miss Alabaster.' (21) 
But William has not yet been reminded by Matty that things are not what they 
seem, and he has forgotten that he himself has just been telling Harald about the 
butterflies which feed on poisonous plants and 'seem to know that they may 
flaunt themselves with impunity, that predators will not snap them up'. (20) 
However, Eugenia does know that she is not the virginal creature William 
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thinks she is and yet she demurely offers herself to him. 62 William cannot 
believe his good fortune when he finally discovers that, in spite of his lower 
social status and lack of means, she will be his wife. This feeling is only 
intensified on their wedding night: 
'Oh,' he said, in the warmth and the wet, 'you are honey, you are so 
sweet, my dearest.' He heard a strange chuckle, something like laughing and 
weeping together, in her throat. He thought of the mysteries of knowledge, of 
what men and women, no less than the creatures, could do if they followed 
their instinct, unafraid. She was darting her hot face, the cold white Eugenia, 
into his neck, and kissing him repeatedly where his vein pulsed. Her fingers 
were wound in his hair, her legs were wound in his, and this was Eugenia, of 
whom he had said he would die, if he could not have her. (68) 
Naturally, in the heat of the moment, William's considerable ability to reflect on 
what is happening to him - his double vision - does not quite extend to 
wondering about that strange, ambiguous chuckle, or to asking if Eugenia's 
sexual knowledge perhaps owes more to experience than to instinct. 
Immediately following this scene Byatt, as narrator, stands back a little 
from William's point of view and makes this comment on his situation, a 
comment which not only suggests that the kind of story she is telling is both 
fairytale and pseudo-realist novel but that William's expectations, like those of 
many people, have been coloured by fictional conventions of genre: 
And so he lived happily ever after? Between the end of the fairy story with its 
bridal triumph, between the end of the novel, with its hard-won moral vision, 
and the brief glimpse of death and due succession, lies a placid and peaceful 
pseudo-eternity of harmony, of increasing affection and budding and crowing 
babes, of ripe orchards and heavy-headed cornfields, gathered on hot nights. 
William, like most human beings, expected this in some quiet corner of his 
emotions, and, although he would not have said so, if asked, he would have 
been properly cautious about the unknown future. (69) 
Clearly this is not the end of William's story - indeed it is less than half way 
through and the 'happily ever after' ending must come much later. Any illusions 
William may have had about his marriage are gradually dispelled. First, he 
discovers that Eugenia's bedroom door is open to him only during the brief time 
it takes her to get pregnant. Next, the children she bears all have the 
unmistakable Alabaster stamp and look nothing like him. Then he realises that 
he is trapped by his responsibility for his new family and must postpone 
indefinitely his return to the Amazon. He also has to continue to face the disdain 
which Edgar has barely concealed from him ever since he came to the house. 
62 Later Eugenia does show some hesitation in offering herself to William, due apparently to her 
feeling that no-one would have her after her tragic rejection by her fiancée who had committed 
suicide. (47) However, in the light of subsequent events (54, 55) it is possible to see her as 
knowingly playing upon William's sympathies. 
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William, not having 'entirely thrown off his father's censorious religion', (61) 
does not approve of Edgar either, since he gambles, drinks, rides his horses 
cruelly, and womanises. Of course, given his own sexual liaisons in Brazil, 
William is aware that he is being somewhat hypocritical in judging Edgar's 
conduct in this last matter. Still, Edgar is selfish and brutal, and provides a stark 
contrast to William's thoughtfulness and kindliness. Moreover, William has 
proved through his expeditions in the jungle and his survival at sea that he has 
at least as much courage and endurance as Edgar. However, William is enabled 
to cope with all these disappointments by his innocent conspiracy with Matty, 
who has encouraged him to take up the study of the local natural history and to 
write his book about it. As he does this though, he often reflects on the tentative 
analogy between his role in Bredely Hall and that of a male ant in the Wood 
Ants' nest: 
'Analogy is a slippery tool, said William. Men are not ants.' 
Nevertheless, in the hot days just after Midsummer, when they increased their 
vigilance in order to observe, if possible, the nuptial flight of the Queens and 
their suitors, he was hard put to it not to see his own life in terms of a 
diminishing analogy with the tiny creatures. He had worked so hard, watching, 
counting, dissecting, tracking, that his dreams were pricking with twitching 
antennae, advancing armies, gnashing mandibles and dark, inscrutable complex 
eyes. His vision of his own biological processes - his frenzied, delicious 
mating, so abruptly terminated, his consumption of the regular meals prepared 
by the darkly quiet forces behind the baize doors, the very regularity of his 
watching, dictated by the regularity of the rhythms of the nest, brought him 
insensibly to see himself as a kind of complex sum of his nerve-cells and 
instinctive desires, his automatic social responses of deference or required 
kindness or paternal affection. One ant in an anthill was neither here nor there, 
was dispensable, was nothing. (100) 
Finally the last shred of illusion about his marriage is torn away when 
William sees Eugenia and Edgar in the moment after their sexual intercourse. 
At the centre of this feudal household, which Byatt has made to appear more 
and more like an ants' or bees' nest, is a long-standing practice of incest. After 
the initial shock of revulsion, William feels 'humiliated, and simultaneously... 
hugely empowered'. (149) Edgar especially is now under his control but 
ultimately all William really wants is to be free from this world in which his life 
had become merely that of a drone. Clearly, even Eugenia's children were not 
his, though she says she had been careful not to know who the father was. 
Eugenia's response to being discovered is interesting. She certainly 
displays a sense of guilt. She admits to having complied with Edgar since she 
was very little when it began, she says, as a game. But she knew it had to be 
kept secret 'like other things you must not do, and do. Like touching yourself in 
the dark'. (150) She had been engaged before to a Captain Hunt but he had 
become suspicious that all was not well and it had preyed on his mind. She tried 
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to stop relations with Edgar and to persuade her fiancée that he had been 
mistaken. She realised then how terrible her behaviour seemed to others, but, 
she says, 
' - we could not stop. I do not think - he -' she choked on Edgar's name, 
'meant to stop - he - he is - strong and of course Captain Hunt - someone led 
him to see - he saw - not much- but enough. And he wrote a terrible letter - to - 
to both of us - and said - oh -' she began to weep rapidly suddenly, 'he could 
not live with the knowledge even if we could. That is what he said. And then 
he shot himself. In his desk there was a note, to me, saying I would know why 
he had died, and that he hoped I would be able to be happy.' 
William watched her weep. 
'But even after that - you went on.' 
'Who else could I turn to?' 
She went on weeping. William looked back over his life. He said, 'You 
turned to me. Or made use of me anyway.' (151) 
Eugenia is to some extent just another victim of Edgar's sexual depradations, 
and yet she has gone on knowingly, making use of William in the process. Her 
duplicity (not at all the same thing as William's double vision) has been 
revealed, and hence William, set free from her sexual spell, now also feels free 
to leave her forever and pursue his scientific career. He visits Eugenia one last 
time before he goes, conducting himself with impeccable reasonableness 63 and 
magnanimity. She asks him if he will tell on her, and he replies: 
'Who can I tell, Eugenia, whom I should not destroy in the telling? 
You must live with yourself, that is all I can say, you must live with yourself as 
you can.' (159) 
By this point in the novella Byatt has let Harald Alabaster slip from view. 
Indeed, we are never told how William makes his excuses to his elderly 
benefactor for abandoning wife and children and returning to the Amazon, this 
time with Matty as a companion. Perhaps Byatt did not see how such a scene 
might be plausibly managed. However, here we see that she has William 
wishing to spare Harald's feelings from the pain of a potentially devastating 
disillusionment about the relationship between his son and daughter. Thus 
William, like Marlow in Heart of Darkness, prevaricates - at least by his silence 
- for the sake of one whom he judges will be better off not knowing the whole 
truth in this instance. But, unlike Marlow, there is no additional pretence that 
the survival of civilisation depends upon keeping a whole class of people in the 
63 Reasonableness could perhaps be considered one of the humane virtues. It is another example 
of what Bernard Williams (1985: 129) calls 'thick concepts'. In what follows I demonstrate from 
William Adamson's behaviour what I mean by reasonableness and hence how it might be 
considered to differ from that sort of rationality which is only concerned with logic. Briefly, the 
reasonable person is both guided by his own judgements based on a wide variety of relevant 
considerations, including emotional ones, and is open to being reasoned with by others. 
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dark - or perhaps I should say, with the final scene of Heart of Darkness in 
mind, bathed in a golden but ominously fading glow of illusion. 
Continuing their final interview, Eugenia replies to William's reproach: 
'I know it was bad, said Eugenia. 'I know it was bad, but you must 
understand it didn't feel bad - it grew little by little, out of perfectly innocent, 
natural, playful things - which no one thought wrong - I have never been able 
to speak to any other living soul of it, you must forgive me for speaking to you 
- I can see I have made you angry, though I tried to make you love me - if I 
could have spoken to anyone, I might have been brought to see how wrong it 
was. But - he thought it wasn't - he said - people like making rules and others 
like breaking them - he made me believe it was all perfectly natural and so it 
was, it was natural, nothing in us rose up and said - it was - unnatural.' 
'Breeders know,' said William curtly, 'that even first-cousin marriages 
produce inherited defects - increase the likelihood -' 
Eugenia cast down her lashes. 'That is a cruel thing to say.' (159) 
William has of course only spoken rationally, enunciating a fact which animal 
breeders have learnt from experience. However, Eugenia does not think at this 
level. She knows, as Edgar does, that conventional morality condemns incest, 
but she feels more deeply that it was 'natural'. This raises the question of what is 
'natural' in human behaviour. Is incest natural? Are taboos natural? Is morality 
natural? Are laws natural? Certainly the activity of breeders is not, since they 
practise artificial selection, a technique which had been known for a very long 
time before Darwin proposed that evolution works by natural selection. 
Biologists have shown that incest tends to be avoided in ape societies, and 
anthropologists have found that all human groups have some form of incest 
taboo, although it was not so clear why until sociobiologists proposed a 
plausible explanation. (Gribbin 1993: 267-269) It is reasonable to suppose that 
the taboo is based at least partly on an instinct which has been naturally selected 
for its value to the survival of the species. Yet incest does occur among both 
apes and humans since the characteristics of any species are distributed across a 
certain range. If that were not so, the process of natural selection of those 
particular characteristics which enhance survival could not occur. Instinct, 
therefore, is only sometimes in harmony with what intelligence dictates in this 
matter, and not enough to prevent some inbreeding. William has known this all 
along and also that noble families like the Alabasters 'are supported by 
inbreeding of stock'. (14) He had made this observation in his journal when he 
first came to Bredely Hall and was considering his prospects of marrying 
Eugenia. He also wrote: 
- I am as good a man, take me for all in all, as E. A. [Edgar Alabaster] and 
have, I dare swear it, used my intelligence and my bodily courage to greater 
purpose. But how would that consideration weigh with any such family, 
constructed exactly to reject any such intr... [sic] 
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The only rational course is to forget the whole matter, suppress these 
inopportune feelings, make an end. (14) 
What a pity William had not followed his intellect rather than his instinct from 
the beginning - but then he would not have been a normal human being, and he 
would not have met Matty or learned her useful moral lesson. Neither, of 
course, would we have had the full benefit of Byatt's complex ethical fiction. 
Conventional morality enshrines an amalgam of instinctive taboos and 
past ethical reasoning, but it is not an adequate guide to every new situation. 
Reason must be applied over and over again, and by reason I mean not just cold 
logic but also consideration of feelings and consequences. This is how ethics 
differs from morality. William illustrates this difference in his final dealings 
with Eugenia, for he has had time to consider the situation and he chooses not to 
condemn either Eugenia or Edgar merely on the basis of conventional morality. 
His final judgement of their incestuous behaviour is a rational one based only 
on the science of good breeding (i.e. eugenics - in this respect too Eugenia's 
name belies what she seemed) and in this way it exemplifies Robert Wright's 
view that an understanding of the biological determinations of so much human 
behaviour should teach us to be more tolerant. William had felt a momentary 
impulse to kill Edgar, but then it seems to him that Edgar has become 'in some 
ways less simply hateful, in this hellish plight. He was more driven, less 
complacently, ordinarily brutal and overbearing than he had seemed'. (154) To 
judge Edgar, as he is simplistically portrayed in the novella, by conventional 
morality might have seemed to William like holding a horse morally 
responsible for its actions. Furthermore, William tells Matty, "Retribution is not 
my business. I will - I will ask Edgar for money, for Amy - I do not care how 
that may appear, I will ensure that Amy has an income for life - and then I will 
go". (155) Amy is a servant girl who had assisted William and Many in their 
study of the ants, and whom Edgar had impregnated. William had hesitated to 
help her previously when he confronted Edgar over the matter. Edgar had 
warned him that others would misconstrue William's concern for her, but 
William no longer cares what the society of Bredely Hall thinks of him and sees 
only the little bit of good he might do to improve the lot of one who is weak and 
of low social status. 
In his last moments with Eugenia, William observes her 
...clasping her own hands nervously in her lap. She had the curtains half-drawn 
against the sunlight and to hide the shadows of her tearstains. She was lovely, 
and complacent, and amoral, and he sensed that she was now waiting for him 
to go, so she could resume her self-nurture and self-communion. At some level, 
what had happened was inconvenient to Eugenia, and he was about to remove 
the inconvenience, himself. He said, 'Morpho Eugenia. You are very lovely -' 
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'It has not done me good,' said Eugenia, 'to look pretty, to be admired. 
I would like to be different.' 
But William could not take that seriously, as he watched her compose 
her mouth, and open wide her eyes, and look hopefully up at him. 
'Goodbye, Eugenia. I shall not come back.' 
'You never know, she replied vaguely, her attention already sliding 
away from him, with a pretty little sigh of relief. (159) 
William is now better informed and no longer so driven by emotion. Through 
experience he has become a much better judge of other people than he was 
when he first came to Bredely Hall, and he judges Eugenia to be amoral. This is 
perhaps a generous interpretation of her behaviour, but on the other hand she is 
a victim in a patriarchal society. At the same time she has been portrayed 
throughout the novella as a butterfly, and an ant queen - creatures of instinct, of 
a certain intelligence, and of a conventional altruism, but not sufficiently 
rational to make ethical judgements. 
That degree of rationality needs the kind of self-consciousness and 
objectivity afforded only by wide experience and a highly developed language. 
Even then it will help to have a facility with the particularly reflective form of 
language which is writing, especially in the form of literature and moral 
philosophy. At this level of human development the analogy between humans 
and animals breaks down. But, for whatever reasons, it is certain that some 
humans, like the hedonistic Edgar, do not possess the capacity, or perhaps the 
desire, for this kind of ethical development. Even in a democratic society we 
might agree that an intrusive attempt should be made to adequately socialise 
such people - perhaps because we decide on rational grounds that it is in their 
best interests as well as in the interests of the present and future flourishing of 
our species of social animal. If so, we might be justified in the nurture, training 
and discipline of whatever social instincts they possess, by parents, teachers and 
other agencies. And ultimately we might be justified in restraining those who 
still do not comply with our codes of conduct. But how far should we go in this 
process of intervention in the lives of others without being guilty of gross 
indoctrination or worse - in other words, without being guilty of Fascism? This 
path has already been trodden to its most terrifying limits by the Nazis who 
have demonstrated that the Enlightenment ideal of rationalism has, like 
medieval Christianity, its darker side. 
It is certain too that other people who do have the intellectual capacity 
and the desire for ethical reflection have not been adequately educated to be 
able to make autonomous moral judgements. Eugenia, for example, shows signs 
of having once been educable, and even William, in spite of his double vision 
and his residue of Christian compassion, still had some learning to do. In 
particular Byatt shows that, through a wealth of experiences, William has 
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enlarged his moral imagination and his capacity to govern instinct by 
understanding - and she has done this in her novella for the amusement and 
ethical instruction of her readers. 
If William Adamson represents the new scientific man - a modern creation - 
Matty represents a new type of woman, one who was certainly present in the 
nineteenth century (in such shining examples as George Eliot) and indeed in 
every age, but who comes into her own in the late twentieth century with the 
many successes of feminism. She is, perhaps, a postmodern phenomenon. 
Regrettably, what Matty exemplifies is still for many Western women an 
unachievable ideal, a creation of fairytale, although many more women are now 
in a position to emulate her. 
Matty has had an excellent education, as William is obliged to 
acknowledge: 
'I am amazed at your accomplishments. Latin, Greek, draughtsmanship 
of a high quality, a thorough knowledge of English Literature.' 
'I was educated with my betters, in the schoolroom of a Bishop. My 
father was the tutor and the Bishop's lady was kindly-intentioned.' (118) 
Furthermore she has made intelligent use of her opportunities and has gone on 
educating herself through voracious reading. And although she can quote 
extensively from the poets, hers is not simply rote learning: she understands, for 
example, that more complex ethical issues lie beneath the surface of 
conventional moral sentiments, as this contribution by Matty to a discussion of 
slavery among ants and humans shows: 
'But if we call the beehive Pandemonium, what name shall we give to the home 
of the Blood-red slave-makers?' 
'It is a horrible trade,' said Miss Mead, with unexpected vehemence. 'I 
have never wept so much over a book as I wept over Uncle Tom's Cabin. I pray 
nightly for the cause of President Lincoln.' 
The first shots had been fired in the war between the states. Opinions 
were divided in Bredely about the issue - much of the family money came from 
the Lancashire cotton trade - which was therefore not on the whole discussed... 
'We might call [the Blood-red Ants' nest] Athens with perfect justice, 
said Miss Crompton, 'since the Greek civilisation we so much admire was 
founded on slavery, and I daresay could not have shone so brightly without it...' 
(80, 81) 
Byatt portrays Matty as determined to make good use of the opportunity 
for inquiring into natural history afforded by William's presence in the house, 
but not only for the sake of her own education and that of the children: 
apparently she also sees her chance to free herself from dependency on the 
Reverend Alabaster and satisfy her hunger for wider experiences of life. It is 
hard to escape the conclusion, which William also comes to suspect, that she 
179 
has foreseen the crisis in William's marriage and has been positioning both of 
them to take advantage of it from the beginning. She is not entirely selfish in 
this either, since she perceives that William's coming into her life is one of those 
happy 'accidents' in which the interests of both parties coincide exactly. Indeed, 
the ultimate goal of ethical behaviour might be to achieve just such an ideal 
outcome. Certainly evolutionary ethics supports this view, and even Jesus' 
Sermon on the Mount seems to recognise as much in his commandments to 
'love your neighbour as yourself and 'give and it will be given unto you'. 
However, achieving this end often requires that we put at risk our own interests 
in focusing on the good of the other. This is precisely what Byatt has Matty do, 
creating in the process an engagingly suspenseful plot. 
Of course the truth of Jesus' promise that our giving will be rewarded 
ultimately depends on there being a just and providential God who evens up the 
score sooner or later. William does not believe that this God exists, having 
rejected any such idea when he unburdened himself of his father's particularly 
frightening theology. Yet Matty in the end seems certain that there is some sort 
of beneficent Design or Fate in the universe which especially helps those who 
help themselves. Ironically this notion is not far removed from the deism which 
Harald seems to be left with after all his painful deliberations. But while Harald 
and William's beliefs are characterised more or less by disillusionment and loss 
of faith, Matty's have the quality of rediscovering enchantment, belief and hope 
in the world. Particularly apposite here is this lengthy exchange between Harald 
and William in which they are struggling together to find some vestige of 
meaning in life: 
'But do you not feel your own sense of wonder corresponds to 
something beyond yourself, William?' 
'I do indeed. But I also ask myself, what has this sense of wonder to do 
with my moral sense? For the Creation we so admire does not appear to have a 
Creator who cares for his creatures. Nature is red in tooth and claw, as Mr 
Tennyson put it. The Amazon jungle does indeed arouse a sense of wonder at 
its abundance and luxuriance. But there is a spirit there - a terrible spirit of 
mindless striving or apathetic inertia - a kind of vegetable greed and vast decay 
- which makes a mindless natural force much easier to believe in... 
'The world has changed so much, William, in my lifetime. I am old 
enough to have believed in our First Parents in Paradise, as a little boy, to have 
believed in Satan hidden in the snake, and in the Archangel with the flaming 
sword, closing the gates. I am old enough to have believed without question in 
the Divine Birth on a cold night with the sky full of singing angels and the 
shepherds staring up in wonder, and the strange kings advancing across the 
sand on camels with gifts. And now I am presented with a world in which we 
are what we are because of the mutations of soft jelly and calceous bone matter 
through unimaginable millennia - a world in which angels and devils do not 
battle in the Heavens for virtue and vice, but in which we eat and are eaten and 
absorbed into other flesh and blood. All the music and painting, all the poetry 
and power is so much illusion. I shall moulder like a mushroom when my time 
comes, which is not long. It is likely that the injunction to love each other is no 
more than the prudent instinct of sociability, of parental protectiveness, in a 
creature related to a great ape. I used to love to see paintings of the 
180 
Annunciation - the angel with his wings dipped in the rainbow, of which the 
butterfly and bird of Paradise were poor, imperfect echoes, holding the white 
and gold lily and going down on his knee to the thoughtful young girl who was 
about to be the Mother of God, love made flesh, knowledge given to us, or 
lent. And now all that is as it were erased, and there is a black backcloth on an 
empty stage, and I see a chimpanzee, with puzzled eyes and a hanging brow 
and great ugly teeth, clutching its hairy offspring to its wrinkled breast - and is 
this love made flesh? 
'I know my answer - it is - if God works at all he works in the ape 
towards Man - but I cannot measure my loss, it is the pit of despair itself. I 
began my life as a small boy whose every action was burned into the gold 
record of his good and evil deeds, where it would be weighed and looked over 
by One with merciful eyes, to whom I was walking, step by unsteady step. I 
end it like a skeleton leaf, to be made humus, like a mouse crunched by an owl, 
like a beef-calf going to the slaughter, through a gate which opens only one 
way, to blood and dust and destruction. And then, I think, no brute beast could 
have such thoughts. No frog, no hound even, could have a vision of the Angel 
of Annunciation. Where does it all come from?' 
'It is a mystery. Mystery may be another name for God. It has been 
well argued that mystery is another name for matter - we are and have access 
to Mind, but Matter is mysterious in its very nature, however we choose to 
analyse the laws of its metamorphoses. The laws of the transformation of 
Matter do not explain it away.' 
'Now you argue on my side. And yet I feel, all these arguments are 
nothing, the motions of minds that are not equipped to carry them through.' 
'And there too is hope, as well as dread. Where do they come from, our 
minds?' (60) 
Byatt has set this deeply moving discussion in the nineteenth century, 
but its force can be felt equally by many people today. The world is rapidly 
changing; past certainties have been unsettled; contradictions and dilemmas 
abound. Religious belief is declining in some communities while 
fundamentalism is growing alarmingly in others. The laws of the transformation 
of matter have been expressed even more mysteriously in the terms of quantum 
mechanics which seem to run completely counter to common sense. The planet 
is being laid waste by technologies which have also brought much good. 
Societies are being shattered by individualism and resurgent nationalism whilst 
their economies are increasingly being globalised. The full moral implications 
of Darwinism are only now being articulated by philosophers such as James 
Rachels (1990) and Peter Singer (1994) in an ethics which offers a more 
humane approach to abortion and euthanasia by dispensing, perhaps 
dangerously, with illusions of a unique human dignity. What are we to make of 
these and many other disturbing developments? How can we judge between 
better and worse in such a world? Are we not desperately in need of a renewed 
sense of wonder which corresponds to something beyond ourselves, some 
transcendent 'Truth' which would unite the peoples of the earth in one faith and 
on which we could found a universal moral code? Of course we are unlikely to 
agree upon such a 'Truth', and, judging by the history of past pretenders, we 
may be better off without the attempt to define it. Matty, in Byatt's ethically 
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complex fiction, offers a more modest truth to live by, a maxim whose virtue 
lies in the paradox that it encourages both belief and disbelief at the same time: 
'Things Are Not What They Seem.' 
This negative statement could be the catch-cry of postmodern 
scepticism. It would certainly not qualify for Kant as a categorical imperative 
upon which to found the whole of morality. But is it a truth, a principle, which 
can enhance human flourishing? The answer is yes, because only if we live by it 
will we make progress along the pathway of successive disillusionments and re-
enchantments towards whatever immanent truths we can construct or discover - 
and it will warn us against Fascist tendencies of judging too harshly those who, 
for the time being, hold to truths different from ours. The idea that things are 
not what they seem also encourages a sense of wonder at the ineffability of the 
universe, that variety of religious awe which William experienced when he felt 
his mind dwarfed by the vastness and complexity of things in the Amazonian 
forests. It runs counter to the religious wonder, a type of aesthetic sense, which 
Harald felt when the meaning of life was fully explained to him in simple Bible 
stories and an intricately beautiful Catholic theology - yet one cannot help but 
feel that the attempt at such explanations has its place too, in spite of its dark 
side. (Perhaps, too, there is something in Harald's sense of wonder which is 
similar to Kant's rationalist 'feeling' of respect for the Law.) Apparently, living 
by the maxim that things are not what they seem requires full command of 
William's double vision, the finest balancing of all manner of binary 
oppositions, some of which form the themes of this novella: objectivity-
subjectivity; belief-doubt, optimism-pessimism, instinct-intelligence, design-
chance, individual-commonwealth, art-religion, religion-science, science-art, 
free-will-determinism, appearance-reality, egotism-altruism, cruelty-kindness, 
life-death, matter-spirit. In juggling these dualities we will need to judge when 
it is appropriate to privilege one of the binary terms over the other (and which 
one) and when it is appropriate to hold both of them together in tension. 
It is just here, in providing models for these delicate moral judgements, 
that ethical fictions and ethical criticism have educative value - and that some 
fictions, because they are more subtly true-to-life, are better than others. Thus 
Byatt portrays Matty as a master of such judgement. From the beginning of the 
story she is shown to have been an extremely detached and perspicacious 
observer of human and animal nature, even where her own interests are 
involved. William has had many intimations of this, for we are often told that he 
was vaguely aware of her sharp looks and ironic comments. But it is only after 
William has discovered Eugenia's devastating secret that Matty finally reveals 
to him that she has been minutely studying him and what pertains to his 
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happiness (and hers?) ever since he arrived. (156) She certainly knows about 
Eugenia as soon as he does - but probably sooner - as she signals to him in the 
game of anagrams which members of the household play in the evening 
following upon William's fateful day of discovery. This marvellous scene, rich 
in reverberations, also shows the mastery Matty has over language - that 
symbolic system which has given humans so much power over the world - since 
she can play with it adeptly, conveying serious information with 
characteristically light irony. 
The game consisted of making words out of alphabet cards, prettily 
decorated with pictures of harlequins, monkeys, columbines and devils with 
forks. Everyone had nine letters, and could give any complete word they could 
make secretly to anyone else, who must change at least one letter, and pass it 
on. The game was not to be left with the letters with demons on, which were, 
rather at random, some of the awkward letters, like Q and X and some of those 
in demand, like Es and Ss. William played with half his mind, pushing on easy 
words like 'was' and 'his' and 'mine' and accumulating demons. At one point, 
finding himself with PHXNITCSE he suddenly woke up, and found himself 
able to present Matty Crompton with INSECT even though that left him with 
an X with a demon on it. Miss Crompton, her face heavily shadowed in the 
lamplight, gave a small snort of laughter at this word, considered it for some 
time, rearranged the cards, and pushed it back to him. He was about to point 
out that the rules did not allow of returning the same word with adding or 
subtracting a letter, when he saw what she had sent him. There it was, lying 
innocently in his hand. INCEST. He shuffled the evidence hastily, looked up 
and met the dark intelligent eyes. 
'Things are not what they seem,' said Matty Crompton amiably. 
William looked at his cards, and saw that he could make another word, and get 
rid of the X, and answer her message. So he pushed his word back, and she 
gave another snort of laughter, and the game went on. But now, his eyes met 
hers, from time to time, and hers gleamed with knowledge and - yes - 
excitement. And he did not know if he was more comforted or alarmed that she 
knew. How long had she known? How? What did she think? Her smile was not 
commiserating, nor was it prurient, it was somehow satisfied and amused. The 
luck of the letters was uncanny. It gave him the feeling that occasionally comes 
to most of us, that however we protest we are moved by chance, and struck by 
random shocks and blows, in fact there is Design, there is Fate, it has us in its 
grip. 
It was possible, of course, that she had somehow shaped his cards. She 
liked riddles. He watched the flick of her precise, thin wrists as she passed 
PHOENIX on to Elaine, neatly getting rid of the dangerous X. Did she see him 
as a dupe, as a poor victim? Had she always seen him that way? Things were 
not what they seemed, indeed. (153) 
The word which William passed back to Matty is - as the reader may deduce - 
SPHINX, and it is appropriate not only because of its connection with incest 
and riddling in the Oedipus legend, but also because it appears in Matty's 
fairytale. She had been inspired to write her 'illustratory', 'instructive' 'puzzler 
 (118, 119) partly by William's 'chronicle of [the] insect cities' (119) and 
partly by her reading about the naming of moths in Linnaeus's Systema Natura 
and Mouffet's Theatrum Insectorum. 
Just after she has read William's work - in which he 'had argued round 
and round' (116) about 'Instinct or Intelligence, Design or Hasard, The 
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Individual and the Commonwealth, What is an Individual' (109) in ant and, by 
analogy, human societies - and just before she gives her tale to him, they have 
the following conversation: 
She said, 'I liked your passage from Michelet about the depredations of the 
Sphinx Atropos. It is amazing how much - how much of mystery, of fairy 
glamour - is added to the creatures by the names bestowed upon them.' 
'I used to think of Linnaeus, in the forest, constantly. He bound the 
New World so tightly to the imagination of the Old when he named the 
swallowtails for the Greek and Trojan heroes, and the Heliconiae for the 
Muses. There I was, in lands never before entered by Englishmen, and around 
me fluttered Helen and Menelaus, Apollo and the Nine, Hector and Hecuba 
and Priam. The imagination of the scientist had colonised the untrodden jungle 
before I got there. There is something wonderful about naming a species. To 
bring a thing that is wild, and rare, and hitherto unobserved under the net of 
human observation and human language - and in the case of Linnaeus, with 
such wit, such order, such lively use of our inherited myths and tales and 
characters. He wished to call the Atropos the Caput mortuum, you know, the 
Death's Head exactly - but the system of nomenclature requires a 
monosyllable.' 
'So he chose the blind Fury with the abhorred Shears. Poor innocent 
insect, to have its small life burdened with so large an import.: (118) 
Naming God's creatures in the Garden of Eden was one of Adam's first tasks 
and a sign of his dominion over Creation, but scientists (the new men) have 
undertaken to observe the world and categorise it all over again. However, they 
cannot escape the need to anthropomorphise nature in terms of the stories which 
have given meaning to life throughout European history. In fact it is difficult to 
conceive of doing this in any other way than by relating the unknown to the 
known - by creating analogies. Yet how interesting that science, in seeking in its 
own way to give a more accurate account of the world, has turned not to 
Christian mythology for these analogies but to the myths of ancient Greek 
religion. One reason for this was, no doubt, that Greek mythology is much more 
attuned to nature, but another may be that the Christian stories were still widely 
taken literally and so could not be so readily used as metaphors. Matty's story 
plays upon these mythological-cum-scientific names in order to make sense of 
William's unfortunate circumstances. In so doing, she succeeds in pointing a 
moral which he needs to learn in its most far-reaching applications, and in 
restoring a religious dimension - indeed an element of faith in the goodness of 
life - to his thinking. 
In Matty's story, entitled 'Things Are Not What They Seem', Seth, the 
youngest son of a struggling farmer, is sent out into the world to seek his 
fortune. He travels the oceans until finally he is shipwrecked with his 
companions on an unknown shore. Travelling inland, they come to a walled 
palace which they enter. It seems to be deserted but in a great banqueting hall 
they find a sumptuous feast which all of them immediately set upon, except for 
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Seth who, like Adam in the Garden of Eden, has been taught by his father 'never 
to eat anything that was not freely offered'. (120) After some time the owner of 
the palace enters, accompanied by a goat-man and various animals. She is 'a 
cheerful, comfortable-looking lady, dressed a little like a shepherdess, in a frilly 
cap and a delightful embroidered apron, with beautiful white ringlets falling to 
her shoulders. In her hand she carried the prettiest shepherd's crook, decorated 
with ribbons, silver and rose and sky-blue, and she had the sweetest smile, and 
the most dancing eyes'. (120, 121) She welcomes her visitors enthusiastically 
and encourages them to go on eating, turning her persuasive charm especially 
on Seth who remains reluctant. Of course, well-educated people have read 
similar stories before (though never with such a delicious conjunction of Little 
Bo Peep and Circe) and they know precisely what is about to happen. But Seth 
is not very literate, only polite and sensibly cautious. Finally the lady shames 
him into taking just three pomegranate seeds. She then reveals that she is 'a 
Fairy who likes to make things pleasant for mortal men', that her 'name is Mrs 
Cottitoe Pan Demos - which means "for all the people", and that she keeps 
'open house for everyone who comes'. (122) She demonstrates her magic by 
making the feast disappear and by immobilising the sailors. When the cook asks 
that they be allowed to leave, Mrs Cottitoe replies, "How ungrateful men are... 
They will not stay, whatever we give them, they will not rest, they will sail 
away'. (122) Whereupon she changes each of them into a different breed of pig, 
except for Seth who only has his hair changed into a kind of mane. Seth is then 
put in charge of looking after his companions and a collection of other 
unfortunate creatures in the caverns beneath the palace. 
Seth could be read as roughly representing William, and Mrs Cottitoe as 
Eugenia. But they could also stand for all men and women, in which case Matty 
might be empathising to some degree with Mrs Cottitoe. Later Matty reveals 
that she would like to be William's constant companion in his travels, but, 
unlike Mrs Cottitoe and Eugenia, she has all along respected his desire to sail 
away and his freedom to do so. Indeed, she has helped him to regain the power 
to do just that, and, while she is determined to go with him as far as Brazil, she 
offers to go her own way from then on. Furthermore, whereas Eugenia has never 
been open with William until she is forced to be, Matty, after keeping her 
desires hidden for so long, now wants William to see her as she is before he 
decides to go with her. Matty's behaviour, I contend, is thoroughly ethical: she 
knows how to strike a balance between keeping silent and speaking the truth, 
but she also knows that in the end freedom depends on things being rightly (i.e. 
more accurately) seen. 
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Further reinforcing the analogy between Seth and William, Matty has 
Seth rescued from his hopeless plight by an ant which brings him three 
fernseeds from beyond the wall of the palace. Seth is reduced to the size of the 
ant and led through tiny fissures out into the garden. There he finds himself 
surrounded by all the plants, which now seem to him huge, and is 'overcome 
with a mixture of awe, and apprehension, and admiration of the huge force 
behind all this burgeoning'. He is threatened by some fierce-looking caterpillars 
and is reassured that they are actually harmless by a spider-like fairy called Miss 
Mouffet. She answers Seth's questions, including telling him about the poetic 
names of the caterpillars, for, as he says, he comes 'from a country family, 
where name giving is a family occupation'. (131) Miss Mouffet comments that 
"Names...are a way of weaving the world together, by relating the creatures to 
other creatures and a kind of metamorphosis, you might say, out of metaphor 
which is a figure of speech for carrying one idea into another." (132) She then 
arranges for Seth to be carried on the back of the Sphinx Atropos, the death's 
head moth, to the home of the Fairy-beyond-the-wall, a more powerful being 
than Dame Cottitoe. When Seth asks Miss Mouffet about the name of the 
Sphinx, she replies in a lowered voice: "Sphinx is one of the names of the great 
Fairy. It means, in part, the asker of riddles. And the answer, too. She loves 
these moths because they are riddles, like herself." (134) She also tells him that 
he must go now 
'...into her Presence. But the journey is fearful, and the place where She is is 
not for the faint-hearted. For you must go into the Shadows and beyond, and 
few return from there.' 
Will she help me?' 
'She helps all of us, though some of us do not recognise her help for 
what it is.' 
'Will she restore me to my former shape?' 
'She will change you, for that is her work. It may be that the change 
will be a restoration.' (135) 
When Seth finally comes into the Temple of the Lady, he is in a gloomy 
underworld where all but the moths are asleep. She appears both beautiful and 
savage, and he begs her to help him. Whereupon he is commanded to lie down 
to sleep before the cavern and to accept what dreams may come: 
He dreamed of kind hands touching his brow, and of hot, bloody breath in his 
ears, and he heard a voice crying, 'Fear no more,' and another saying, 'I care for 
nothing, all must go,' and he saw in his dream everything that was, like a great 
river hurrying to the lip of a huge fall, and going over, in one great rush of 
mingled matter, liquids and solids, blood and fur and feather and leaf and 
stone, and he awoke with a terrible cry, and the even light was as it had been. 
And the Figure behind the veil addressed him directly in a low voice, 
neither male nor female, which asked him who he was, and what he desired. 
(138) 
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Before he can be helped Seth must answer the Figure's question, 'What is my 
name?' but so many names rush through his mind that he is dumbfounded. 
Finally he says, 
'How can I name you, who have more names than all the creatures, 
when they have so many each, and Elpenor is Elephant, Hawk, Pig, Twilight 
Lover and Sphinx and he is only one tiny rosy moth? How can I name you, 
when you are hidden behind a veil, and you spin your own hiding-place, and 
make your own light? What would any name I choose be, to you? I cannot 
name you, and yet I believe you will help me, for Mistress Mouffet said you 
would, if you wished to, and I do believe, I do believe you are kind -' 
And at that all the moths danced furiously and the light inside the silk 
moved with laughter, and the voice said, 'You have solved the riddle most 
excellently, for I am indeed kind, and that is one of my names, one of the best 
of them. I am known as Dame Kind in many places, and you have understood 
my riddle by trusting me. So I will help you. (139) 
Seth is enabled to rescue his friends, who, restored to their manhood, 
return to their adventures. But before he leaves her presence, Dame Kind - who, 
of course, represents nature itself, the mystery of energy and matter apparently 
springing out of nothing and metamorphosing in space and time - has one more 
thing to say to him. 
'...Here, as you may have noticed, you have many forms and many sizes, for 
you are what you are as reflected in the pupil of my Eye, which you cannot see, 
for it is behind the veil and shrinks and grows huge like a dark moon, like the 
pupil of a great cat. And what I see and what my Eye reflects is your outward 
case, containing what you may become, like Atropos's pupa, which is named 
for a carved doll, or a small girl child, ready to grow. I hold you small in my 
gaze, Seth, and you may grow in it, or shrink in it, or vanish, if I blink. You 
may see my pupil, or my puppet, as you choose well or ill. Everything is single 
and double. Things are not what they seem.' (139) 
Matty captures in her delightful story a sense of both scientific and religious 
wonder in the face of nature. Her anthropomorphising fable - certainly not an 
attempt at realist fiction - is quite accurate in its presentation of our experience 
of life. Nature is indeed both single and double; it is ineluctably paradoxical. 
Sooner or later it kills us, yet in the interim it can be kind, for it has created us 
and therefore cannot be altogether inimical to our flourishing through the 
transforming stages of our lives. In its eye Seth may grow or shrink or vanish. 
But what does Matty mean by Dame Kind's pun on the words 'pupil' and 
'puppet', one of which Seth may see, depending on whether he chooses well or 
ill? Is Matty offering William a veiled choice between herself, as William's 
pupil in their study of natural history, and Eugenia, who is a mere puppet of her 
own and Edgar's natural instincts? 
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Matty is writing an instructive fable for a general audience of young 
readers, but she admits to having been carried away by language, in particular 
the metaphorical names of the insects. Also she is afraid there is 'too much 
message'. (141) Like most writers she is no doubt trying to make sense of her 
own concerns in what she writes, in spite of being constrained by the resources 
of language available to her - in this case, for example, by Derrida's 'already 
said'. Chief among these concerns is William. Why then does Matty convey the 
moral of her story to William in such a riddling way? Why doesn't she tell him 
straight out what she thinks he needs to know? One answer may lie in the fact 
that Byatt presents her as an enterprising, creative and patient teacher of the 
children of the house. She knows that people must be led into understanding by 
appropriate experiences at the appropriate time, and that only in this context can 
direct instruction be effective. She also knows - and she has taught William this 
- that narrative combines vicarious experience with instruction in the most 
palatable form. However, William misses the point of her fairytale as it applies 
directly to him, since he has not yet had the experience which will make it 
unequivocally relevant. 
William was much surprised by Miss Crompton's flight of 
imagination. It made him uneasy, in ways he could not quite analyse, and at the 
same time his own imagination could not quite see her writing this story. She 
had always seemed dry, and this tale, however playful, was throbbing with 
some sort of emotion... 
'...The impression I got was one of thickening mystery, like the riddle 
of the Sphinx herself, a most portentous person. I think childish readers will 
find both instruction and delight in it.' 
'Ah,' said Miss Crompton. Then, 'I had meant to write a fabulous Tale, 
not an allegory, it is true.' 
'I wondered if Dame Cottitoe was the Church, at one point. Bishops, 
you know, with crooks. There have been very pretty religious allegories using 
butterflies, since Psyche is the Soul and the Greek name for butterflies -' 
'I had no such grand aims, I assure you. My message was linked to my 
title.' 64 
—Things Are Not What They Seem, — said William. Well, that is 
certain at least. That is a good lesson. You could have included the mimicry of 
poisonous butterflies by harmless ones, observed by Bates -'(141) 
In William's reaction to Matty's tale, Byatt shows us that the experience of art, 
without some measure of the real life experience to which it refers, is just empty 
riddling, and conversely, that real life experience is potentially devastating 
without the meaningful context in which art can place it. Education through art 
is the business of creating useful analogies, and as we have seen, religion and 
64 It occurs to me that a cynically allegorical reading of Byatt's novella might interpret it 
politically, with Bredely Hall as upper class, Conservative-party England and Eugenia as 
Maggie Thatcher. Byatt gives an example of such an allegorical reading here when she has 
William wondering if Matty's fairy story can be read as a religious allegory directed against the 
spell-binding power of Bishops armed with crooks. 
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science participate in this practice in their own ways. Matty, with characteristic 
elegance and modesty, is able to combine all three modes of making sense of 
the world in her fairytale. 
Another important aspect of the role of art in moral education is apparent 
here. The riddling quality of analogy allows for a variety of interpretations of 
the work, especially of a tale like Matty's. Any one reader's interpretations will 
of course be partly predetermined by a variety of factors: social, political, 
personal etcetera. 65 But, in so far as readers can learn that different 
interpretations are possible, they will then be free to choose between them. As 
we have seen, Matty is concerned to enlarge William's freedom of choice, even 
though she has been manipulating him in both their interests, but she foregoes 
any further manipulation when they discuss her story, allowing him the freedom 
to miss her personal meaning. Artists certainly set out to manipulate their 
consumers for all kinds of interests, and art can be used to convey good or bad 
morals. In this direction lie propaganda and indoctrination, which raise 
important considerations concerning the moral responsibility of artists. 
Certainly young readers should be made aware of alternative readings, 
including resistant ones, if they are to become more autonomous agents. 
Byatt's portrayal of how Matty translates her own principle into practice 
suggests that she is more successful than William in balancing objectivity and 
subjectivity, altruism and egotism, 66 yet she risks her altruistic objectivity in the 
very act of writing her fairy tale and showing it to William. Fortunately or 
unfortunately (who can tell?), he had been too blind to her desires to see the 
self-interested meaning the tale has for her. She maintains her equilibrium until 
the very end when, trusting again to good fortune, she reveals the self-interest 
which partly motivates most, if not all, human acts of altruism, and achieves 
what she and William both desire: escape, love, adventure and the pursuit of 
knowledge. After the game of anagrams, when William had been struck by the 
luck of the letters and felt himself to be in the grip of fate, he and Matty meet in 
her room. William implies that Matty had sent for him to come back to the 
house to discover Eugenia and Edgar, but she denies this, saying, 'There are 
65 Byatt touches on this subject in 'The Conjugial Angel' from the perspective of the writer: she 
portrays the poet Tennyson as being aware that in producing his own work he inevitably draws 
on the language of all the writers he has ever read. (268, 269) William Adamson's and Harald 
Alabaster's early religious views have likewise been more or less 'rewritten' by their exposure to 
the discourse of Darwin et al. However, it is clear that this discourse would not have such power 
over them if it did not concur to some degree with their observations of life. 
66 Perhaps we should add another binary opposition to the list: truthfulness/deception. Matty 
encourages William to 'be truthful, as far as possible, or the whole truth will never be found. 
You must say nothing you do not think'. (117, 118) At the same time she is being less than 
completely honest with William, but in both their interests. Also they are practising an extended 
subterfuge on Eugenia and her family in writing and publishing their books. Are truthfulness and 
lying ever compatible? I have examined this question in my discussion of Heart of Darkness. 
Suffice to say here that morality seems to be inescapably paradoxical. 
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people in a house, you know, who know everything that goes on - the invisible 
people, and now and then the house simply decides that something must happen 
- I think your message came after a series of misunderstandings that at some 
level were quite deliberate -" (155) Presumably the same thing had occurred 
when 'someone' led Eugenia's fiancée, Captain Hunt, to see a hint of her 
incestuous relationship. (151) The house has been compared to an ants' nest and 
William has reflected in his book on the way in which the ants seem often to be 
moved by a kind of group intelligence, 'a Spirit of the Nest'. (40) Here, then, 
William's and Matty's interests seem to have been served by some 'deliberate 
misunderstandings', a kind of instinct of the community which is opposed to 
incest. At first sight it might appear that 'the house's' intuitive opposition to 
incest has resulted in a misguided action in exposing Eugenia and Edgar to 
William, since he goes away and allows their relationship to continue. 
However, if William had acted only according to his instinct in the matter he 
would almost certainly have put an end to their incestuous practice, perhaps by 
resorting to violence. Instead he brings to bear his capacity to reflect and reason, 
skills which have evolved in humans because of their adaptive qualities but 
which may now enable us to take some control of our future. Matty has learned 
to use her reasoning skills to work with the immanent 'spirit' of life, a kind of 
power of design or fate, which paradoxically works through the accidents of 
genetic mutation. Thus she says, 'There are people in houses, between the 
visible inhabitants and the invisible, largely invisible to both, who can know a 
great deal, or nothing, as they choose. I choose to know about some things, and 
not to know about others. I have become interested in knowing things that 
concern you'. (155) 
Not surprisingly William feels used, certainly by Eugenia, but also, in a 
more beneficent way, by Many. However, through a process of disillusionment 
everything is being made clear to him, including Matty's own needs, and he is 
now being given the opportunity to take his destiny into his own hands. (155) 
Matty has provided them both with the means to leave, even before William 
could think of it, and he is grateful for her interference. He sees her as a 'good 
Fairy' (156) but she wants to be more than that: she is determined to go with 
him despite his objection that as a gentlewoman she could not endure the 
privations of life in the jungle. Gradually her desires are unfolded to William 
and he begins to see her as she truly is - a passionate, capable but still 
vulnerable woman with a strong feminine name, not the neutral 'Matty': 
'My name,' she said, 'is Matilda. Up here at night there is no Matty. 
Only Matilda. Look at me.' 
And she put up her hands to her head and undid the plaits of her hair 
over her ears, and shook it out, and came and stood before him. And her face 
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between the dark tresses was sharp and eager and hungry, and he watched how 
trimly she turned and said, 'I have seen your wrists, Matilda. I dreamed about 
them now and then. You have - remarkable - wrists.' 
'I only wanted you to see me,' said Matilda, less confidently, once she 
saw that he had indeed seen her. He saw that her cheekbones were high and 
sharp, and her mouth was hard, not soft, but full of life. He saw how quick she 
turned at the waist, and thought quickly of a greyhound. He said, 'I don't think 
that was all you wanted.' 
'I wanted you to be happy,' said Matilda, fiercely. 
William stood up, and looked her in the eye, and put his hands on her 
waist. 
'I will be,' he said. 'I will be.' 
He pulled her against him, the unyielding Matty Crompton, the new 
hungry Matilda. (157, 158) 
Thus Matilda has been successfully sustaining a double life, but is now able to 
integrate both selves in a full relationship with William, one which serves both 
of their interests. Moreover, in this relationship we can see Byatt's prototype of 
a feminist project aimed at reshaping the politics of gender. It depicts a rational 
enterprise instigated by women whose bold strategies draw upon an increasingly 
clear sense of the biological and cultural determinations of gender. It may be a 
utopian vision but ethics and politics need some sense of what they might strive 
to achieve. As a male I welcome the recognition of both gender difference and 
human equality which this vision includes. 
In the final scene of the novella - the happy ending - Byatt creates an image in 
which every detail encapsulates her vision of a good life lived optimistically in 
the uncertainties of the postmodern world. William and Matilda are on a ship 
midway between the Old and New Worlds, and on the crest of a wave between 
'the flowing, spangled river of the Milky Way' and the 'phosphorescent 
animalcules' (159) which inhabit the ocean depths. Matilda, no longer in drab 
clothing, wears a crimson shawl, identifying her perhaps with the blood-red 
ants, the slave makers which she and William had observed in the wood. She 
has, in a sense, captured William from Eugenia's nest and used him for her own 
purposes, though he has co-operated with her willingly enough. Indeed, now 
that he is fully aware of her plot he has become an equal partner in the 
conspiracy. 'William's brown hand grips her brown wrists on the rail', (160) and 
thus their warm colouring contrasts strongly with the cold whiteness of Eugenia 
Alabaster. 'They breathe salt air, and hope, and their blood swims with the 
excitement of the future.' (160) Captain Papagay joins them, bringing an amber-
gold butterfly which had been found by a midshipman in the rigging. 
It is the Monarch, says William, excited, Danaus Plexippus, which is known to 
migrate great distances along the American coast. They are strong fliers, he 
tells Matilda, but the winds can carry them hundreds of miles out to sea. 
Matilda observes to William and Captain Papagay that the wings are still dusky 
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with life. 'It fills me with emotion,' she says. 'I do not know whether it is more 
fear, or more hope. It is so fragile, and so easily crushed, and nowhere in reach 
of where it was going. And yet it is still alive, and bright, and so surprising, 
rightly seen.' That is the main thing,' says Captain Papagay. 'To be alive. As 
long as you are alive, everything is surprising, rightly seen.' And the three of 
them look out with renewed interest at the points of light in the dark around 
them. (160) 
Everything is surprising, rightly seen. Byatt's 'Morpho Eugenia' is a story 
about seeing things more and more clearly as they truly are, for right living 
depends on accurate information. Knowledge of the truth, in this sense, sets us 
free. We may never know the whole truth - or, indeed, be able to determine an a 
categorical imperative - but perhaps we can make some progress towards it, if 
we begin by recalling that things are not what they seem. Rightly viewing the 
circumstances of our lives - represented afresh in new works of art, in revised 
versions of religion, in new theories of ethics, and in the on-going observation 
and analogising of science - lends to the world a new enchantment. Freed from 
old illusions, and wary of new ones, we can then choose, if we so desire, to 
emulate the warm, fragile beauty of the Monarch butterfly rather than the cold, 
deceptive shapeliness of Morpho Eugenia. We can be like Matilda and William: 
grateful for life, making the most of each fleeting moment, enjoying the 
company of like-minded people and doing what we can to help others find 
happiness too. 
One of the circumstances of our lives which Byatt has made us see more 
clearly is that 'Instinct [is] Predestination' (116) for human beings as well as 
animals, yet she also affirms that sometimes humans are capable of sufficient 
objectivity to give them a choice in how their instincts may be fulfilled. At least 
this is so when they work together, as Matty and William do, and take risks in 
the faith that nature will, for the moment anyway, continue to favour the 
flourishing of human life. It is especially significant that Matty and William 
work together on a liberating project which is conducted through writing, 
undertaken in order to make some provisional sense of experience and to 
convey that sense to others. Indeed, they each write for the same youthful 
audience but in different genres - those of natural history and fable - and within 
different discourses - those of science and mythological literature. Hence Byatt 
demonstrates that the extent to which people can command the powers of 
language within a variety of discourses, rather than be completely commanded 
by them and by their instincts, determines the degree to which they become 
self-conscious, imaginative, objective, free, circumspect - and so more capable 
of ethical judgements. Herein lies some encouragement to implement an ethics 
education program in schools, one in which writing, reading and reflecting 
together on stories will play a key role. 
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Another circumstance of our lives which is apparent in 'Morpho Eugenia' 
is that social discourses are also predestination, since our complex selves are to 
some extent discursively constructed. The opening up of a degree of freedom of 
choice in this respect has been the educational project of critical social literacy, 
to which I shall return in the next chapter. For the moment, though, I reiterate 
that social structures are themselves the adaptive strategies of beings who are 
responding fundamentally to biological imperatives. Hence evolutionary theory 
ought at least to underpin our construction of discourse theories. Yet, with 
further developments in such fields as memetics and complexity theory, perhaps 
evolutionary theory can reshape our understanding of discourse - including 
literature - more extensively than anyone has previously thought possible. 
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Part Three: Praxis 
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Chapter 4 
Critical literacy teaching as principled practice 
1. Towards an ethical and political literacy 
All aspects of English teaching, including literary criticism and critical literacy, 
need to be informed by an even more highly sophisticated understanding of the 
nature of the self and society, ethics and politics, language and communication, 
science, art and religion - an understanding which goes well beyond the 
relatively narrow range of discourse theories with which critical literacy 
advocates have been grappling. In Chapter 2 I have indicated just some of the 
areas of research from which literacy theorists could profit. In most cases, of 
course, practising teachers will not have time for such an encyclopaedic survey 
as I have barely begun in this study, but they should at least be aware of two 
things: new conceptions of the subject English are always in need of further 
refinement, often from unorthodox directions; and the practices which new 
approaches advocate may in themselves be morally ambivalent. As we have 
seen, Bauman (1993) stresses this second point, declaring that almost everything 
we do for the good of others also has unforeseen detrimental side effects. Thus 
part of their duty of care for their students requires teachers to be both open-
minded and sceptical, to take risks in attempting to help them and to be as 
circumspect as they can in adopting new strategies. Furthermore, as teachers 
discuss these pedagogical problems openly with their students, drawing upon 
the full range of their own experience and interests, and as they live out this 
ethic of cautious risk-taking in all their dealings with them, so too their students 
may learn by example and precept to be more careful of the needs of others. In 
this way, beginning with teachers of ethical and political literacy, caring 
communities of rigorous inquirers might flourish in classrooms around the 
world, sharing in the on-going task of freeing humanity from destructive 
illusions and finding new enchantment in the astonishing circumstances of our 
lives. 
In spite of all that has been said so far, I cannot be certain of convincing 
literary critics and teachers of critical literacy that moral education and ethical 
reflection are important missing ingredients in our dialogues about English 
teaching today. However, it might be salutary to compare what is regularly 
discussed in the pages of English in Australia and at AATE national 
195 
conferences with what excites and dominates the interest of students in 
classroom conversations. In their professional discussions teachers are 
continually asked to consider various aspects of literacy, yet rarely, if ever, do 
they deliberate about the values which direct their practice. For example 
aesthetic values are rarely mentioned any more. Indeed, another study could be 
undertaken to investigate why this is the case, and to pursue an important 
question which for the most part has had to remain in the wings of this study: 
that of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics. Social (i.e. moral) values 
are assumed in discussions of the politics of literacy which occupy a great deal 
of attention, but as we have seen, politics has frequently been divorced from 
deeper ethical questions about the purpose of life and how it should be lived. 
Contrary to this scenario, in my experience students are eager to discuss ethical 
issues as they are modelled, albeit problematically, in class texts, and as those 
issues can be applied to themselves and the bewildering world they live in. They 
are fascinated by the 'big' philosophical questions about the nature of existence, 
which in the end impinge upon their lives ethically. 
Most English teachers, therefore, are already 'doing' a relatively 
unexamined form of ethics in their classrooms. Hence it is time they talked 
about it in order to refine their practice, publicly justify their inculcation of 
particular values, and avoid the excesses of indoctrination. Perhaps they could 
shed further light on the relationship between the political agendas which they 
are being urged to pursue and the ethical underpinnings of such concerns. It will 
no longer suffice to leave open to the 'free' play of interpretation their answers to 
the question, 'How can we live, if we hope to live together in our local, national 
and global societies as best we can?' In consultation with students and the wider 
community, teachers should adopt a credible system of ethics, a meta-ethical 
theory - however modest it might be in the final analysis - one which can help 
them determine effective answers to this all-important issue. This is why I have 
taken the risk of championing evolutionary ethics, whilst pointing out that there 
are also other approaches which are currently worth pursuing. I hope that a 
lively debate about what might be the best ethical theory to underpin critical 
literacy practices will ensue. 
While critical literacy is a largely admirable practice, especially as it has been 
promoted by Colin Lankshear, (1994) it is clear that there are particular 
problems associated with it: 
1. Theorists and practitioners of critical literacy have largely neglected to 
declare the intentions and ethical foundations which direct the value positions 
which they adopt. (James Gee, as we have seen, is a notable exception.) While it 
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is ultimately impossible to guarantee that critical literacy methods will not be 
used to promote attitudes and behaviour which are inhumane, we are better able 
to judge the morality of those practitioners who are willing to be open about 
their motives and who give reasons for their aims and methods. Indeed, more 
urgent than a workable pedagogy of critical literacy, is the need for educators, 
and the communities which they serve, to engage in critical and creative 
dialogue in order to redefine the values which will best serve human flourishing 
within a sustainable environment, and to find the courage to inculcate these 
values into their children. The value of respect for cultural diversity can only be 
sustained by a commitment to the resolution of serious conflicts of interest 
through peaceful negotiation rather than destructive conflict. Thus schools need 
to impart an understanding of diverse traditions within a multicultural society 
and to espouse core values which can unite those traditions in harmonious social 
relationships. Careful selection of literary and other narrative texts for class 
study can help in achieving these aims. 
2. Critical literacy has not adequately addressed the problem of what to 
do about students who understand the demands of social justice but continue to 
exploit others. Indeed, a grasp of critical literacy might give such students 
greater power to pursue completely selfish ends. Here I think teachers can learn 
from the experience of the Philosophy for Children movement, which has 
achieved some success in drawing anti-social students into the caring 
community of inquiry which it develops in the philosophy classroom. I will say 
more of this in section 2 of this chapter. 
3. By concentrating on empowering oppressed individuals and groups, 
critical literacy runs the risk of further fragmenting our already divided society. 
The post-structuralist tendency to reduce social relationships to the exercise of 
power simply reinforces what Zohar and Marshall (1994) see as the outdated, 
mechanistic view of politics as confrontation rather than conciliation. Of course 
society is shaped by power, but it is power wielded by human beings who, in 
most cases, also possess a degree of free will and moral sense, even though their 
consciences may have been made more ego-centric by particular social 
discourses and personal experiences. As social animals humans are morally 
ambivalent, a mixture of selfishness and altruism. Hence our ethics and politics 
will be inadequate if we ignore the impulses which draw us into relationships of 
care and co-operation, focusing only on those which set us in competition 
against each other. What is needed, therefore, to support the political aims of 
critical literacy is a clear philosophy of moral and ethical education and the part 
which literacy teaching can play within it. 
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4. The social justice values which critical literacy theorists seem to 
espouse have become associated with multi-culturalism and political 
correctness, two aspects of postmodern life about which many people in 
Australia and other Western societies seem to be increasingly uneasy. This 
uneasiness has become apparent in Australia in the debates which have followed 
the statements on these matters by the recently elected, independent, right-wing 
politician, Pauline Hanson. Why is it that the mildly left-wing politics which 
established the welfare state in Australia and the UK, and which have been 
influential in the development of critical literacy, have not been successful in 
converting everyone to the value of controlled immigration and cultural 
pluralism, or of redressing entrenched injustices to aborigines and women 
through affirmative action? One answer to this question can be found in 
sociobiology. Humans evolved in small tribal and family groups which 
depended on co-operation with one another for survival, while competing for 
scarce resources with rival groups. The proliferation of neo-tribes in postmodern 
societies, which Bauman (1993) describes, can be simply explained as atavistic 
social behaviour in response to the need for survival in the social and physical 
circumstances of urban life which many individuals find increasingly 
threatening. Some of these tribes are familial, some racial, national or religious, 
and some are sub-cultural, being based on social class, gender, sexuality, or 
some other focus of identity. Often these groupings are driven by an overt sense 
of exclusion from the so-called 'mainstream'. Selected readings followed by 
discussion in the critical literacy classroom could help to make this instinctive 
behaviour more conscious and so enable students to bring rational processes to 
bear in defusing their own fears and prejudices, and in learning to understand 
and placate the fears of others. 
Another reason why many people are feeling uneasy about multi-
culturalism and political correctness is their intuition that they entail 
irreconcilable conflicts in the application of particular moral principles which 
are generally endorsed by the wider community. For example cultural pluralism 
asks individuals to tolerate others' differences which may morally offend them, 
whilst at the same time to co-operate with others in spite of these differences. 
Thus an Anglo-Saxon feminist might have to teach children of Greek migrants 
who allow their sons, but not their daughters, to participate in after-school 
activities. On the one hand, the principle of tolerance demands that she show 
respect for the customs of the migrants by supporting the children in 
maintaining good relationships with their parents, and on the other, the principle 
of gender equity demands that she expose the inequity to her students and help 
them to develop strategies for redressing it. Delicate ethical and political 
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negotiations are required if such conflicts of principle are to be resolved both in 
theory (if possible) and in practice. 
Political correctness in the form of affirmative action may, for instance, 
ask individuals to accept an apparent injustice to a well qualified job-candidate 
from a privileged social group, when the position is awarded to a slightly less 
qualified candidate from a marginalised group, such as Australian aborigines. 
Here is another perplexing ethical and political problem, one which has been 
debated passionately and extensively in the United States. James Rachels, 
(1993) in his primer of ethics, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, addresses this 
issue of 'reverse discrimination' from the perspective of his version of 
evolutionary ethics, which he calls 'Morality Without Hubris'. According to his 
account of the implications of evolutionary theory, moral philosophy must 
dispense with the old and discredited assumption that humans are essentially 
superior to other species. The primary rule of morality which Rachels applies to 
this issue is stated as follows: 
We ought to act so as to promote impartially the interests of everyone alike, 
except when individuals deserve particular responses as part of their own past 
behaviour. 
He then comments: 
This principle combines the best elements of both Utilitarianism and 
Kantian 'respect for persons,' but it is not produced simply by stitching those 
two philosophies together. Rather, it springs naturally from a consideration of 
the main facts of the human condition - that we are perishable beings with 
interests that may be promoted or frustrated, and that we are rational beings 
responsible for our conduct. (185) 
In applying this principle to the case of reverse discrimination involving a well 
qualified white American candidate from a privileged background, and a 
slightly less well qualified black American candidate from an underprivileged 
background, Rachels says the key question is: 'What accounts for the fact that 
the white [candidate] is better qualified?' (191) Thus if the white student has 
chosen to work hard at gaining his qualifications while the black student has 
chosen only the easy subjects and spent his time partying instead of working, 
then the white could justifiably complain of unfair treatment if he did not get the 
job. However, if both have worked equally hard, but the black student has had 
to contend with a more difficult social environment and poorer educational 
opportunities, and this accounts for his poorer qualifications, then there is no 
injustice to the white student in giving the black student the job. 'Natural 
advantages of birth,' says Rachels, 'are not legitimate bases of desert'. (192) 
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It is in facing such difficulties as I have described here that critical 
literacy as both principled and strategic political practice (i.e. praxis) needs the 
organising concepts, clarifications, explanations, rational justifications, and 
processes for making difficult judgements which the discourse of ethics 
provides. Furthermore, an ethical and political critical literacy will need to be 
informed by an understanding of the way different ethical theories can throw 
light on different problems, for no doubt a completely satisfactory synthesis of 
these theories lies sometime in the future, if it is possible at all. Rachels, at the 
time of writing The Elements of Moral Philosophy, expresses confidence that 
his Morality Without Hubris is a satisfactory theory, but he goes on to say, 
...it is instructive to remember that a great many thinkers have tried to devise 
such a theory, and history has judged them to have been only partially 
successful. This suggests that it would be wise not to make too grandiose a 
claim for one's own view. Moreover, as the Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit 
has observed, the earth will remain habitable for another billion years, and 
civilization is now only a few thousand years old. If we do not destroy 
ourselves, moral philosophy, along with all the other human inquiries, may yet 
have a long way to go. (192, 193) 
5. Surprisingly, critical literacy has not yet engaged extensively with two 
major issues which are associated with the ills of late capitalism: unemployment 
and the destruction of the environment. Cultural studies may be ahead of critical 
literacy here. For example Jennifer Slack and Laurie Whitt (1992) have made a 
compelling case for cultural studies theorists to analyse and critique their old 
ethical assumptions and to engage with ethics in a way which would allow them 
'to counter the oppressive forces of the New Right [in the USA] and of the well-
entrenched ecological indifference of late capitalism'. (571) The problem for 
cultural studies and critical literacy, however, is the same: they have both been 
deeply ambivalent about capitalism, for reasons which Fredric Jameson (1991) 
and James Gee (1993) have pointed out. On the one hand they have opposed 
capitalist exploitation from the perspective of various kinds of Marxism, and on 
the other they have complied with capitalism as it has been associated with 
democracy, individual freedom and the proliferation of choice. In fact, 
capitalism exploits 'choice', as it has exploited the environment, and thus post-
structuralist notions of the proliferation of interpretations and of ways of being 
can play into the hands of capitalism. 
The values of capitalism are ultimately the values of the market place. 
This may not be too bad while the market place belongs to a village where 
everyone knows everyone else and individuals have to co-operate in order to 
survive. But late capitalism is characterised by global market places and the 
extreme alienation of production and consumption both from each other and 
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from capital and its agents, which may also be alienated from one another. In 
this milieu choice itself becomes a commodity which multi-national 
corporations can market both to the so-called 'general public' and to sub-cultural 
'niches'. Thus choice is offered to consumers in the form of the hyper-market, or 
one of those suburban strips which contain a proliferation of fast-food outlets, 
all of which might be owned ultimately by the same conglomerate. This may be 
attractive to many people as long as they have the money to participate and have 
not yet realised that all the different foods have a similarly bland taste. To the 
unemployed and poor, however, the prospect of these choices which are at least 
partly denied them may be deeply galling. However, any resentment so 
generated is unlikely to be directed at the real culprits who are well isolated 
from the ghettoes where the dispossessed are forced to congregate. For it is a 
little publicised fact that capital requires a substantial pool of unemployed to 
keep the cost of labour down. The fear of unemployment and its alienating 
consequences, so evident in our society in which the social welfare state is being 
replaced by the philosophy of 'user pays', drives workers to accept work-place 
agreements in which they trade productivity increases, diminishment of working 
conditions, and various other benefits for pay rises. Thus fewer people work 
harder in poorer conditions for meagre increases in their purchasing power, 
while the growing pool of unemployed is pacified at the lowest possible price 
by 'welfare benefits', which allow them only to purchase the cheapest forms of 
mass-produced goods and entertainments. There are delicate political 
compromises to be struck here, since the pool of unemployed must not be 
allowed to reach a critical mass of discontented voters, and the cost of pacifying 
them must not exceed the ability of the employed taxpayers to afford. But, of 
course, it is not the unemployed who are allowed to have a significant voice in 
the negotiations. 
This bleak sketch is certainly a caricature of our society, especially as it 
leaves out the positive, socially constructive motives which the captains of 
capitalism also share with their fellow human beings. It is merely intended to 
represent some key trends in late capitalism. If, then, this sketch is substantially 
accurate, it is no wonder that we witness widespread calls for a return to family 
and community values - especially from right-wing groups - and a growing 
interest in bio- and business ethics, in what may yet prove to be a futile attempt 
to paste this fragmenting social 'contract' back together. A similar caricature 
could be drawn of the strategic compromises which capitalism is ultimately 
being forced to make in order to maintain the profitability of resource-based 
industries, whilst conserving their increasingly scarce or polluted resources. 
Other forces have also been mobilised in this scenario, including those of 
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environmental ethics, the green movement's political lobbyists and the more 
extreme ecological guerrillas. 
If critical literacy is to strategically deploy educational powers in the 
struggle to produce what the literacy theorist, Gunther Kress, (1994) calls 'a 
future society which offers its members the possibility of a life no less rich than 
that which we enjoy - even if in different perhaps less materialistic ways', (100) 
then it must be clear about its guiding principles and utopian dreams, as well as 
about its means of achieving them. Ethics, as I have argued, proceeds by 
peaceful and conciliatory means to establish principles and resolve conflicts. 
Most importantly, it is an enterprise predicated upon hope. Of course, ethics has 
its roots in the democratic discourse of the free men of the Athenian city-state, 
at a time when women and slaves were not considered to have a legitimate stake 
in determining the future of society. So ethics is not above being used to secure 
sectional interests. But, translated into today's more egalitarian ideal of the 
global village, ethics can be readily adapted to drawing around the negotiating 
table everyone with an interest in the outcome of its deliberations, the possessed 
and the dispossessed alike, and to attending carefully to each contribution. 
For all of the above reasons critical literacy - a literacy which might be 
seen to promote only disillusionment - should be expanded to include ethical 
literacy - a literacy, as I conceive it, capable of producing both disillusionment 
and re-enchantment. In other words, we need an educational praxis, a pedagogy, 
which renews hope through the rigorous discussion of all kinds of texts - 
especially literary ones - and which helps students to grapple with the 
complexity of living out the positive motives in their lives. There is, of course, 
nothing particularly new about the aims of such a program: traditional literature 
courses have always dealt with issues of moral value. Moreover, English 
teachers have never ceased to be in some way conscious of the power of literary 
studies to contribute to this moral and ethical agenda, since literature models 
very diverse contexts and dramatises the interaction of different voices within 
them, thereby expanding immensely the scope of the dialogue which can take 
place in the classroom. Within the constraints of schooling, critical literacy turns 
its attention to an almost bewildering variety of texts, including mass media 
productions, computer games, political speeches and so on. And the 
understanding of the nature of textuality and of social and political issues which 
we are asked to deploy is overwhelmingly more complex. Yet it would be a pity 
if the wealth of simple and more subtle literary fictions which humans have 
produced were to be squeezed out of the curriculum for the sake of a too 
narrowly political conception of the aims of education, combined with an 
overcrowded canon of texts. As Nussbaum, Siebers and others have shown, and 
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as I hope my experiment in the ethical criticism of two novellas and a novel in 
Chapter 3 has also amply demonstrated, stories continue to offer the most 
engaging and confronting prototypes of what it has meant and can mean to live 
together in the world as best we can. Time and time again writers of stories have 
given imaginative and critical expression to the philosophies and ethos of their 
age, and moral philosophers have turned to those stories for their most potent 
illustrations. Educators owe it to our children to provide an initiation into the 
riches to be enjoyed through reading, creating and discussing stories in the 
context of a fully articulated ethical and political literacy program. Of course, 
my focus on the novel is not meant to imply that discussions of aural and visual 
narratives (including television, cinematic, theatrical and multi-media dramas) 
are not capable of achieving similar aims. In recognition of the value of such 
narratives I have used a play in the next section to illustrate some salient 
teaching techniques. 
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2. Teaching critical literacy ethically 
If, as I have been proposing, an ethics founded on some synthesis of 
evolutionary, postmodern and metaphysical principles - an ethics of 
disillusionment and re-enchantment - is possible for today, how might English 
teachers act upon it? How might they construct a pedagogy of ethical and 
political literacy which is defensible in terms of this theory? As we have seen, 
Bauman (1993) and Wright (1995) are for different reasons sceptical that a 
completely coherent ethical system will ever be possible. Bauman warns us that 
even if we are confident that we have achieved a secure, universal system of 
morality, there can be terrible dangers associated with legislating for people's 
behaviour on that basis. Moreover, he points out that legislation abrogates 
individual moral responsibility and so tends to stifle the moral sense. Nor can 
philosophers argue everyone into being good: the most they can do is to make 
some kinds of conduct seem plausibly better than others. Thus Bauman 
advocates the nurture of individual conscience, although he does not propose 
how this may be achieved. Wright, however, suggests that moral and legal 
codes have a role to play in promoting human flourishing by acting as cultural 
determinants of behaviours which enhance co-operation and social stability. If, 
under the influence of evolutionary theory's revelation of the deeply selfish 
motives underlying morality, we were able to remove all internal and external 
moral sanctions, we would be dispensing with the very restraints which have 
evolved through our adaptation to our physical and social environments, and 
which have ensured our survival as a species. Thus Wright provides a 
justification for the leaders of society - legislators, teachers and parents - to 
inculcate an agreed set of social values into its citizens, especially while they are 
young and impressionable. 
Churchland (1995) supports this program with his argument for the place 
of imparting to children increasingly sophisticated moral prototypes, or 
examples, by means of stories. Zohar and Marshall (1994: 271) put their trust in 
the value of dialogue about society's aims and methods, and advance complex 
reasons in line with their quantum notions as to why it has the potential to 
change individual attitudes and behaviour and thereby begin to revolutionise 
society. Dialogue, they say, substitutes the politics of conciliation for the 
politics of confrontation. Heylighen (1994, 1995, 1996) and his collaborators in 
the Principia Cybernetica project envisage an expanding dialogue taking place 
via the internet, involving interested participants from around the globe. A key 
element of this project is the development of information-handling techniques 
which will facilitate the evolution, by a process of natural selection, of a system 
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of knowledge through which humans may successfully adapt to their changing 
environments. 
Thus an appropriate pedagogy of ethical and political literacy would be 
founded upon an epistemology in which human knowledge is seen as capable of 
evolving through a process of disillusionment and re-enchantment towards more 
accurate representations of the conditions of our lives. Such a pedagogy would 
also provide students with the tools of critical and creative inquiry, including the 
formal and informal logic of traditional philosophy, the deconstructive methods 
of post-structuralism, and the empirical processes of science. In this way many 
students would acquire the skills to question the values of their mentors on their 
own terms, and to construct new values and practices better adapted to their 
environment. Teachers will be aware that they have an immediate responsibility 
to engage with their students in such an open-ended dialogue - a dialogue about 
the ethical implications of the content and methods of their disciplines, about 
what contributes to human (and ecological) flourishing, about the moral codes 
which will help the inhabitants of our planet to live together as best we can. 
A model for such a pedagogy, I believe, can be found in the 
Philosophical Inquiry program which has been devised by Matthew Lipman 
(1982, 1985, 1991) in the USA, and promoted in Australia by Laurance Splitter 
(1995), Philip Cam, (1995) Tim Sprod (1993) and others who are members of 
the international Philosophy for Children movement. In conjunction with this 
program as it operates from grades 2-10 at The Hutchins School, Hobart, where 
I teach, dialogue in the form of whole class discussion is being promoted as 
ultimately the only ethical means of nurturing ethical understanding and moral 
conduct through the school's values education program. A detailed and well 
documented pedagogy has been developed by the above-mentioned educators 
around the notion of dialogue within a 'community of inquiry'. They explain 
how such a pedagogy avoids the excesses of indoctrination, while requiring 
students to show consideration for one another in the classroom community, and 
how it develops their understanding of, and skill in dealing with, common 
problems through 'doing' philosophy. 
Further work may be needed to develop the theory and practice of the 
community of inquiry, as it is understood in the Philosophy for Children 
movement, to respond to the challenges of post-structuralism. However, 
Philosophy for Children has been constructed by Lipman within the tradition of 
American philosophical pragmatism, which has grown up around such figures 
as Charles Peirce, John Dewey and Richard Rorty. Their versions of 
pragmatism include similarities to aspects of post-structuralism along the lines 
which I have discussed in Chapter 2.4. Furthermore, from his perspective as a 
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leading theorist of the postmodern, Jean Francois Lyotard (1992) discusses in a 
letter to a friend the nature, and some of the present difficulty, of teaching 
philosophy in high schools. He situates the aims and methods of this project 
within the history of Western philosophy from Pythagoras to postmodernity, 
and describes a commitment to open-ended questioning in the classroom which 
will be very familiar to proponents of the Philosophy for Children program. Of 
even greater significance, from my perspective, is an attempt by Philip Guin 
(1993) to supply the Philosophy for Children pedagogy with a foundation in the 
evolutionary epistemology of Karl Popper. (1979) Hence the community of 
inquiry method adopted by The Hutchins School's values education program 
provides an appropriate model for English teachers in promoting ethical literacy 
through class discussion of all kinds of texts, including literary works. 
Since 1991 I have been a member of a working party responsible for 
developing the values education syllabus which is being implemented from K-
12 by all teachers in all subjects at the school. Following our experience in 
grades 2-10 with the Philosophy for Children program, we have adopted as our 
basic teaching method Lipman's concept of the community of inquiry. In 
particular we are building on the success of the teachers of grade 6, who have 
been using the teaching materials entitled Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery: 
Philosophical Inquiry, (Lipman 1982), and the teachers of grades 7 and 8 
English, who have been using Lisa: Ethical Inquiry. (Lipman 1985) Harry lays 
the foundation for all philosophical discussion by introducing students to the 
basics of formal and informal logic. Through the student text and the activities 
contained in the teacher-support materials, teachers are able to lead their classes 
to conduct their inquiry in a more reasoned manner and to apply it to an 
extremely wide range of philosophical issues, including ethical, epistemological 
and metaphysical questions. Lisa builds on this foundation by leading students 
to inquire more deeply into ethics through raising many everyday issues for 
whole class and group discussion, and by encouraging students to give reasons 
and examples to support their views, and then to challenge one another's 
arguments in a logical way. 
We have been willing to give up time in English lessons to follow the 
Lisa program partly because it uses a specially contrived novel to both model 
and stimulate reasoned, communal inquiry among children. From an aesthetic 
point of view the novel is in fact too contrived in the way it introduces 
philosophical themes, whilst it also lacks a sufficiently compelling development 
of the plot. Thus we sometimes pause to criticise it along those lines. For 
example we have noted that the lack of a compelling plot hinders students from 
engaging imaginatively and emotionally with the moral dilemmas which face 
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the characters. These criticisms serve to raise further philosophical issues for 
discussion, such as aesthetics, hermeneutics and literary theory in general, 
revealing that ethical inquiry needs the insights of literary theory as much as 
literary theory needs the insights of ethics. In using this novel English teachers 
are provided with an example of, and a method for dealing with, the fact that 
almost every other literary text they teach also raises pertinent moral issues - 
though usually not so many in the one text, and in most cases more engagingly. 
Indeed, English teachers at Hutchins are now being encouraged to complement 
their use of the Lipman novels with philosophical discussion of literary texts 
which are more typically studied in English classes. Philip Cam (1995) in 
Thinking Together: Philosophical Inquiry for the Classroom is proving 
particularly helpful in showing teachers how to apply Lipman's methods to such 
texts. 
However, there remains an important advantage in using Lipman's 
novels - especially for Australian students reading those which are still only 
available in American versions. The very fact that the novels do not readily 
engage our students in identifying strongly with the characters and their 
dilemmas prevents these students from being too caught up in the illusion of 
reality which realist fiction frequently attempts to generate. Hence the students 
tend to move quickly from the particular circumstances in the novel which have 
given rise to the discussion of a philosophical issue to apparently more relevant 
examples in their own lives. The teacher then has the opportunity to point out to 
the class their easy movement from what they perceive as an unrealistic text to 
what they correspondingly see as their own more realistic accounts of life, and 
begin to open up post-structuralist and other questions about the nature of 
textuality which it raises. And not only should questions about realist fiction 
arise here: there are similar problems related to all kinds of verbal constructs 
from anecdotes to philosophical (e.g. ethical) theories. The challenge for the 
teacher is to make discussion and experimentation with these ideas both 
entertaining and enlightening: in fact, it may be that a too earnest (too 
committed?) approach to post-structuralist notions is the worst enemy of literary 
theory today. A grade 12 literature class, therefore, might find a suitably light-
hearted exploration of textual issues in Laurence Sterne's Tristram Shandy. 
A key element of community of inquiry methods is the development of 
the students' sense of individual responsibility for the conduct and outcomes of 
their communal inquiry, particularly in valuing the contribution of every other 
student in arriving at the highest possible level of agreement about appropriate 
beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. In this way even reluctant and anti-social 
students can be encouraged by the other students, as well as the teacher, to 
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contribute positively. Gradually the teacher is able to relinquish her role as sole 
leader of the inquiry and enter the discussion as just another participant whose 
views are equally open to question. Initially she needs to inculcate those 
procedural values and practices which facilitate open-ended inquiry, while being 
careful not to tell the students what to think about the topic under discussion. 
Later, when these practices - such as listening carefully, respecting others' right 
to speak, challenging others' views by offering counter examples and arguments 
- have been internalised by the students, the teacher can contribute her own 
opinions more strongly and expect to have them challenged. In this way she can 
put into practice Hill's (1991) notion of 'committed impartiality' which 
empowers teachers to declare their own views, while pointing out those of the 
school and others, and encouraging students to make their own informed, 
rational judgements. Students begin to develop the confidence and skill to 
challenge one another and their teachers surprisingly early in the Philosophy for 
Children program. By grade 6 this is clearly evident in many students, and so by 
grades 11 and 12, if the pedagogy has been continued, a very lively and 
productive dialogue can take place between students who are usually more 
widely informed and represent a greater variety of points of view. 
Experience has shown that teachers benefit from training in the methods 
of conducting a successful community of inquiry. Workshops are run in most 
Australian states in order to pass on the considerable expertise which 
Philosophy for Children practitioners have acquired. Now that teachers of 
English in grades 7 and 8 at The Hutchins School, together with a number of 
primary teachers, have developed some of this expertise, they are able to share it 
with the remaining members of the staff who are being asked to use it in 
teaching the ethical issues raised in and by their own subjects across the 
curriculum. First they need to find suitable materials to discuss - in other words 
texts of all kinds which deal with relevant ethical issues. Then they practise 
community of inquiry methods in faculty groups to define the issues pertinent to 
their subject and to develop their own skills of inquiry. Finally they continue 
this process with their classes. 
Among the texts suitable for promoting ethical inquiry, historical, 
biographical and fictional narratives will certainly be useful, whatever the 
subject being taught. For example senior science classes studying genetics and 
the possibilities for genetic engineering would find it stimulating to read and 
discuss Peter Goldsworthy's (1992) humorous novel, Honk if You are Jesus. 
This work raises ethical issues concerning human motives and relationships 
associated with the general practice of science, and the uses which might be 
made of cloning by means of the substitution of DNA in human embryos. 
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Goldsworthy's central example of genetic engineering is the attempt by a 
wealthy gospel preacher to have implanted in his wife an embryo that contains 
DNA from biological material which he is convinced comes from the body of 
Jesus. The use of a such a literary narrative in a science class can also help to 
break down the separation of the sciences and the humanities in higher levels of 
education, a separation which I have argued previously in this study is 
disastrous for both fields of endeavour and for society at large. Goldsworthy 
himself exemplifies the bridging of the two cultures, since he is both a general 
medical practitioner and a successful novelist. Furthermore, he has 
demonstrated an acute awareness of the wider cultural significance of both 
scientific issues and of the debates taking place among literary theorists. 67 
Critical literacy theorists and practitioners could profitably address the 
'two cultures' problem in both schools and universities, but in many cases they 
might first have to set aside their prejudices and re-educate themselves in 
scientific and mathematical discourses. The work of the science fiction novelist 
and discourse theorist, Damien Broderick, (1994) might be a good place to 
begin. As part of this project, the bringing to bear of ethical considerations on 
the application of science and technology could have beneficial results for the 
long-term survival of humanity and other species. A novel which would 
provoke useful discussion here is William Gibson's (1984) Neuromancer, which 
raises issues concerning the use of computers and virtual reality technology. 68 
Science and mathematics teachers could perhaps also use historical and 
biographical narratives as a means of teaching the history and philosophy of 
their disciplines, in order to help their students understand the nature of the truth 
claims which are made in these disciplines, and the extent to which they are 
socially, psychologically and textually constructed. Of course, all disciplines, 
including English, should include this strand in their syllabuses. 
Another major element of The Hutchins School's values education 
program is the provision of initial and on-going support for teachers in 
deepening their understanding of ethics and morality, particular moral issues, 
pedagogical methods, and how to reconcile the open-ended aims of ethics 
education with the particular religious and moral commitments of an Anglican 
school. This last question is one which in more general terms confronts all 
teachers, whether they work in state or independent schools, since all teachers 
67 As a further example of the former see Goldsworthy's (1995) novel Wish, which addresses the 
issue of animal liberation through its treatment of the language capacities of gorillas and the use 
of these animals in scientific experiments. It also employs an extraordinarily tender love scene 
between a man and a gorilla. As an example of Goldsworthy's grasp of literary theory see his 
(1989) paper, "Of Blood, Sweat, Ink, and the Death of the Novel". 
68 For a detailed discussion of the metaphysics and ethics of virtual reality see Michael Heim. 
(1993) 
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and school communities have values to which they are committed and which 
influence their teaching, often unwittingly. Hutchins already has in place its 
own policy of committed impartiality, in which the school inculcates in its 
students, through its curricular, co-curricular, pastoral care and discipline 
programs, a set of values and practices - a culture - which it hopes the students 
will carry into adult life. However, the policy also recognises that an important 
part of this culture is the habit of questioning the values and practices of which 
the culture is constituted - not in a mindlessly rebellious way, but rather through 
reasoned, communal inquiry aimed at genuine reform. In this way the tendency 
to indoctrinate students, which is only one aspect of the legitimate aims of 
education, is offset by a commitment to giving them the power to understand 
and, if they so choose, to resist such indoctrination. Indeed, in a school which 
operates like this the eccentric and transgressive students will be valued not only 
for themselves but also for the much needed challenge which they bring to the 
dominant culture. One way in which this policy of dialogue between the 
dominant culture and its dissenters can be encouraged is by introducing students 
to a variety of increasingly sophisticated literary and media texts which give 
imaginative expression to the widest possible range of alternative ways of 
living, and by conducting open-ended discussions about them in order to 
develop a more complex appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of these 
life-styles. 
Establishing such a policy at the Hutchins School did not prove very 
difficult in practice, since, from the school's foundation in 1846 by a nephew of 
Thomas Arnold, it has combined a commitment to Christian moral values with 
the humanist tradition of rational and empirical inquiry. Thus the staff have 
been generally at ease in the territory of ethics education. However, creating a 
truly open-minded ethics education together with an ethically justified program 
of moral development in both state and fundamentalist religious schools is 
potentially more difficult. In the case of state schools the long-standing policy 
of the separation of church and state has combined with more recent policies of 
multi-culturalism to create a situation in which teachers have not been allowed 
to articulate their own value positions under any circumstances, except perhaps 
to reinforce the discipline policies of the school. The fact is that no education is 
value-free, and so state education systems must grasp the nettle of re-negotiating 
their community values and of implementing both moral development and 
ethical education programs. In Catholic and more fundamentalist schools the 
problem takes a somewhat different form. Such schools have a strong and often 
clearly articulated policy of moral development related to their unashamed 
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inculcation of religious beliefs. However, in some of these schools open-ended, 
ethical debate is not so strongly encouraged. 
In both these types of schools, state and sectarian, English teachers are 
often well placed to take the lead in introducing moral and ethical education 
through the discussion of literature which itself models open-ended dialogue 
between dissenting voices. Teachers of English have thus found themselves 
articulating both 'good' and 'bad' morals which emerge in the narratives that are 
studied in class, and then opening these values up for scrutiny through 
discussion. It is my experience, too, that in fundamentalist schools teachers of 
English are more likely than teachers of other subjects to be accused by parents 
and administrators of introducing students to texts which they think might 
corrupt their children's morals, or of encouraging students to question the beliefs 
and values of the school and home. Often this is because such teachers, in spite 
of their own fundamentalist religious convictions, have also been formed by the 
dialogical tradition of the Western, humanist literary canon which they studied 
at school and university. A clearly articulated ethical and political literacy 
program might help English teachers in this situation to improve their practice 
and justify it to their detractors - although in extreme circumstances it may still 
not save their jobs. Certainly, given the philosophy of education which informs 
this study, an ethical and political literacy program would benefit students in 
these schools. 
A particularly perplexing problem which has faced values education 
theorists is that of defining learning outcomes and assessing their achievement. 
At first sight this might seem to imply that teachers should evaluate the morals 
of their students. Of course such a practice would be abhorrent. Whilst in 
various aspects of community and school life it is necessary to judge particular 
behaviours which arise from or embody particular moral values - for example in 
a court of law, or in administering a school discipline policy, or in selecting a 
suitable candidate for a job - it would not be appropriate for a teacher to pass 
judgement on a student's commitment to a value position when it is expressed in 
an assessment task. What aspects of moral and ethical learning, then, is it 
possible and legitimate to assess? Brian Hill (1995) has addressed this question 
and devised a workable approach. 69 
Hill defines values as the priorities individuals and societies attach to 
certain beliefs, experiences, and objects, in deciding how they shall live and 
what they shall treasure. He then analyses values as consisting of three 
components: a belief (or cognitive element), a feeling (or affective element), and 
69 The following summary of Hill's ideas was constructed from my notes of a lecture which he 
gave at the Philip Smith Education centre in Hobart in August 1995. 
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a commitment (or volitional element). Teachers, he says, can impart to students 
a range of capacities, but they ought not, in the end, to dictate to students their 
commitments. Thus, to take an extreme example, students can gain the capacity 
to empathise with (i.e. to understand - a cognitive operation) Hitler's motives, 
but we would not ask them to sympathise with (i.e. share his commitment to - a 
volitional operation) his policies. A commitment, Hill says, is a disposition to 
act on a belief, which is thereby constituted as a value. A commitment, then, is 
not a mere impulse. Commitments are acquired through a process of hearing, 
understanding, believing, and finally adopting the disposition to act upon that 
belief - a process, it should be noted, in which each of the stages can be acquired 
to varying degrees. It is possible and legitimate, therefore, to test the degree to 
which a student has heard, understood and believed the cognitive and affective 
elements of values education, but we should only teach towards, and hope for, 
particular commitments - we should not assess them. 
On the basis of this rationale Hill lists the following cognitive and 
affective outcomes (i.e. assessment criteria) which can be taught and assessed in 
a values education lesson in an Australian studies class: 
1. Description and transmission: e.g. the student identifies the value traditions 
and world-views which have had the most impact in the past on the evolution 
of contemporary Australian culture; describes the value system of major ethnic 
and religious groups in Australian society. 
2. Clarification: e.g. the student explains what values are and how individuals 
acquire them; explains the concepts of rights and the main themes of 
international charters of human rights; explains the leading ethical ideas in the 
Australian form of liberal democracy. 
3. Empathy: e.g. the student exhibits the capacity to empathise with the way 
members of different faiths and ethnic backgrounds see the world, and are 
motivated by their beliefs; shows ability to understand the feelings of people 
subject to political expression and various forms of discrimination. 
4. Justification: e.g. the student evaluates the strength of value-judgements in 
terms of the adequacy of the reasons underlying them; exhibits awareness of 
the values which have influenced his or her own upbringing, and a capacity to 
critically examine them. 
5. Negotiation: e.g. the student demonstrates both social and ethical skills in 
conducting values negotiation groups; exhibits the capacity to engage in non-
defensive dialogue with people of different persuasions on values issues. 
6. Participation: e.g. the student analyses issues involved in assessing needs and 
providing caring services in the community through government and voluntary 
agencies; shows ability to identify the motives of people who do and do not 
elect to participate in community helping services. (Hill, 1995) 
The application of these criteria in assessing some of the capacities which an 
ethical and political critical literacy aims to impart to students will help to 
further legitimate its role in schooling. Furthermore, the application can be 
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easily effected in the study of a literary text. For example in relation to 
Breaktime students could be asked to describe the different value traditions 
which have produced the conflicts at work in Ditto's life; explain his attitudes to 
the value of literature; demonstrate, by writing from the characters' different 
points of view, an ability to empathise with Ditto and his father; analyse and 
evaluate the reasons which Ditto gives for his difficulties with his father; 
demonstrate through role playing the meeting and reconciliation of Ditto and his 
father in which they re-negotiate their differences. Furthermore, to treat the 
novel as more problematic, students could be asked to analyse and evaluate, 
from a feminist critic's perspective, Chambers' depictions of Ditto and Helen, 
and then to role-play a fictive discussion between Chambers and his critic in 
such a way that they negotiate between their different value positions and arrive 
at an agreement. 
In order to illustrate, the teaching methods I have been advocating as applied to 
one of the vast range of literary texts which might be discussed in an ethical and 
political critical literacy class, I offer the following account of tentative 
responses to a play script which I have been teaching at grade 12 level. As with 
my discussion of Breaktime and 'Morpho Eugenia' in Chapter 3, I am following 
Harpham (1992) here in resurrecting the voice of the author in order to throw 
light on the aspects of the creation of texts, in the same way that it is possible to 
attend to the voices of readers in throwing light on the aspects of the criticism of 
texts. I also ask my students to respond to the text creatively as well as 
critically, and to reflect on both processes from an ethical perspective. 
At the beginning of Dorothy Hewett's (1981) play, The Chapel Perilous, 
the heroine, Sally Banner, refuses to bow to the altar in her school chapel. At the 
end of the play, the stage direction says that Sally, whilst visiting her school 
again as a successful author, 'straightens her back and bows to the altar'. (90) In 
the context of the portrayal of Sally's rebellious character throughout the play 
this action seems surprising, and so I asked my students to discuss what 
meanings it suggested to them; whether it seemed to them a surprising action 
and, if so, why; and whether or not they thought it was the morally right thing 
for Hewett to have Sally do. The students then considered how other characters 
in the play might explain and judge Sally's action and what attitudes might 
influence the construction they would put on it. At this point I introduced to the 
class some ideas about how differing moral judgements could be supported by 
Christian, communist and hedonistic systems of ethics, each of which could be 
associated with particular characters in the play. Next I pointed out that theatre 
directors often feel free to adapt the script in ways they consider appropriate, 
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and asked the class to create alternative conclusions to the play and to consider 
their moral implications. Here I suggested that they might also consider what 
features might characterise a contemporary feminist production. Next I 
challenged the students to try to give an account of the beliefs which had formed 
their own opinions of the conclusion. 
We had now reached a point in our exploration when it seemed 
appropriate to read Hewett's account of how she arrived at the ending given in 
the published text. Her explanation is contained in an essay entitled, 'Why Does 
Sally Bow?', reprinted in the 1981 Currency Press edition of the play. One 
advantage of this account as a teaching instrument is that it does not attempt to 
close off the proliferation of interpretations of the play. Of course, playwrights 
are accustomed to working with directors and actors who bring different 
insights to the text, and they are often willing to rewrite scenes during rehearsal; 
so there is already at work here a tradition of open-mindedness about multiple 
and conflicting readings of the text. Hewett tells her readers that she remained 
dissatisfied with the two or three separate endings she wrote for the play and 
with the different ways the directors of the first two productions had handled it. 
Then she saw a student actress put her own interpretation of Sally on the scene 
by kneeling before the altar 'not humbly but proudly, head held high'. Hewett 
describes her reaction to this: 
I saw this added business on the opening night and was, for one instant, 
outraged. How dare they make my Sally bow? Surely this made nonsense of 
her whole life? 
My outrage has since been shared by others. The innovation has 
caused more controversy than all the rest of the play put together. At seminars, 
in letters, articles, reviews and foyer conversations, I have been faced with the 
accusatory question: "Why does Sally bow?' It is asked sometimes in 
puzzlement, sometimes in anger, sometimes in disappointment. I wrestled 
with the problem. I wrestled with the problem all that night; and next morning 
I accepted the gesture, for it is a gesture, not a capitulation. It is a gesture to 
the exigencies of life. Sally finally accepts life. 'So is that all there is in the 
end,' she says, 'to accept oneself, to be finally and irrevocably responsible for 
oneself?' The answer is 'Yes!' As she pauses at the entrance of her Chapel of 
Life and Death, under her ironic self-donated stained-glass window, she 
makes a kind of peace, not with the Church, not with the State, not with 
temporal authority, but with life itself, which includes authority. 
The way that bow is given is very important. There is nothing craven 
nor defeated about it. It is an inclination of the head, a bow to the forces of life 
and death, the limitations of our own humanness, which we must all 
acknowledge. To this extent the play still remains unresolved. The conclusion 
is still ambivalent and depends greatly on the interpretation director and 
actress place upon it. Maybe this is inevitable. 
My lesson was that I had to lose myself in order to complete The 
Chapel Perilous. A work of the imagination is not autobiographical in the 
accepted sense, although it may have strong autobiographical elements. The 
central figure had to be, in the end, a created character... Sally Banner lives 
only in the play. She doesn't exist outside it. 
When I was writing The Chapel Perilous I was never conscious of it 
being a thesis play. I dislike thesis literature. Why then has it come to stand, 
for so many people, as a force for liberation? For many young women Sally 
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Banner is the first modern liberated feminist in our literature: I believe this is 
an historical and literary accident. Sally Banner came to life at a period when 
liberation and freedom began to be on the agenda, as indeed were repression 
and bigotry. She reflects her time and she appears to have passed through her 
time to become variously to others a modern day symbol, an ego-tripper of 
monstrous proportions, a boring self-advertiser, a vulgar hotpants and a 
heroine of liberation. Nobody seems to view her, as I do, with quiet, calm 
acceptance. I seem to have created some kind of female doppelganger, which 
is both humbling and irritating, because, like the albatross, I suspect she will 
always be slung around my neck. (xi, xix) 
Having read this passage, my students put their questions about it on the board 
and proceeded to discuss them in turn, according to the usual Philosophy for 
Children method of the community of inquiry. Sitting with the class in a circle, I 
took part as a community member, but where I felt students were missing 
useful points to do with ethics and literary theory, I interposed, as teacher, 
appropriate questions of my own. In this way the discussion teased out some of 
the concepts which I have touched on in this study. 
For example, it would be hard to find a clearer illustration of Harpham's 
(1993) account of the ethics of criticism and creativity: final answers to moral 
questions are not supplied by the text of the play, since it will always remain 
open to various interpretations. Instead the answers must be determined by the 
moral agents who write, direct, act, view and respond to the play. And, in Iris 
Murdoch's (1992) terms, these decisions are made in the light of our knowledge 
of 'the Good' (or goods) which we garner in the course of lives lived in the rich 
fields of bodily and cultural experience, and reflected upon in private meditation 
and public conversation. To highlight these concepts, I drew attention to the 
powerful imperatives in the third and fourth paragraphs of the passage: '...the 
forces of life and death, the limitations of our own humanness, which we must 
all acknowledge... I h ad to lose myself in order to complete The Chapel 
Perilous..., the central figure had to be, in the end, a created character...' I then 
asked the class to consider what were the grounds for their authority. Of course, 
as I have argued in this study, my view is that ultimately 'the forces of life and 
death' and 'the limitations of our own humanness' - in other words, the 
biological and physical conditions of our existence - must be recognised as 
determining in far from trivial ways the discourses which shape our lives. But I 
was not necessarily going to tell them that straight away. Finally, I set my 
students to write a short story, dramatic sketch or poem about an incident in 
Sally's life, one not recorded in the play, and to append to it a reflection on the 
ethical choices which they had to make in creating it. Then, of course, the 
process of ethical criticism began again as the students read and discussed each 
other's work, confronting in the process another ethical problem: how to judge 
one another's efforts with both justice and mercy. 
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Dialogue in a spirit of rigorous communal inquiry remains the best hope we 
have of dealing with the moral dilemmas confronting us in the postmodern 
world. It seems especially effective when it is conducted face to face, as in the 
classroom or around the international conference table, where it brings into play 
a much richer variety of signifying systems than the disembodied language of 
writing alone can provide. But this point takes us into the wider realms of 
semiotics, where it raises further interesting questions - particularly in the light 
of Derrida's famous deconstruction of Plato's privileging of speech over writing. 
These are questions which it has not been possible to explore here, except in so 
far as I have tried to resurrect the voice of the author, and his or her intention to 
communicate, in contributing to our complex deliberations about the meanings 
of literary texts. 70 I can only reiterate that the intimacy of dialogue has the 
potential to draw into the discussion the entire panoply of ways of seeking 'the 
Good' which Iris Murdoch calls upon in her encyclopaedic review of the 
Western metaphysical tradition, and which in this study I too have attempted to 
revive. Dialogue is a method which is being used extensively in our pluralist 
society by medical ethics committees, business ethics centres, 71 and countless 
agencies dedicated to resolving disputes. It is also an important method by 
which moral philosophers have attempted to construct ethical systems. 72 Of 
course, there is a great deal of work still to be done in defining an ethics, a 
theory of ethical criticism and a pedagogy of ethical and political critical 
literacy for our time. Indeed, this is a task which may never be complete: 
undoubtedly it will continue to take the form of negotiation and re-negotiation 
between dissenting voices in imaginative, rational and emotional dialogue. 
Nevertheless, there is reason to hope that humanity's ideas about how to live 
together as best we can may evolve in ways which will enable us to adapt and 
flourish in changing environments. 
In the classroom, then, our most powerfully educative and ethically 
liberating pedagogy is that dialogue which takes place between teacher and 
student, between student and student, between class and text, between text and 
70 I am not alone in this task: Susan Stanford Friedman (1991) notes that, since the death of the 
author will not serve the needs of feminism, 'where Barthes's text is an infinite web seemingly 
spinning itself, [Nancy K.] Miller insists on reintroducing the spider - as author, as subject, as 
agent, as gendered body, as producer of the text'. The image of the infinite web spinning itself 
may only be appropriate when applied to the universe as a whole - or God, if they are not one 
and the same entity. 
71 For example the St James' Ethics Centre in Sydney conducts a program of workshops, 
discussion groups and telephone counselling services to assist businesses in dealing with ethical 
issues. See their quarterly newsletter, City Ethics, GPO Box 3599, Sydney NSW 2001. 
72 See Christina Slade (1996) for a philosophical discussion of dialogue, or 'discourse 
reasoning', as a non-trivial method of 'conversing across communities' and dealing with serious 
differences without falling into more extreme forms of relativism. 
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text, and between text and context. But there is one form of dialogue which has 
been omitted from this list - perhaps the most important kind: the dialogue 
between dissenting voices which has formed the mind of the teacher, especially 
through wide reading in the 'mainstream' and the 'margins' of world literature, 
and which continues unabated in her thinking through successive 
disillusionments and re-enchantments. Only the teacher whose mind remains 
open can exemplify and instigate open-ended dialogue in the classroom. 
You can't be a philosopher (not even the teacher of philosophy) if your mind is 
made up on a question before you arrive, if in class it does not commence, if it 
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